AFRICA

IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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DE HUMANIDADES

PUEAA

Africa in the 21st Century

México, 2023

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Introduction

This book is the product of an academic effort made by different institutions in the world. It is also one of the most significant steps that UNAM has taken to open spaces for African studies in the institution. The African Colloquium was a two-day international event aiming to showcase and disseminate current research conducted by renowned academics who are devoted to studying Africa in a wide array of issues.

Each of these topics was discussed in the 8 panels of the colloquium and has a reason to find a place as a chapter in this book. It is imperative to study global history from an African perspective, not only because its own history was erased as one of the consequences of European imperialism and colonization during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. As it has been proven, German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, among other Western philosophers, played an important role in legitimizing the colonial and imperial undertakings of European powers. In his book, *Philosophy of History*, he denied African societies had a past and were trapped in a stage of eternal barbarism. Even though there has been extensive work in Western thought to deconstruct this vision of the continent, its effects are still present in the academy as well as in African states and their international relations, not to mention media and popular representations in Western countries. In this sense, it remains essential to continue studying Africa, its history and its societies within a critical perspective.

With relation to contemporary political constructions, the fact that most African nation-states only gained political independence and

international sovereignty less than 63 years ago, poses the problem of state and nation construction within the framework of globalization and the role of the state in the global economic order. Nevertheless, researchers of African politics still consider important to analyze and discuss processes of state development and the construction of a national identity in the postcolonial period during which the political systems that emerged after decolonization have faced the material and economic impact of military conquest and colonization. In fact, due to recurrent crises and the deepening of dependency relations between former colonies and metropoles since independence, postcolonial theory in social sciences has emerged as a framework to explain these phenomena in a context where neoliberal globalization has accentuated crisis scenarios with the failure of structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and the WB since the late 1970s. In this framework of persistent and generalized state crises and in some cases state failure, the new millennium has also brought hope to the continent thanks to peak economic growth rates recorded by some African countries during the first and second decades of the twenty-first century. This viewpoint is shared by Carlos Oya, Spanish researcher based at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, who delivered the colloquium's keynote conference entitled "Africa and Economics in the Twenty-First Century". Based on several countries, he discussed the opportunities and disadvantages of industrialization processes in the continent.

Another essential issue in contemporary African Studies is research focused on diaspora, mobility and transnational dynamics, both inside and outside of the continent. Since the centuries of slave traffic and even before, Africa has witnessed important human displacements originating on a regional, continental, or world basis. While it remains important to recognize and investigate the historicity of African migrations, it is imperative to analyze current flows related both to environmental challenges and economic and political factors.

As the relevance and legitimacy of the nation-state is both questioned and challenged by global economic and cultural forces, it has become crucial to develop anthropological approaches sensitive to ongoing spatial

and territorial reconfigurations at the regional and local level for a critical understanding of the dynamics occurring in the continent.

In this sense, anthropological approaches to Africa in this volume intend to study some cases as the Tuareg rebellion or the pentecostalization of social life in African states like Benin. These phenomena open new perspectives for studying the history and present of the continent through social, cultural and political practices that go beyond the orthodox and Eurocentric accounts of African historical and contemporary polities.

As for the role of arts and cultures, inasmuch as investment in these two interrelated areas is seriously taken into consideration by the academy as providers of insights to enrich theories in the social and political fields, we will be able to obtain higher or better understandings of African realities and therefore counter misperceptions and misconceptions product of Western bias and stereotypes that continue to negatively impact knowledge about the continent through distorted and colonial or imperial representations of it. In their presentation, specialists on this panel remarked the importance of continuing decolonizing knowledge by deconstructing and critically examining the Western episteme by which the African continent and its cultures have come to be known while highlighting the need for a systematic recovery of African sources, oral or written, for scientific research purposes.

Finally, another topic that has received much scholar attention in recent years and that plays an ever-greater role around theoretical and political issues concerning African Studies besides decolonization and deconstruction is the task of de-gendering the role of women in both African Studies and African political societies. Long time concealed not only by Western imperialism and colonialism but by a great number of patriarchal pre-colonial African societies, women's dynamics, collective action, and political participation are now widely recognized as local development and social forces as well as part of state government apparatuses in a large number of African countries. These are the reasons why the colloquium also enjoyed the participation of specialists centered on the issue of developing critical feminist and gender approaches in Africa and beyond.

This book attempts to give testimony of the intellectual effort undertaken by the participants at the colloquium and also tries to prove the need of deepening our understanding of Africa's political, social, and cultural problems in order to advance scientific knowledge, not only at UNAM but also at other academic institutions across Mexico, Latin America and the world. Nowadays, our university has specialists who can more than contribute to the global discussion about Africa. This is why one of the main goals of the University Program of Studies on Asia and Africa (PUEAA) is to gather these specialists in order to build cooperation and collaboration strategies that can add to the development of African studies in Mexico and abroad.

Mexico, like other Latin American countries, has a lot of historical similarities with African nations. In the twenty-first century, we are bound to start deconstructing our own fundamental knowledge about the continent in order to introduce our students into critical perspectives of the African continent that can allow them to think and study their own country or region through different lenses. In this respect, it is striking to observe and realize cultural connections and mutual influences through musical expressions and exchanges in both sides of the Atlantic. One example of this can be found in the translation of the popular Mexican song "El Rey" to Swahili, one of the most important and spoken languages of Africa.

Mexico needs to recognize the contribution of millions of Africans brought by force to America and the Caribbean during the centuries of slave trade. Our country is now home to approximately 1.2 million people of African descent who recently have been constitutionally recognized as members of the Mexican nation. This represents one of the major reasons why UNAM has engaged in developing an approach to the continent that looks forward to recognizing our African past in order to have a better understanding of ourselves.

The fulfillment of this academic activity was fundamental to the Mexican academy. The discussions held between Mexican participants and those coming from other countries will certainly have a very positive impact on African Studies research being carried out at UNAM, and

incentivize collaboration between institutions for the creation of international works. The global context needs the academy to start contributing to politics, and Mexico is the perfect example. As a Global South country, Mexico must develop and strengthen South-South links and overall co-operation to foster critical research and build bridges with other south countries and regions.

This book has ten chapters. In the first one, Wesley Marshall analyzes the idea of Africa as the continent of the future from Polanyi's standpoint. Using the author's political framework, Marshall demonstrates that Africa can change its path and become the continent of the future. With the shift in financing structure, this work talks about the possibility of a new economics that can be (both) human and nature-friendly.

For most African countries, it is urgent to change some of their political and economic policies because in many cases they possess huge natural resources whose exploitation do not benefit their populations but must face its consequences such as climate change, environmental degradation and migration flows. In his chapter, Muñoz explains many characteristics pertaining to African migration. While almost all of these flows occur in a context of generalized environmental transformation due to climate change and global warming (i.e. countries of the Sahel sub-region have faced increasing desertification since the 1970s) others stem from serious damage caused by capitalist activities like extraction and exploitation of natural resources. This is why the causes of migration have become imperative in order to both change the migration policies in host countries and change developmental and cooperation schemes that would allow rehabilitating local economies by providing employment and investment opportunities that go beyond mere extraction and exploitation activities.

However, African migrations have had an enormous impact on Europe, where they are perceived by public opinion as a political, social and cultural problem. Even though South-North migrations are statistically less significant than the movement of people at the continental level, flows coming from Africa (or other southern country) have a strong political impact on host countries where far-right nationalist parties build

their discourse and policies around migration issues. In the third chapter, José Luis Gázquez discusses how West Africa, especially the Sahelian sub-region that has historically been characterized as a free-movement and transnational space for circulation of highly diverse populations, has recently been subjected to the European Union policy of externalization of borders. These policies are built by conditioning development funds to the securitization of borders in countries of origin which in turn has resulted in an increased militarization and clandestinization of traditional migratory routes and, more importantly, they have rendered them even more dangerous making the Saharan desert an open-air graveyard, same as the Mediterranean Sea has become a submarine burial ground due to this kind of policies.

Within this context, in order to stop migration, African governments are searching for economic policies that could provide better life conditions for their citizens. In this sense, the African Union is negotiating a Free Trade Area that is analyzed by Paulina Berumen in her paper. She discusses how this new African Union Will project is an essential tool in building food security all along the continent. It is believed this initiative will boost development in different sectors of African economies. However, it will be necessary to understand how each African country will implement this agreement for the benefit of the rural sector.

The Free Trade Area is a measure for changing the prevailing economic conditions in the continent. In Alicia Giron's research, the reader can understand how the new financial flows are being directed to Africa in order to reroute investments after the crisis. This period gave Africa an essential role in the industrialized world that can be seen in the Chinese investments in the region. This investigation demonstrates that Europe, India, and China are becoming the continent's main international players, regarding it as an area of opportunity.

If it is true that the economic models imposed by Western international economic institutions to practically all African countries since the early 1980s have proven to be a failure and that a deep structural change is needed in order to revert the situation the same can be said about the conditions of women in the region and their political involvement. In this

vein, Arlin Rivas stresses the participation of women in African politics. Women continue to face structural difficulties that hinder strengthening their participation and political leadership, thus limiting their influence on decision-making and the affirmative action's to integrate a strategy aimed to underpin women's participation and empowerment in politics. She centers on Namibia, Rwanda, and South Africa to demonstrate the gap between men and women and the need for increasing women's participation in decision-making.

Women have been forgotten in African history. Therefore, it is necessary to revisit the process of decolonization in the continent. The Mau Mau was a crucial agricultural rebellion in Kenya. This historical event determines the national identity after independence. Javier Sacristán talks about the division in the political class and the structures that dictate who was a Kenyan and who was a rebel. The Mau Mau rebellion was the first step to independence in 1963, and it was until the 21st century that the Kenyan government started to rescue their memory.

Monika Meireles analyzes the changes in the bank system in Angola and Mozambique from 2000 to 2016. She explains the changes before the global crisis in 2008 and after it. It is worth remembering that according to specialists, this was one of the most significant crises; thus the compelling need for changes in the global bank system. Angola and Mozambique were not the exception, which makes this contribution essential to understand the development of this event in Africa.

The economy is intimately related to the conditions of some communities along the continent. Adriana Franco talks about the Tuareg rebellion and the political changes in Mali. The history of these people in northern Africa is about a tribe that protects their traditions against globalization and the changes in the world. The differences in social and territorial representations of the Tuareg portray them as a danger to the West, legitimizing the violence used against them.

Finally, Marco Reyes talks about the Ubuntu philosophy using the cases of Mandela's Moral Regeneration Movement and the Gacaca Courts. While it may seem that Reyes centers his attention on two specific cases, this is an illustrative example of how Africans understand their history.

To Africans, history is useful and vital, and it can be the best tool to stop violence in some communities. It is necessary for governments in Africa (and elsewhere) to adopt elements of the Ubuntu philosophy or other similar philosophies of the region (or elsewhere) that conceive human relationships as a way of managing them differently from the triumphant individualism of the West.

In this book, the reader will find outstanding contributions regarding Africa authored by academics of different countries and institutions. It is one of the first endeavors of PUEAA to trigger an understanding of Africa from the South.

PUEAA was created by UNAM's current president, Enrique Graue. It is a fundamental effort this university has undertaken to gather experts in these two regions. The program's main objective is developing a multidisciplinary group of specialists to ultimately strengthen academic ties between Mexico, Asia and Africa.

As editors of this book, we are grateful to all the collaborators of this work. We especially thank Wendy Santiago, since without her participation and support, this book would not have seen the light.

José Luis Gázquez y Javier Sacristán

I. Development from a Western Perspective: Impacts and Consequences of the Prevailing Model

Regional Cooperation or Universal Capitalism: A Polanyian View of the Rising African Continent

Wesley C. Marshall

Abstract

In 1945 Karl Polanyi published an essay entitled "Universal Capitalism or Regional Planning", which analyzes the possibilities of the coming new global order according to the "tendencies" of the major world powers' foreign policies. Polanyi correctly identified the moment as a "turning point" in world history and was in fact uncommonly prescient in describing the United States' "utopia" of restoring the 19th century liberal world order. Based on his own criteria, Polanyi also claimed that this utopia of re-establishing a global market order could never be met. Indeed, restoring the 19th-century liberal order during the past fifty years has placed tremendous strains on markets, societies and the environment, bringing humanity closer to the absolute limit that Polanyi places on such a utopian project—the survival of human civilization. In recent years, as market failures and rapidly accelerating ecological disasters prompt the worry of scholars and populations alike, Polanyi's framework becomes ever more relevant. Much like in 1945, today the world is at another turning point. Using Polanyi's analytical framework, this chapter argues for a distinct path for Africa as a continent.

Introduction

In recent years, the term anthropocene has gained prominence in describing how human activity now determines the fate of the planet and

has also become a source of debate. The title of a 2016 book (Moore) names one such debate: *Anthropocene or Capitalocene*? Under a Polanyian perspective, the term capitalocene is appropriate, as disembedded capitalism will destroy nature, humankind, and money— the three false commodities for Polanyi. As market forces have greatly outstripped their antithetical forces of social protection in recent decades, poverty has directly led to environmental disaster and overpopulation, while the militarization required for market expansion has created a vast nuclear arsenal that hangs like Damocles' sword over the head of humanity.

Proponents of the capitalocene perspective place emphasis on the turning point that humanity faces. In this chapter, we focus specifically on Africa. Accepting the capitalocene hypothesis and that the "developed world" must soon chart a different path if widespread destruction is to be avoided, this chapter argues that Africa likewise cannot follow a similar course as that of the historical "development" of the global center. This is not to say that Africa must stay poor so that the rest of the world can enjoy higher living standards. To the contrary, this is to propose another form of development different from the models of the global north, which did achieve greater material wealth for the majority of its populations, but at a high and unsustainable cost to all. The spirit of this chapter's argument is to discuss a development model that will first serve Africa's multiple national interests safeguarding the interest of human survival as a result.

Within this context, this chapter aims to discuss the many paths that lie ahead of Africa at this historical crossroads. In the global spread of capitalism, sub-Africa has always been treated as a backwater, where the interest of global corporations has traditionally focused on the export of primary goods —particularly oil— but not on the creation or control of deep national markets. In recent years, the advance of China's outward expansion has sharpened the interest of the largest global corporations to the threat of losing influence in the region. Such interest is also due to a demographic boom which projects Africa to bestow more new people than any other region in the world over the next few decades.

The destiny of what promises to be the world's largest emerging market is often framed as being determined by external forces: western

interests versus Chinese expansion. However, as we argue in this chapter, such binary debates exclude a third option that we claim better accommodates the general interests of Africa and humanity as a whole: cooperative regional self-government. Such an argument follows the intellectual guide of Karl Polanyi —here introduced in his mentioned 1945 article, with other of his ideas subsequently introduced in the chapter—, which discusses the theoretical and historical antecedents to this third option. Situated within Africa's current situation, this chapter offers several guidelines as for how it would be best followed.

Revisiting 1944 from today's perspective

Africa's position at the crossroads today is reminiscent of the crossroads in which the world found itself at the end of World War II. Two opposing sides had clearly emerged in the US bloc and the Soviet bloc, with the US bloc being simultaneously at a fork in the road. Polanyi's cited 1945 article clearly outlines the two options facing the US bloc and global capitalism, while treating the Soviet Union (USSR) as a bit of a mystery. As this chapter will assert, the role of China today is very similar to that of the USSR at the time. However, we first focus on 1944 and the intellectual battle that would lead to the "golden age" of capitalism, in which international finance was organized under the ethos of state-to-state cooperation.

In 1944 both *The Great Transformation* and *The Road to Serfdom* were published. The first convincingly makes the argument that leaving people, nature, and money to the custody of the market can only lead to their destruction— what we would understand today as ecological disaster, financial collapse, and social degradation. The second book earned Von Hayek the 1974 Nobel prize in economics for arguing that societies must submit to market forces if civilization is to be preserved. With the historical perspective of over seventy years since these books were written, the intellectual victory of Von Hayek and the restructuring of the global economy to the needs of a universal market through the process of financial globalization has meant that the possibility of

economic organization based on national general interests and effectuated through the state has been written out of existence. Today, the debate described in this chapter is all but forgotten in forums of public policy debate.

While Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* (1944) can be seen as the great counter to *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), it has never had its moment in the (public policy) sun, as Von Hayek's work did. Indeed, Von Hayek's great intellectual enemy was not Polanyi, but rather Keynes, and for good reason. Keynes was an intellectual leader of the *zeitgeist* of the time, and the belief that the war was the great enemy of humanity, and once over, the next greatest enemy—unemployment—should be tackled head on. Furthermore, it was Keynes's intellectual leadership that brought about the Bretton Woods international financial system.

The establishment of this system was an exception in the history of capitalism and was the foundation of its golden age. This system was historically novel as its the architects and governing actors were the national states rather than private banks. Under the formal gold standard or today's informal dollar standard, the globe is an international space for finance: (almost) any country can access loans from private banks in financial centers such as New York, London, or Paris. This was very much less the case under the Bretton Woods regime, under which the world was divided into national spaces of production. Finance was entrusted to national private and public banks, and fiscal (as opposed to monetary) policy was the favored tool for controlling prices and distributing national wealth. Due to the structure of the system —which ensured that banks could not profitably bet against customers— as well as adequate regulation and supervision, there were no banking crises in the Western World during the "golden age".

Today's financialized globalization, or the restoration of the universal market, had its first major victory in the de-pegging of the Dollar from gold in 1971, marking the beginning of what Noemi Klein has termed "disaster capitalism", or what one of the material authors of the de-pegging of the Dollar —Paul Volcker— has termed "controlled disintegration" (Volcker, 1978, p. 2). As the "golden age" gave way to the "the leaden age"

(in the words of Joan Robinson), and whatever we could call the most
recent age, the western world has returned to one of radical financial un-
certainty, wild price swings, and ever increasing wealth inequality.

Polanyi and Seccareccia (2016) have discussed the similarities be-
tween today's financial architecture and the gold standard. Much like the
gold standard, the structure of today's global financial system has assured
that a handful of global banks —*haute finance* in Polanyi's words— and
their vast network of market and non-market actors, can safely assure
profits for themselves and impoverish the masses. The impacts on peace,
population, and ecology have been great. If Africa is fully incorporated
into this system, humanity has little future.

Today's bank-led global financial architecture has destroyed itself
by the pervasive fraudulent practices that corrode the most essential el-
ement of banking: trust. In Polanyi's time, the *haute finance*-led order
sowed the seeds of its destruction in a different fashion. Even after the
2007-2009 crisis, conventional wisdom still holds that today's global fi-
nancial architecture is designed for stability. The centuries-old argument
that the market is the best form of pricing and distributing goods and
services and that government planning can only distort such processes
have yet to be vanquished. Nevertheless, it is certainly untrue, be it today
or a century ago:

> This Utopian conception failed in practice, as it was bound to do; and
> the gold standard was destroyed by the unemployment that it caused.
> In fact, the new methods of "foreign economy" which have superseded
> the gold standard are incomparably more effective for the purposes of
> international co-operation. With their help we are able to solve prob-
> lems which were formerly intractable. Among these are the distribution
> of raw materials, the stabilizing of prices, and even the ensuring of full
> employment in all countries (Polanyi, 1945).

With seven decades of hindsight, we can appreciate Polanyi's wisdom
and also identify the natural experiment that has occurred during the
decades since its writing.

Polanyi is correct in highlighting the very poor history of economic functionality under the "free market" prior to the Bretton Woods system. Under this system of international government planning that "superseded the gold standard", the Bretton Woods system offered an umbrella of financial stability to all countries that did not exist before and has not existed since. It is without exaggeration that we can say that the golden age was a parenthesis in the history of international planning, a break from the norm of universal capitalism, be it in the form of the open gold standard before it or the veiled US dollar standard after it. If measured by the frequency and depth of financial crises, unemployment, investment and production, the natural experiment offers conclusive proof of which system is more effective under the stated goals of both regimes.

As mentioned, the possibility for a framework of international cooperation to protect the multiple national interests from global private finance is not up for debate today. In the popularized form of academic debate, it is curious how various principles of national economic management are excluded, while others are falsely included. For example, the extremes of free market capitalism and communism are often used to frame the debate, although neither of them have —nor can— exist in modern economies. Similarly, managing an economy around the principles of protecting the general and national interest is swept aside under the pejorative narratives of populism and protectionism. In both academia and popular economics, the middle ground pragmatism of Keynes and Polanyi are either omitted or contorted beyond recognition.

As today's academic debate is not sincere, in order to analyze a third path for Africa today, we must return to the debates of yesteryear. With the benefit of more than half of a century of hindsight, it is much easier to identify the key arguments behind the policies that they spawned, and the basic considerations around which they revolve. Shedding all insincere arguments, the questions of who controls the system and to what ends become fundamental. Accepting the fact that all markets are social constructions with nothing "natural" about them, and that "laissez faire is planned" (Polanyi-Levitt, 2013, p. 150), then we are left with

considerations of mere planning and organization: what type of system is more suited to the goals proposed by which group of people.

Keynes argues against the free market order as proposed in the *The Road to Serfdom*, in the form of a personal letter to Von Hayek:

> I come finally to what is really my only serious criticism of the book. You admit here and there that it is a question of knowing where to draw the line. You agree that the line has to be drawn somewhere [between free-enterprise and planning], and that the logical extreme is not possible. But you give us no guidance whatever as to where to draw it. In a sense this is shirking the practical issue. It is true that you and I would probably draw it in different places. I should guess that according to my ideas you greatly underestimate the practicability of the middle course. But as soon as you admit that the extreme is not possible, and that a line has to be drawn, you are, on your own argument, done for since you are trying to persuade us that as soon as one moves an inch in the planned direction you are necessarily launched on the slippery path which will lead you in due course over the precipice. I should therefore conclude your theme rather differently. I should say that what we want is not no planning, or even less planning, indeed I should say that we almost certainly want more. But the planning should take place in a community in which as many people as possible, both leaders and followers, wholly share your moral position. Moderate planning will be safe if those carrying it out are rightly oriented in their own minds and hearts to the moral issue. This is in fact already true of some of them. But the curse is that there is also an important section who could almost be said to want planning not in order to enjoy its fruits but because morally they hold ideas exactly the opposite of yours, and wish to serve not God but the devil [...] (Keynes, 1944).

This quote is of importance for two reasons. First, Keynes reveals the academic dishonesty of Von Hayek by his shirking of "the practical issue" that who controls planning, governs. As Keynes understands, the neoliberal argument against government is not against all planning and regulation, but rather against governing in the general interest. Corporate planning and regulation —manifested in the gold standard of centuries

past or the dollar standard of today— are permitted and omitted by neo-liberalism. Keynes therefore takes Von Hayek's "shirking the practical issue" to its logical conclusions that planning will be done by those who "wish to serve not God but the devil."

The second important point that Keynes insists upon is morals. At the extreme ends, either "free markets" and the corporations behind them can do all the planning, according to their private interest and morals, or society can do all the planning, according to the general interest and popular morals. As Von Hayek argues in *The Road to Serfdom*, the general population can never attempt to govern the market, much less understand money, if civilization is to be preserved. Polanyi argues the contrary point: that if the "free market" is not governed by society, then it will destroy all over which it governs. As to defining the general interest, Kari Polanyi states of her father that "He finds in the writings of Rousseau support for his contention that the ultimate foundation of government must rest on that reservoir of wisdom, knowledge, tradition, and common sense of the people that is the popular culture" (Polanyi-Levitt, 2014, p. xii).

Africa's external forces

In Polanyi's times, when speaking of the USSR, he stated that "she may still prove herself a true daughter of the French Revolution" (Polanyi, 1945). The same could be said of China today; it would also appear that the new upstart to the capitalist order is the most intriguing. In a sense, this is logical. Post-revolutionary China is now a consolidated political actor, with a fairly well defined and steady character, but is still a new one, especially as compared with the US. Chinese outward projection is even more recent. Yet in another sense, there has been a great deal of misinformation regarding this expansion.

Announced at the end of 2013, the Silk Roads or officially the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of the Chinese government is a clearly expansionist program aimed solely at market expansion through the creation

of new infrastructure. Towards the end of 2019, and despite many claims to the contrary, this is largely true in both theory and practice. At the present time, it would appear that the us block's only real reaction to the Silk Roads project has been in the media. When the pink tide began to be washed out in 2014, it appeared to signal that the us was updating the Monroe Doctrine, and would not permit "populist" governments in Latin America to increase commercial and financial ties as many pink governments had done. Yet what appeared to be a proxy war in Latin America between us and Chinese interests has not materialized as of to-day, as after the ouster of many of these governments, commercial ties with China continue strong.

Throughout mainstream corporate media, a constant claim is that China is setting up debt traps for recipient companies. At this point, there is no evidence to these claims. The deals do involve debt, but they do not appear to have been made under fraudulent or coercive terms. As shown by the recent history of Latin America, more than any other region, the us has laid many debt traps under both coercive and fraudulent terms. Regarding the region as a whole, the original debt has been paid over many times; yet, it will never be paid off in full under current terms.

More recently, the conflict between Huawei and the us government has brought up another issue related to China's infrastructure expansion; its technological expansion. Throughout the world, the fifth generation (5G) of cellular network technology, very much connected to traditional infrastructure, has opened new spaces for competition and dispute. The us has accused China of using Huawei to spy on foreign actors and even in a Wall Street Journal (2019) article of using espionage in order to med-dle in local African politics. Much like in the case of foreign debt, the us would appear to be projecting its sins upon its rivals. The Obama presi-dency came into direct conflict with both the German (Financial Times, 2013) and Brazilian presidents (Reuters, 2014) for the National Security Agency's corporate espionage in the first case, and corporate and state espionage in the second. Nothing of the sort has arisen against Huawei, despite what is surely a close monitoring of the situation.

The accusations of both debt traps and espionage have at their heart the suspicion of imperialist intentions, understood as a political control over a foreign country with the extraction of resources as the primary motive. As of today, the official Chinese position that these deals are always nonpolitical and based on mutual gain—the essence of state-to-state cooperation—cannot be refuted. This could certainly change, much as the character of the US bloc could in theory.

The argument of this article is that regardless of a change in US or Chinese foreign policy towards Africa, a regional African policy would give the continent greater bargaining power. Even if China maintains a purely commercial relationship with its African partners, as Africa's trade and financial relationships with China deepen, markets will be transformed, and differences will appear, and negotiating as a block is always advantageous. If either the US or China take a more keen political interest in Africa, maintaining self-sufficiency and sovereignty become much more vital. However, the case for regional cooperation goes far beyond strategies to deal with foreign commerce and protection from more direct external threats. In all moments, a regional financial framework can assure monetary abundance and directly combat poverty and ecological degradation.

In recent decades, Latin America went further than any other region in the global south to plan and construct a regional financial architecture with these goals in mind. With the rollback of the pink tide, these initiatives have been suspended indefinitely. However, these experiences are nonetheless valuable in the African context. The Ecuadorian plan for the *Banco del Sur* envisioned a Bretton Woods system, but on a regional level. All countries would maintain their local currencies, but external trade would be carried out in a regional currency. The balancing of national currencies against the regional currency would be done through exchange rate adjustments by a regional monetary fund, and a regional development bank would finance and oversee investments in infrastructure and other priority areas. Under a regional central bank with global weight, the regional currency can be stabilized relative to more dominant

currencies, and then individual national central banks can further buffer any variance between the regional currency and the national currency.

Such a regional financial architecture could be deepened in many ways. The regional development bank can work with national and local development banks to channel loans into projects that regional, national, and local governments deem priority. Under a financial architecture that permits the pooling and coordination of regional finance, recent developments in both the theory and practice of digital currencies point to ways to align spending with public policy goals with far greater efficacy than in the past (Andresen, 2014).

Within a framework of extra-market cooperation, a wide range of opportunities also arise in which countries of the region can balance strengths against weaknesses. In recent Latin American experience, the exchange of Cuban doctors for Venezuelan oil is a prominent example. Other similar exchanges have occurred and many more are possible.

Unlike market mechanisms that hide governance issues, this type of cooperation requires openly political decisions: what the equivalency of workers for national resources should be; what the priorities of development banks ought to be; what the exchange rate between national currencies, and between them and the regional currency would be, and the same between this and international currencies, etc. As argued by Keynes and Polanyi, the guidance of local morals and cultures will have to be the basis for the exercise of political sovereignty in the context of regional cooperation.

Having the priorities of trade and markets, and of money and finance, well within the confines of local and national morals and cultures in no way guarantees that decisions will be harmonious with long-range social, political, and ecological goals. However, having these decisions made outside of these confines almost certainly guarantees that such goals will never be taken into serious consideration. Foreign capital arrives to make a profit, not to improve local conditions. The two can indeed coincide, but it is only out of coincidence and not out of an alignment of interests emanating from similar goals. Keynes offers a historically pertinent warning:

But experience is accumulating that remoteness between ownership and operation is an evil in the relations between men, likely or certain in the long run to set up strains and enmities which will bring to naught the financial calculation. I sympathise, therefore, with those who would minimise, rather than with those who would maximise, economic entanglement between nations. Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel— these are the things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily national (Keynes, 1933).

In order for such a sentiment to not define the BRI as proto colonization and condemn its fate to one creating "evil in the relations between men", we must remember that Keynes is speaking of capitalist expansion, which, as mentioned before the quote, has profit as its goal. At the current historical juncture, Chinese spending on the BRI is state to state. Profit does not need to be a goal. However, the deepening of the project will certainly open new spaces for profit that will be filled by actors led by profit.

Yet even the opening of capitalist markets between China and Africa does not make the BRI/5G inherently antagonistic to African interests. From the vantage point of a new project which could move forward in a number of directions, Galbraith's maxim that the type of system is sometimes less important than how it is run is perennially important. However, there are also many ways that Africa-China financial commercial and financial relationships can be structured. Ownership and reach of commerce are two key elements.

One the one extreme, if African markets were shaped to offer the greatest benefits for local interests, then Keynes's above quote offers wise advice. In order to minimize "economic entanglement between nations", finance would have to be primarily national. As long as the basic agreement is that African governments pay Chinese companies to build infrastructure projects better and cheaper than they could, the entanglement is relatively little. In this case, the BRI/5G would act only as an umbrella under which mutually beneficial markets interact infrastructure in its most essential terms.

With regards to the reach of commerce, Keynes recommends for
"goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possi-
ble". If the export of African goods —even if they be mostly agricultural
products— can create a wider customer base for local producers, and
if rural production can be conducted in environmentally sustainable
ways, commerce to China should only serve the general interests. If on
the other hand, the BRI only serves to flood local markets with cheaper
goods, allowing both governments and national companies to be pulled
into the orbit of the Chinese economic system as satellites, then China
could perhaps perfect the colonialist model first employed in Africa by
the Europeans, and then the Americans, by extracting the region's wealth
without a shot fired. In this case, China would have betrayed the French
Revolution in the global south and would have evolved into the latest
global superpower. If this is not the case, China will have created the first
successful south-south, state-to-state global infrastructure project that
can serve as a protective umbrella under which national economies con
flourish under conditions of financial autonomy.

Conclusions

The choices available to Africa are presented much like they are for the
rest of the world: some type of "free market" capitalism or some type
of socialism-communism. The third alternative of regional planning be-
tween mixed economies is left out of almost all policy debates. As this
chapter has argued, this third route not only makes the most sense in
theory, but in historical practice as well. Much as the international state-
to-state cooperation embodied in the Bretton Woods financial system
provided an umbrella of financial stability that allowed countries to
pursue their own goals of development and created the golden age of
capitalism, China can provide a commercial umbrella under the BRI and
a technology umbrella under 5G that would likewise allow Africa to pur-
sue local, national, and regionally determined goals. As we have argued,
a regional financial architecture is crucial for Africa under any future

scenario, and Latin America has provided several important examples of how this could operate.

If financing can be structured in order to serve the general interests of local populations and not the private interests of foreign market powers, there are multiple paths that African development can take that are harmonious with both nature and human wellbeing. Lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty does not need to rely on industrial growth as has happened in the past. Enlightened wealth creation can only happen under the conditions of political and economic sovereignty based on local culture and morals, and does not need to be at loggerheads with the environment. Indeed, aiding the environment offers a great source of meaningful employment, and with full financial sovereignty to invest in whatever local general wills see fit, there are no technical obstacles. Once freed from the paper shackles of monetary scarcity, eliminating poverty—certainly the best route to reducing population strains and the specter of war—becomes not only possible but an imperative. As the rising continent, the route that Africa takes will determine the fate of humanity.

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Environmental degradation, conflicts and human displacements in Africa

Milton Muñoz

Abstract

In addition to the high levels of poverty and sociopolitical disputes, degradation of the environment in certain African regions is influencing the generation of armed conflicts and the growth of human displacements.

The degradation of the environment, in particular desertification, is related to factors such as over-cultivation, overgrazing, deforestation and the use of inappropriate irrigation systems. This situation causes the displacement of social groups to other territories, and in some cases, beyond the borders of their States, which leads to sociopolitical and even armed conflicts that in turn originate the expulsion of population.

This paper will review the link between climate change and environmental degradation resulting in the expulsion of populations, especially in the Saharan area.

Climate change, environmental degradation, and human displacement

Climate change, which is the product of climatic alterations attributed directly or indirectly to the activities carried out by mankind that change the composition of the global atmosphere, has generated a series of harmful effects on both natural ecosystems and the environment of the socio-economic, health, and welfare systems of human beings (UN, 1992, p. 3).

This phenomenon is due to the gradual increase in global warming, mainly caused by the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation and some methods of agricultural exploitation. These human activities performed from the mid-18th century until our times have increased the volume of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide) discharged into the atmosphere (Conde, 2013, p. 17).

The average temperature of the earth's surface has increased more than 0.6 degrees Celsius since the last decades of the nineteenth century and is predicted to grow again between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees by 2100 (UNIC, 2019), which will mean shrunk polar caps, sea level rises, more intense rains and longer droughts, intensified ecosystem degradation and, of course, human displacement.

Despite the opposition of skeptics and the interests of politicians and businessmen—such as Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump—, available scientific evidence[1] shows that global warming influences the availability of natural resources, the migration of birds and some fish, a change in growth and flowering seasons of vegetation, the displacement of several species to other regions or higher latitudes, as well as changes in the abundance and composition of the communities in the ecosystems (Conde, 2013, p. 21).

The increase in tsunamis, cyclones, and droughts that climate change entails is affecting several regions of the world and jeopardizes the subsistence of millions of people forced to leave their places of origin, either to save their lives from contingencies or because land degradation prevents them from continuing with productive activities.

Human displacement due to environmental causes has been on the rise since the end of the 20th century and at the outset of the new millennium. However, in the specialized literature and among the specialized agencies of the United Nations, it is still discussed whether those who suffer from this situation should be considered migrants or environmental refugees.

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1   See the reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1990 at https://www.ipcc.ch/ar6-syr/

Migrants or environmental refugees?

The way in which processes and actors are named is essential to implement policies that call for attention; however, since the 1970s, a discussion—still unfinished—began on how people displaced owing to environmental causes should be considered. Despite not voluntarily deciding to leave their place of origin—as they are obliged due to natural disasters or the depletion of resources—they are not persecuted for "race",[2] religion, nationality reasons, political ideas or for belonging to a specific social group.

Traditionally, the international migrant has been considered as a person who freely decides to leave their country of origin for "reasons of personal convenience" and without the intervention of external factors that oblige them to do so" (IOM, 2006, p. 41). This situation allows States to determine admission or expulsion policies for foreigners, according to their own interests and without greater commitments than those concerning the protection of migrants' human rights, regardless of whether their status is regular or undocumented.

And although the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2019, p. 130) has recently reformulated the concept to underline that migrants are all persons who move outside their habitual place of residence, either within a country or through an international frontier, temporarily or permanently, and for various reasons, including environmental ones, in practice nation-states conceive of migration as an individual or collective attempt to improve social and material conditions, so they can encourage their arrival, prevent entry or make expulsions, according to their interests.

In the meantime, when the refugee figure is granted, the receiving State agrees to guarantee the safety of persons, employment, health services, housing, etc., and the beneficiary or beneficiaries cannot be taken

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2   Biologically speaking, there is only one race among humans, the only thing that changes is skin tone.

out of the country of destination, in accordance with the Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951, and its 1967 Protocol.

Due to the above, the displaced who cross borders for environmental reasons remain in limbo because international law does not recognize the figure of environmental refugees, although they are often people who a) lack the protection of their States of origin, b) are outside the borders of their countries of birth, and c) have left their homes because there are threats against their lives—in this case, as a product of natural disasters caused by climate change. The three conditions are considered to grant traditional refuge, but the last one makes reference to the existence of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political ideas and gender, as set forth in the Convention monitored by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

There have been some attempts to conceptualize people displaced for environmental reasons since the 1970s. For example, natural ecosystem analyst, Lester Brown, introduced the term environmental refugee in his book *Twenty-two Dimensions of the Population Problem*, originally published in 1976. Subsequently, Essam El Hinnawi further developed the concept in a 1985 report addressed to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP, 2017), and pointed out that environmental refugees were forced to leave their traditional habitat due to environmental disturbances—either natural or artificial—and whose existence was at risk or saw their quality of life seriously affected.

IOM, on the other hand, began working on the issue since the 1990s and as of 2007 defined migrants as environmental persons such as people or groups that "because of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their life or living conditions, are forced to leave their habitual places of residence, or decide to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and that they move within their own countries or abroad" (IOM, 2007).

None of the conceptualizations proposed so far—environmental refugee, climate refugee, or environmental migrant—are tacitly endorsed in the international legal framework, which makes it difficult to properly treat people who are forcedly displaced for climatic reasons.

Map 1. Sahel Region

Source: The Conversation.com, available at http://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569

Meanwhile, global warming continues escalating with deglaciation, irregular rainfall, and increasing droughts, making food security and population displacement part of the international scene in the decades to come, especially if one considers that 44 percent of the world's population lives within 150 kilometres from the coast (IOM, 2009, p. 15).

Some of the regions that could face most problems in the following decades as a consequence of climate change and in terms of internal and transnational human displacements are Latin America, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, being the latter analyzed below along with some future projections.

The situation in Africa and some of its most dramatic cases

The African continent is rich in cultural and territorial diversity with its tropical rainforests and the Sahara, bringing about varied realities and

situations in African countries. Contrastively, increasing deforestation, accelerated loss of animal and plant species, and rainfall patterns widely affected by climate change are hitting the continent.

Only from 1970 to 2014, Africa lost 50% of its biodiversity (wwf, 2018, p. 48) and the most impacted area is the Sahel, which is a transition ecoregion between northern Sahara and the Southern Sudanese savannah, and where the desert is expanding southward with serious consequences for several states, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. The latter country is the most populated in the region (190 million people) and suffers from the siege of the radical group Boko Haram.

In this regard, it is worthwhile noting that in several regions armed conflicts develop, 40% of which have been related to the exploitation of natural resources, from water and wood to diamonds, gold, oil, and various minerals in the last 60 years (cear, 2018, p. 4). The control of such commodities in Central and Eastern Africa finances activities of armed groups, leading to the forced displacement of millions of people.

The impacts on the environment caused by armed conflicts sharpen human displacements given the pollution generated by oil spills and chemical products when in combat, not to mention "looting of natural resources by the armed forces, desertification, hoarding of land for the occupation of military personnel or the destruction and pollution of marine and terrestrial ecosystems" (cear, 2018, p. 5).

The African continent is home to the largest number of armed conflicts in the world, 13 of 33; 7 of which are considered of high intensity (ecp, 2017, p. 15), and the control of natural resources is at the heart of the disputes. The clearest example is that of Darfur (Sudan), where rival groups fight energy sources, fertile lands, and drinking water. Similar situations are seen in areas of Libya, Chad, Somalia, South Sudan, and Egypt.

This double situation—climate change (with human actions) and numerous armed conflicts—makes the continent particularly sensitive, which also has little resilience to adapt and respond to the consequences of forced displacement.

Figure 1. People Displaced by environmental causes in the worst scenario by 2050

| Sub-Saharan Region 86 million | South Asia 40 million | Latin America 17 million |

Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank data (2018a, XV-XVII).

Conclusions and the outlook for the following years

In the world, there are around 260 million people living in places other than those of their birth (DESA, 2017), which represents just over 3 percent of the world's population. UNHCR (2019), for its part, recognizes that there are 70 million displaced people in the world due to armed conflicts and persecutions, nearly 30 million of whom are under the figure of refuge. In addition, there are about 10 million stateless persons; nevertheless, it is difficult to clearly locate those people displaced by environmental causes.

Despite the above, non-governmental organization Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDCM, 2016) estimated that only in 2015 almost 20 million new displacements were registered in 113 countries due to natural disasters.

These figures are compelling for the elaboration of public policies that allow addressing the different challenges that human mobility entails, especially in the face of what is to come, since the projections towards 2050 indicate that there will be 400 million "traditional" migrants in the world and about 143 million displaced by environmentally related causes.

The World Bank (2018a, xv-xvii) believes that by 2050, in the worst case scenario, there would be about 86 million people leaving their homes in the sub-Saharan region due to climate change, while South Asia and Latin America would experience 40 and 17 million of displaced persons each.

And while it is true that there are coastal cities in developed countries that could be affected by sea level rises, the reality indicates that the three aforementioned regions are the most susceptible to suffer the ravages of nature and the consequences of human activity (desertification, deforestation, contamination of cold mantles, lack of food) and they are also the least able to deal with a humanitarian emergency of these dimensions.

Climate change poses a great paradox: underdeveloped countries will be the most affected by it whereas the largest producers of greenhouse gases and major consumers of the planet's natural resources, that is the most developed countries, will not be as adversely harmed.

The reality facing Africa today is pressing and the future is even more complicated when considering that the continent will have an exponential population growth in the next three decades, and countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Ethiopia will be among the eight with the highest population in the world (World Bank, 2018b),[3] which will imply challenges to access natural resources and eventual internal, regional, and transcontinental human displacements.

There are many fronts that must be addressed in the short, medium and long term. To begin with, it is necessary to overcome the theoretical-legal discussion and thus have a specific international framework that contemplates rights for those people displaced due to environmental causes. Multilateral cooperation is also required to generate sustainable development in the continent, as well as the real commitment to prevent companies from continuing to exploit natural resources irrationally and at the expense of indigenous populations.

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3   The list of the most populated countries is completed by India, Pakistan and the United States.

Two more elements that are essential to avoid a catastrophic scenario in Africa are the pacification of the continent—which includes creating conditions to prevent the emergence or continuation of radical groups such as Boko Haram—and meeting the goals set in the Paris Agreement, which entered into force in 2020, seeking to prevent the temperature on the planet from continuing to rise, even despite the non-participation of countries such as the United States.

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West African Transnationalism and the Externalization of ᴇᴜ Borders

José Luis Gázquez

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to contrast how the historical free mobility of people from Sahel and West African countries in general has been undermined by migration policies adopted both by the ᴜsᴀ and the European Union during the last decades. This policy has been characterized by its coercive and restrictive impact in the free movement of people, causing high human costs in the Mediterranean Sea, the Sahara Desert or the jungle in Central America.

Since the time of the Great African Empires, the Sahara and Sahel countries in general have been transit hubs for migration flows at the continental and intercontinental level. One of the most striking examples of these historical transnational communities due to its historical depth is Islam. The presence of Islam in West Africa goes back to the 7ᵗʰ century when the continent received Islam from Arab cultures from the Middle East. For centuries, Islamic societies have been reproduced by cultural elements that cut across borders in a constitutive way. The *Ummah* is at the same time a political community and a geographical space linked together by religious belief. In contrast with the secular European nation-state introduced and imposed in the last quarter of the 19ᵗʰ century, territories under the rule of Islam neither promoted the separation of the religious and political spheres nor the centralization of power nor a sharp definition of borders determining political and cultural adscription to the nation. This favored the development of economic exchange systems such as the trans-Saharan trade system that existed before the borders imposed by European conquest and colonization but that continued to bypass them in the colonial and postcolonial periods.

Introduction

Free movement has been a prominent historical feature of the peoples and cultures of the West African sub-region instead of a space characterized by its subjection to the politics of surveillance and control of human mobility. Since the time of the Great African Empires, the Sahara and Sahel countries in general have been transit hubs for migration flows at the continental and intercontinental level. The most striking example of these historical transnational communities due to its historical depth is Islam. The presence of Islam in West Africa goes back to the 7th century when the northwestern area of the continent received Islam from Arab cultures from what today is known as the Middle East under the Western perspective. Regarding the Sub-Saharan region of the continent, the presence of Islam dates back to the 11th century when the Almoravide conquests made their way into the territory of contemporary Mali. For centuries, Islamic societies have been reproduced by cultural elements that have crossed borders in a constitutive way. The *Ummah* is at the same time a political community and a geographical space linked together by religious belief. In contrast with the secular European nation-state introduced and imposed in the last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, territories under the rule of Islam neither promoted the separation of the religious and political spheres nor the centralization of power nor a sharp definition of borders determining political and cultural adscription to the nation. This favored the development of economic exchange systems such as the trans-Saharan trade system that existed before the borders imposed by European conquest and colonization but that continued to bypass them in the colonial and postcolonial periods. In a more contemporary vein, it is possible to mention the existence of several regional IGOs such as the ECOWAS —founded in 1975 with the Lagos Treaty —that have promoted free movement of populations within a regional space comprising a number of West African States.

   The aim of this paper is to show how free mobility of citizens of Sahel or West African countries in general has been undermined by the migration policy of externalization of borders adopted by European countries

and the European Union since the last quarter of the 20th century and during the first two decades of the 21st century. This policy has been characterized by its coercive and restrictive nature, causing human catastrophes in the Mediterranean and even more so in the migrant routes across the Sahara Desert. The construction of the Sahel countries as the first (or last depending on the perspective) border of the eu is in fact the result of both the rise of xenophobia and exclusive nationalism (expressed since the 1980s in the emergence of the far-right ideology and parties all over Europe) and the push for always tighter and stronger border control regarding migrants coming from countries outside the eu.

Brief history of eu's Migration Policy

In the aftermath of World War II, Europe was demographically and territorially devastated and thus in need of importing labor from elsewhere in the continent. Colonial powers like France and Great Britain managed to stimulate flows from Africa and Asia to boost population growth and the economy while at the same time, recognized sovereignty of the new independent nation-states. In the case of France, the postwar years until 1974 were characterized by a steady growth of the economy as well as the need for migrants to fill the labor market. *Les trente glorieuses*, spanning the period between 1945-1974 were years when open borders migration policies in France and Germany were adopted following the needs of the reconstruction program and the aid received by the usa.

However, from 1974 onwards, the worldwide financial crisis ignited by the Oil Shocks in the Middle East signaled a change in the orientation of migration policies toward former colonial populations; the latter meanwhile had become politically independent units (nation-states) while remaining strongly dependent on external economic support. The changes that this crisis entailed tightened restrictive migration policies based on increased border controls and surveillance at the territorial limits of states and identity checks to "suspicious" populations (basically police harassment towards racially defined target populations). A milestone event

in the further European migration evolution towards this direction is undoubtedly the Schengen Agreement (1986) and the abolishment of internal common borders among the member countries, leading to the beginning of the external border construction process to make a distinction between those citizens who belong to the area's member states and those who aren't, as they come from third countries. It should be added that the restrictive character of migration policies adopted by European countries such as France and Germany, was fueled electorally by political parties such as the National Front that build their political discourse through constructing a negative image of immigration, especially that originating from former colonial territories. As shown by the following statement made in June 6, 1989 at the National Assembly in Paris by Prime Minister of socialist President François Mittérand, Michel Rocard, even left political parties were forced to adopt defensive positions on the issue of international migration: "Il y a, en effet, dans le monde trop de drames, de pauvreté, de famine pour que l'Europe et la France puissent accueillir tous ceux que la misère pousse vers elles…il faut résister à cette poussée constante" (Rocard, 1989).[1]

Next year, with the Schengen convention, the area constituted by its member states meant that the management of migrant population worked as if it were a single state with common visas and external borders but no internal control among them.

It is precisely the Schengen Area that has been subject to two migration crises since its implementation in 1995. The first one took place in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century when mainly West African migrants started arriving at Spanish coasts in the Canary Islands hoping to gain access to Europe. Some African countries developed a strong mobile culture among their 1980s youth with the economic crisis of postcolonial state and the lack of opportunities it has caused since then. The wish among the Senegalese youth for instance, can be grasped with the slogan *Barça am barsakh²* that equaled economic success with being able to reach Europe,

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[1] This allocution was to be recalled by public opinion in a more cynical manner: "On ne peut pas accueillir toute la misère du monde", "We cannot welcome all the misery of the world" (Deborde, 2015).

[2] Wolof: "Go to Barcelona or die"

deemed as *Eldorado* (a place to seek fortune) and as Fortress Europe. Since the 1990s, there has been a great number of shipwrecks of fishing boats being used to transport mostly young migrants to the Canaries or other insular European territories. *Cayucos, pateras* or pirogues, the ships used by African migrants to try to desperately get to the Canaries since the first decade of the millennium still can be considered an example of West African transnationalism adapted to the current global economic and political juncture. Historically, fishing has been an element that drives integration of societies and communities. However, during the last three decades, the exploitative nature of fishing practices by European industrial vessels has had a negative impact on the sustainable fishing practices of local populations who have been forced to enter informal economic networks of clandestine migration as the boats are increasingly used as transport in the dangerous journey from West African coasts to the Canary Islands.

One of the most important consequences of the escalation (or more precisely the perception of escalation) of these migratory flows since then has been the adoption of the externalization of borders strategy. These strategies are deployed both by reinforcing and supplying equipment for border surveillance (in this case the eu's southern border) and by signing bilateral agreements to contain flows at the borders of countries of transit or origin in exchange for development funds. Bilateral agreements between individual countries also follow the logic of externalization of borders (for example, Spain-Senegal agreements of 2005) and in practice they have consisted of expulsion agreements.

We can number some consequences of this way of handling the issue of increased migration coming from countries and regions that are not members of the eu, such as the growth in the numbers of repatriation and expulsion procedures not respecting the human rights of migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers, or the criminalization of migrants and radicalization of nationalist discourses built on an alleged disruptive or negative effect these flows may have on local identities and societies.

Ten years later, the solution for the refugee's crisis provoked by the Syrian conflict in the Middle East was basically the same though at another scale. It consisted of displacement and reinforcing the European

border at its eastern limits by providing funds to the Turkish government in order to contain migrants in its territory.

Undoubtedly, the most tragic consequence of this kind of migration policy is the clandestinization of informal networks that provide transportation services to people without the documentation required for international travelling and the criminalization of humanitarian NGOs (*Open Arms*) that try to provide relief to people in danger on board this kind of vessels. This in turn has made out of the Mediterranean Sea a submarine graveyard for all the boats that have shipwrecked without being rescued. Another actor worth mentioning in the framework of these migration crises is Frontex or the *European Border and Coast Guard Agency*. Established in 2005 in Warsaw, this EU agency was created to watch the Schengen Area in coordination with border coast guards of member states. Since its creation, Frontex has been a major actor policing the external borders of the EU and a major recipient of funds for doing so. While the main goal of this kind of border control agencies has been the deterring effect they could have in dissuading future migrants, the result has been the opening of new routes that entail more dangers to its users.

South-North, South-South migrations

At this point and for the purposes of this paper, it is worth mentioning that the menacing perception of migrations that European societies have of the phenomenon are also built on several misperceptions about it. First of all, South-North migrations are not as overwhelming as media and far-right politicians' rhetoric affirm. In fact, as the World Bank's statistics indicate, only 26% out of a total of 23.2 million migrants live in OECD countries and 88.4% of West African migrants live in countries of the same region (Puig 2018, p. 3). This data in fact denies the racist/paternalist discourses about "landslides", "waves", "invasion" of migrants and refugees coming to Europe. There are not millions of people waiting to get to Europe. In fact, as several authors have shown, presenting migration as an "irrational or desperate" act helps to justify the nation-states' obsession with border control (Calavita, 2005; Doty,

2003). It is worth highlighting that prior to the Schengen Agreement in the mid-1980s, African migration to Mediterranean countries such as Spain or Italy—that in the last half century were countries of departure of labor migration—was neither perceived as a political nor social issue. While African migrants had no rights, they were not subject to legal discrimination and therefore were not considered irregulars or illegals. That did not mean that they enjoyed any benefits linked to the status of citizenship or that they were not exploited in the black labor market of the burgeoning southern Mediterranean economies of Italy and Spain during the 1980s and 1990s. Within the framework of Schengen, the twin categories of legal and illegal migrants were implemented at the regional level by the signatory countries to deal with flows stemming from non-member states.

Latest developments of eu Migration policy: The importance of Niger

But even if this characterization of migrations from African and Middle East countries is based on false myths about the negative economic and identitarian impact migration has on national identity and economies, it works both for maintaining an economic and political order based on a framework that links security and development concerns of poor countries together in order to justify assistentialism and international intervention through Development and Humanitarian ngos, while justifying and legitimizing a defensive stance toward migration and an aggressive posture towards migrants in host countries. It is on this basis, where poor countries are seen as a source of international insecurity, that externalization strategies are deployed linking security and development issues together.

It is in this context that the geo-strategic importance of Niger lies. Three quarters of its territory are located in the Sahara Desert. It belongs to the sub-region of the Sahel, which means "border" or "frontier" in Arabic. As the Soninke fishermen link for instance several societies in the western coast of Africa, or as the displacement of other ethnical or religious societies during slave traffic and commerce times, the Sahara Desert has also been more of a crossroads, a historical intersection, a transit distributer of

people and cultures for centuries despite characterizations made of it as an impenetrable barrier of desolation and hostility. In 2018, Niger was ranked as the poorest country of the world occupying the last position in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2018, p. 25), and 45% of its population lives under the international threshold of poverty established at USD 1.90/day. While it could be argued that this economic and social postcolonial development is the result of a number of factors and actors such as the extractive nature of colonialism and capitalist firms searching to gain access to strategic resources such as uranium, the latest issue surrounding the security of this country and others in the region is the securitization of migratory flows crossing through the desert trying to get to the Mediterranean Sea and then to Europe.

However, since 2015, after the EU's summit held in Malta for stopping or taming the number of arrivals, the geostrategic importance of Niger has increased, particularly the city of Agadez, a historical example of the social and cultural work connections in desert regions as is the case of Sahara and Sahel countries. After the Malta summit, this feature of the city was recognized by Federica Mogherini—High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission—when she stated the following: "We have agreed to reinforce our presence in Niger because 90% of the migrants from West Africa pass through this country. Only by working with the countries of origin and transit will we succeed in facing the causes of migration". EU ambassador in Congo-Brazaville, Raul Mateus, estimates that Niger was in 2016 the first recipient of European aid *per capita* and its government received enormous amounts of money to act as the policeman of the movement of people in the Sahel. Since the Malta summit, the government of Mahamadou Issoufu has received €610 million from the EU and European countries such as Germany, France, Italy or Spain. Of the €1,800 million of European aid for Africa, only 30 million were destined to fight against poverty in Niger (Puig, 2018).

As it has been stated, the West African sub-region has been historically characterized by its mobile cultures that do not attach the same importance to borders delineating territories where a sovereign central authority governs. With the process of European colonization of the continent during the 19th century and with the creation and introduction of international

borders and jurisdiction (mainly international recognition of sovereign independent states) that were to remain after political independence, West African societies of the Sahel sub-region remained highly mobile and transnational connections were very common within and across countries. As late as the second decade of the 21st century, it is possible to argue that transnationalism among societies of West African Sahel states was fostered by technological evolutions such as cell phones and GPS systems. It should be added that Europe was not even the main destination of migrants for decades. Opportunities existed in other African countries such as Libya under Qaddafi's dictatorial regime that deemed as desirable a destination as European countries. Hausa's popular saying among young people during the 1990s is a proof of this: "Libya kaman turai"[3] (Puig, 2018).

However, the two migratory crises the eu has experienced over the last two decades, the rising importance of the definition and securitization of its external southern borders, and the fall of Qaddafi's regime are all factors of how the desert region of the Sahel, and more precisely Niger, has become the first international European *de facto* border, the country responsible for the externalization of the southern border of the eu.

Between 2014 and 2017, the iom estimated that more than 14,000 people died in the Mediterranean Sea. Many of them first crossed the Sahara Desert in dire conditions facing extreme temperatures, constant dangers, overcrowding situations, abandonment and death. Until now, there are no official statistics about disappearances in the desert but it is estimated that the Sahara has become an open-air graveyard of many migrants (Puig, 2018). As stated before, many of them had the Maghreb countries as their destination, so it is misleading to think that all migrants had the European countries as their primary destination. However, due to the provision of funds, Niger has implemented a series of measures for the securitization of migration at its borders. In 2017, the iom reported a decrease in the number of migrants in transit from Niger of more than 100%. The following are some of the consequences.

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3   Hausa: Libya like Europe.

Consequences of border externalization politics

Migrations do not stop. The persistence of this phenomenon that takes place not only in the context of African-European migrations but also in other regions of the world is a proof of this despite multiple restrictions imposed by externalization policies adopted by the EU to manage human mobility from African countries. Numbers are overestimated because migrants escape controls and are forced to assume bigger risks. Some of the concrete measures of the securitization of the migratory process in Niger include the arbitrary confiscation of vehicles and indiscriminate arrests constituting violations of the free movement protocols such as those of ECOWAS and UEMOA.

Another consequence of the politics of externalization is the increased militarization and blocking of traditional transnational routes. At this point, it is important to mention that the whole process of securitization of migrations in the Sahel occurs against the background of an increased insecurity and activity of non-state military actors operating in the desert setting. The spread of radical and violent *jihadism* is also an element to take into consideration since the fall of Qaddafi in Libya, and since the conflict and the *de facto* collapse of the Malian state in 2012. The proliferation of this kind of military actors has in turn amounted to a more authoritarian approach to control the movement of populations wishing to have the opportunity for crossing the Mediterranean and arrive in some European country. EUCAP Sahel, a mission with a budget of €63.4 million, advises and trains Nigerien authorities on security issues such as terrorism, organized crime, and, since 2016 on the elaboration of techniques and procedures for controlling and better fighting against irregular migration. One of the techniques that seriously disrupt the mobile capacity of populations is the occupation of water wells in the desert routes, which in turn makes them take more dangerous alternative routes. In sum, the securitization of the European southern border through its externalization and deployment in transit countries has unchained increased illegalization, criminalization, and clandestinization of all kinds of mobility in Niger, even the traditional kinds, with economic local actors making a living out of transporting people to international borders without crossing them.

Last but not least, the increased militarization of migrations under the guise of development aid has not been a successful mechanism to break the relationship between insecurity and poverty and flagrant violations of human rights.

As some studies and journalistic chronicles have shown, there is a growing proportion of African migrants in the number of overall migrants trying to cross the Mexican southern border in order to continue towards the northern border and ultimately the usa. In contrast with the situation of Central American migrants, Africans are in a more vulnerable condition because some of them come from countries that do not have diplomatic representation in Mexico. This is only one of the multiple legal problems African migrants must face in Mexico during their transit to the usa, having to deal with a hostile and xenophobic environment toward migrations. In the context of usa-Mexico relations, the latter's southern border with Central America has become also the *de facto* southern usa border with Latin America. However, the politics of externalization is not exchanged for development aid but rather imposed by menacing the Mexican government to contain migration at its southern border in order to avoid a rise on tariffs and trade if it fails to do so.

Border regimes and practices

As Komarova and Hayward assert, "border regimes demonstrate the diffuse operation of borders as networked systems of rules that regulate behavior and are activated by the mobility of people and things at a variety of scales" (2019, p. 542). As for Berg and Ehin, (2006, p. 55) they identify three basic dimensions of a border regime: functions, governance and openness/closure. Another important aspect to point out about the border regime of externalization by the eu is that while it centers on regulating behavior at the borders, this kind of regimes are also rooted in the capacity to control behavior away from the borderline.

What Achille Mbembe calls "bodies as borders" and technology of surveillance capitalism at the service of restrictive migration policies can

actually be considered a border practice, that is, the process by which certain bodies are marked as having rights for unfettered mobility while others are marked, identified, and destined to immobility or forced displacement. The digitalization of DNA data eventually inscribes the border in the bodies of migrants even before boarding a plane that crosses international boundaries. This kind of procedures of profiling certain candidates to migrate is becoming one of the central features of the way migratory movements are being governed globally. Here, technology plays a pivotal role as it is put at the service of the strategy of externalization of borders even in the home country of future migrants.

This feature of the contemporary migrations regime is only one of the proofs of how global inequalities in mobility are being built based on nationality. As Wihtol de Wenden (2017, p. 169) states, " the border regime is different according to nationality and the chosen migratory direction, from North to North (same rights), from North to South (easy entry but limitation of certain rights like access to nationality in many cases), from South to South (easy entry but few rights) and from South to North (difficult entry but progressive access to the same rights as nationals depending on the length of stay)".

Clearly, one of the main advantages of a migration policy based on externalization of borders is that it happens far away from the scrutiny of societies comprising the EU, in exception zones where human rights are not respected. In fact, as some authors have shown, the more guarded a border is, the more it is profitable for human trafficking criminal organizations and mafias to operate.

Together with digitalization and management of biometric data at the service of policing the profile and identity of populations, contemporary migrations and security regimes require the use of other type of technology for tracking or sensing movement such as ground sensors, radars, thermal imaging, drones, etc. Here as well it is possible to observe how military technology has been put to work to govern and manage population movements, enhancing the free movement of certain populations using data-gathering and classification systems while disrupting or hindering that of other kinds of people.

Conclusion

Conditioning international aid for development to the adoption of these kinds of migration policies has favored the strengthening of mafias and human traffickers and even terrorist networks they are supposed to fight.

In a world where the capacity to survive has become intrinsically associated with the capacity to move, both the politics of externalization of borders and borderization of bodies compartmentalize and segment people's identities, obstructing historic connections created by mobile and transnational cultures. One of the biggest paradoxes of the African continent in terms of the mobility of its societies and populations is that what used to be traditional, transnational spaces like West Africa through historical political systems and networks, now face the reality imposed by the 19th century European colonialism and its more perdurable legacy: the international territorial border. The African state system consists of 54 independent states which amount to 216 international borders considering the northern, southern, eastern, and western territorial limits of each nation-state.

The politics of externalization of borders and its concrete practices clearly are a phenomenon that deserves much more scholar, media, and political attention as the process by which the dynamics of externalization of borders are spread among nations and populations of the South.

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II. Regional Integration, Cooperation and Changes in Economy Throughout Modern History

Agriculture and Food Security in the Context of Continental Cooperation in Africa. Policies and Challenges for the African Continental Free Trade Area

Paulina Berumen

Abstract

The recent rethinking of the economic and commercial dynamics in Africa to promote an increased dynamics of economic and commercial development on an intracontinental level supposes evaluating the economic and developmental capacity of the agricultural, commercial and self-sufficiency sectors with regard to the African proposal of African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a priority axis of this initiative. What is the current condition of the agricultural sector and food security within the continent? Does the current perspective set out by public policies on agriculture and food security on national and sub-regional levels contribute to boosting agricultural production and commercialization in the continent? How can agriculture make an impact on continental food security under AfCFTA? What are the challenges of AfCFTA facing a proposal for agricultural development and fighting food insecurity? This paper seeks to present the main actors and sectors of this field, the policies and challenges that agriculture represents within this intracontinental cooperation agreement, and evaluate its contribution in terms of food security.

Introduction

The current continental economic and commercial agenda in Africa has as its priority developing the economy through intracontinental trade to

strengthen economic dynamics, benefiting infrastructure, industry and commercial exchanges, labor, and education.

This continental agenda is anchored in the objectives of the newly created African Continental Free Trade Area, which intertwines its objectives with the agendas of the sub-regional trade organizations of the continent.

Although this economic and commercial initiative is presented as a mechanism that will boost development in different sectors of the African continent's economy, it also raises questions about central aspects for its development, including the agriculture and food security sectors, which are closely linked to the field of rural development and which are cross-cutting axes of any proposal for development.

One of the challenges in the AFCFTA agenda is to make the dynamization of intra-continental trade converge with the development of the farming sector while strengthening food security, sectors closely linked by a rural population that depends on agricultural economy, be it small or medium scale. Thus, we can ask ourselves, what is the proposal in rural development policy, agricultural production, and food security in this first stage of launching AFCFTA?

In an attempt to provide elements that can reply to such a question, this paper will briefly present the collaborative dynamics of the countries in the continent, such as the regional cooperation and integration strategy as an articulating mechanism of the recent initiative on a commercial order and the role that both agriculture and food security have in these sub-regional economic organizations based on the objectives of AFCFTA.

Sub-regional cooperation: an economic strategy of independent life

The tradition of the African continent in regional cooperation sought to meet the demands of decolonization economic policies and the apartheid system—in force until 1994 in South Africa—as well as the economic policies of independent life against the world market. (Ochozias, 2013, p. 48). Meanwhile, with regards to political interest, in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was born, among other things, as an international

projection platform for newly independent countries (Azamiou, 2016, p. 47). In the economic arena, the challenges of independent life were transferred to the practice of regionalism which followed the Pan-Africanist ideal based on the aspiration of shared values, collective autonomy for development, and economic independence (Ochozias, 2013, p. 49), and now, within the framework of the consolidation of independence, of guiding principles of the continent's current Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Regional Economic Communities

Since 1960, and in the first two decades of the 21st century, regional cooperation and integration initiatives have created eight sub-regional organizations recognized by the African Union that promote economic and commercial matters: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENS-SAD), Common Market for Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA).

The evolution of each organization results from their regional objectives, their flexibility to change and respond more effectively to the changing international commercial demand considering their regional economic advantages, to the need to cope with the international market—to which their raw materials are mainly aimed—and the objective of seeing in cooperation and integration strategies a continental mechanism to develop some sectors. In that sense, AFCFTA, as the commercial proposal for continental integration, considers that:

> "Regional integration is about getting things moving freely across the whole of Africa. This means getting goods to move more easily across borders; transport, energy and telecommunications to connect more people across more boundaries; people to move more freely across frontiers, and capital and production to move and grow beyond national limits" (Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2016, p. 3).

Map 1. Regional Economic Communities

CEN-SAD
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cabo Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt
Eritrea
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
São Tomé and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Togo
Tunisia

COMESA
Burundi
Comoros
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djibouti
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Rwanda
Seychelles
Sudan
Swaziland
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

EAC
Burundi
Kenya
Rwanda
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania

ECCAS
Angola
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Rwanda
São Tomé and Principe

ECOWAS
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cabo Verde
Côte d'Ivoire
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo

IGAD
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Somalia
South Sudan
Sudan
Uganda

SADC
Angola
Botswana
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Seychelles
South Africa
Swaziland
United Republic of Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe

UMA
Algeria
Libya
Mauritania
Morocco
Tunisia

Legend: CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, UMA

Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Tomé and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Source: Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, p. 13.

This objective reinforces the continental need to break the distinctive cycle of African economies during their independent life: extraverted development, which favors the extraction of raw materials under explicit demand

from developed economies by offering prices well below their value and the value of human labor of women, men and children in Africa. This system has put African countries in a situation where their raw materials and agricultural products (coffee, cocoa, tea, banana, to name a few) are not only extracted but looted, specifically marked by the relations between the countries of the African continent and the so-called ex-metropolis, today gathered in the European Union (EU). Decades under this African continental economic system of trade with the EU gave way to privileged relations with the ex-metropolis. These relations were based on various agreements starting with the Yaoundé Conventions (1964-1969, 1969-1975) aiming to provide Europe with raw materials, then followed by the Lomé Conventions (1975-2000) seeking to change the productive priorities of the continent from industrial development to agricultural work (Moreno, 2019, p. 16), and finally the imposition of Structural Adjustment policies on African countries to reduce spending on rural development and agricultural production, affecting food security and continental commercial dynamics. In addition, the World Trade Organization (WTO) policies of 1995, under the scope of the new multilateral relations, marked the direction of world and African trade on the intracontinental level and beyond. As Chang points out, all these polices from New Conventional Wisdom (Washington Consensus) "have produced very poor outcomes in most countries in terms of growth, equality, stability and poverty" (Chang, 2012, p. 6).

For their part, proposals for economic development from Africa were expressed in the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (1980), and strategies such as the Abuja Treaty (1991) reformulated and promoted RECs in order to strengthen regional integration (Békolo-Ebé, 2001, p. 84) with a view to a future continental integration, which has translated into today's AfCFTA.

Thus, in less than 60 years—coupled with the process of access to independent life—African economies have gone through swift processes that seek to adapt or meet international financial, economic and commercial requirements, in many cases resulting in a neglect of local socio-economic and commercial needs. In that context, the effectiveness and contribution of RECs to regional and continental development have been continually questioned

given the participation of the states in more than one of these sub-regional organization initiatives, being interpreted as one of the weaknesses of RECs and as a series of political situations that violate the security and development of the peoples of Africa. Under these current circumstances, the level of effectiveness of these economic communities is measured by the Africa Regional Integration Index "which aims to be an accessible, comprehensive, practical and results-focused regional integration tool that focuses on the policy level and on-the-ground-realities", (UNECA, 2016, p. 12). The index aims to measure five socioeconomic dimensions and sixteen indicators. The five dimensions are: trade integration, regional infrastructure, productive integration, free movement of people, and financial and macroeconomic integration (UNECA, 2016, p. 11).

The table shown below presents the average performance (from 0 to 1) of each REC (2016) under these five dimensions.

Table 1. Average performance under the five dimensions

Dimension / REC	Trade integration	Regional infrastructure	Productive integration	Free movement of people	Financial and macroeconomic integration
CEN-SAD	0.353	0.251	0.247	0.479	0.524
COMESA	0.572	0.439	0.452	0.268	0.343
EAC	0.780	0.496	0.553	0.715	0.156
ECCAS	0.526	0.451	0.293	0.400	0.599
ECOWAS	0.442	0.426	0.265	0.800	0.611
IGAD	0.505	0.630	0.434	0.454	0.221
SADC	0.508	0.502	0.350	0.530	0.397
UMA	0.631	0.491	0.481	0.493	0.199
Average of eight RECs	0.540	0.461	0.383	0517	0.381

Source: Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, p. 16.

According to the Africa Regional Integration Index (UNECA, 2016, p. 16), the results of the eight sub-regional organizations in the five measurements

are variable and, to a large extent, this is related to the heterogeneity of the national economies participating in each REC. CEN-SAD presents its highest performance average in financial and macroeconomic integration; given the nature of its customs barrier elimination policies, COMESA and EAC's highest advance is in trade integration; ECCAS holds a high average in financial and macroeconomic integration followed by trade integration; ECOWAS has very representative averages in several sectors but its free movement of people policies place it, with respect to the other RECs, at a very high average in such a field, followed by financial and macroeconomic integration and very closely to trade integration and regional infrastructure. These results present ECOWAS as the sub-regional organization that maintains a balance in the performance of the five dimensions, except for productive integration, which is below average. On the other hand, IGAD shows an above the average performance in regional infrastructure followed by trade integration; and SADC presents a balanced activity in the free movement of people, trade integration and regional infrastructure sectors. With regard to UMA, its best performance is in trade integration (above average) and in the free movement of people, regional infrastructure, and productive integration.

At the continental level—as also shown at the end of the table—after summing the performance of RECs in all five dimensions, the free movement of people reveals a very positive progress, strongly influenced by the good performance of ECOWAS and SADC, regions made up of fifteen countries each. In this regard, it is also worth noting that ECOWAS has the most populous country on the continent, Nigeria, with almost 200 million people. In addition, Nigeria together with South Africa are the two economically representative countries of ECOWAS and SADC, respectively. Due to these characteristics, both become poles of economic reference and migratory attraction, generating significant human displacements at the intra-regional and intra-continental levels.

Despite the advances measured in these RECs, analyses by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) estimate that the raw material export system currently yields only an intra-African trade of between 14 and 16%. This translates into two major items in continental trade: exports to outside Africa with non-extractive exports and extractive

exports accounting for 24% and 76% each; and exports within Africa, where non-extractive exports represent 61% and extractive exports amount to 39% (UNECA, 2018, pp. 2-3).

This shows that the free trade dimension index has favored policies that expedite the elimination of customs barriers between the countries within the RECs—hence the need to incorporate countries belonging to other RECs to privilege customs policies that expedite the export of raw materials from the sub-regions first and from the continent later. However, this has not promoted a dynamic and expansive production and consumption trade that articulates the advantages of the RECs to meet the continent's needs and, above all, that does not make it dependent on the import of products, particularly foodstuffs. In this sense, one of the areas visibly affected by this commercial strategy is agricultural production and its imminent impact on food security.

This dependence on food has had very marked moments throughout the independent life of African countries. A clear example is the impact of Structural Adjustment, which, by reducing international financial aid, quickly led African countries to importing agricultural products (Békolo-Ebé, 2001, p. 87). For its part, the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 triggered a rise in food prices in the long term. Other aspects associated with "poor performance of agriculture" are related with structural and technological constraints, unfavorable external economic environment, and inappropriate policy and institutional frameworks (Chang, 2012, p. 2), with climate change testing people's resilience every time. These crises have also revealed the still insufficient response from regional mechanisms or national policies to cope with these situations that result in the impossibility of having sufficient and permanent access to food, the loss of crops and food production modes, and small or medium scale economic self-sufficiency—agriculture, poultry farming, aquaculture, livestock among others. All this has prompted, among other things, difficulties in resuming and recovering productive life regardless of the sector and scale, combined with other complications such as access to medical services, the restoration of public services, and the normalization of educational, labor, institutional and bureaucratic activities, to name a few.

Development

Initiative and creation of AfCFTA

As a result of the above, the commitment towards a continental trade agreement becomes a necessary initiative devised as a mechanism that drives and accelerates the way in which basic food products are a tangible reality for Africans in "ordinary" times and, of course, under unprecedented and urging circumstances.

Based on the eight RECs and their performance in the five socio-economic categories mentioned above, the creation of AfCFTA is also supported as a strategy to transform the way trade is usually undertaken in the continent. This would reflect as a transition from mobilizing nearly 16% of trade within the continent to 52.3% of intra-continental trade "by eliminating import duties" due to tariffs that favor trade outside of Africa much more than within. In that sense, this new development strategy of the African Union places the RECs as the pillars of a more inclusive and strengthened proposal in its historic regional integration model, leaning towards a greater positive commercial impact within the continent. AfCFTA, for its part, can be "a flagship Project of Agenda 2063 of the African Union" (UNECA, 2018, p. 4), projecting itself as the scaffolding of the eight sub-regional economic organizations and expanding the spectrum of its continental activity, as "consolidating this continent into one trade area provides great opportunities for trading companies, businesses and consumers across Africa, and the chance to support sustainable development in the world's least developed region" (UNECA, 2018, p. 1).

Other aspects lying behind the creation of AfCFTA are the projections showing it will have an African market of 1.2 billion people, calculating a gross domestic product of 2.5 trillion dollars in all of the 55 countries in the continent, and the demographic factor, estimating that the continental population will reach 2.5 billion by 2050, thus contributing to an available labor force and an important consumer market (African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC)-Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 2018, p. 1). However, the demographic factor that can be seen as a "demographic bonus" or

"favorable human resource" also involves a series of challenges for national governments and sub-regional organizations: food security, education, employment, housing services, infrastructure, and transport. Nevertheless, the African Union (AU) seems to be anticipating these needs by promoting the creation of AfCFTA as a mechanism that articulates national policies, and those policies of sub-regional and continental order as well. The needs of access to food in many regions of the continent are an immediate matter to address and a right to guarantee. In tune with this process, the AU has committed to the United Nations 2030 Agenda to advance and comply with the Sustainable Development Goals: decent work and economic growth, the development of industry, food security, and affordable access to health services (African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC)-Economic Commission for Africa, 2018, p. 5), which are intertwined with the need to address the current food (in)security situation in the continent.

The state of food security in Africa, 2018: growing undernourishment

The African continent, as diverse and vast as it is with its 55 countries, does not present a homogeneous map in the way its population accesses food. The UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2018 Food Security and Nutrition in the World report highlights the difficulties of people around the world to eat properly, with special emphasis on one of the aspects of food insecurity: the prevalence of undernourishment in 21% of the population in Africa, that is, 256 million people of Africa's total population (1,400 million) by 2019, being followed by Asia with 11% (FAO, 2018, pp. 2-3).

At present, food insecurity is no longer expressed exclusively as a situation of "hunger". The FAO report (2018), shows that the state of food insecurity is manifested in undernourishment, understood as severe food deprivation. In other words, "in poor countries, a fall in food consumption below the minimum level even for a year or two may have serious irreversible negative consequences for long-term productivity of many people due to irreversible falls in nutrition and, for children, education" (Chang, 2012, p. 9).

The report underlines the particular situation in sub-Saharan Africa, a region where one out of five people has been chronically deprived of food in 2017 (FAO, 2018, p. 3). The reasons are well known: climate change issues—droughts, cyclone flooding—, rising food prices, insufficient inputs, or difficulties in accessing economic means to produce or access their food, and the demographic growth trend are some of the most obvious causes, in addition to political instability or different types of conflict and forced intra-regional displacement and refuge.

Due to the onslaughts of nature, human conflicts and basic food trade, people experience a permanent state of vulnerability. The question is how to articulate the policies of these areas so that they converge on a multi-sector and multi-level government model, favoring specific policies, though joining them to others that by nature relate and assume a multi-sector dimension. This articulation is one of AfCFTA's challenges during its second configuration stage.

The process that should give way to food security, at least from the harmonization of multi-sectors and multi-level government public policies has different ruptures that in summary produce the following outcome: "The dynamics of undernourishment prevalence, combined with rapid population growth, leads to a dramatic increase in the total number of undernourished people [which] increased from 181 million in 2010 to almost 222 million in 2016, with a 22.6% increase in six years and according to current projections, it may have continued to increase, to more than 236 million, in 2017 " (FAO, 2018, p. 4). An FAO fact to consider in this scenario is that, out of the total number of people with prevalence of undernourishment, women have a higher probability of being affected, up to 0.4% (FAO, 2018, p. 10), which is relevant if we consider it is actually women who are the engine of food production in the continent.

The annual reports drafted by FAO and other international and local organizations reveal striking numbers but the causes and their replication over the years show a permanent rupture all along the process among local, national and sub-regional governments. The immediate needs of their populations is also evident, as they are repeatedly exposed to permanently vitiated factors and practices. Examples of this are local or regional

conflicts, uncertainty about the behavior of the different political forces and subsequent corruption, and the multiple actors who either individually or corporately move under particular economic interests at the expense of the work of Africans, regardless of age, sex or condition of reality, generating chronic exploitation and poverty and impacting their state of food (in)security. All of the above couples with the fully intended distancing or omission on the part of the local to national ruling elites, and is accentuated by the coercive inability of Africa's sub-regional or continental agencies, given that sub-regional, continental or international directives are no more than a mere framework of reference in national policies with no coercive mandate.

Public policies on agriculture and food security: from a national to regional, continental and international level

As part of the process to create and consolidate AfCFTA, there are still ongoing negotiations for the inclusion of African countries, and the strategies for the different sectors (industry, commerce, agriculture) have not yet been revealed. However, the first expectations announced as part of AfCFTA's rationale for agriculture are: "Agricultural countries can gain from satisfying Africa's growing food security requirements. The nature of many agricultural food products means that they are particularly responsive to improvements in customs clearance times and logistics that are expected of AfCFTA" (African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC)-Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 2018, p. 4).

Whatever the result may be, it is anchored to regional and continental commitments, such as the 2030 Agenda and the 2063 Agenda, both highlighting the development of the peoples of Africa, agriculture, food security, and rural development as a result.

These general objectives have to find a point of convergence with the AfCFTA framework objectives focused on easing and eliminating customs tariff barriers to circulate goods and services in an accessible, equitable and dynamic way within the continent under the following protocol: elimination of duties and quantitative restrictions on imports; imports

shall be treated no less favorably than domestic products; elimination of non-tariff barriers; cooperation of customs authorities; trade facilitation and transit; trade remedies, protection for infant industries and general exceptions; cooperation over product standards and regulations; technical assistance, capacity-building and cooperation (African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC)-Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 2018, p. 7)

Harmonizing the objectives of the United Nations 2030 Agenda and those of AfCFTA involves devoting efforts to intertwine different levels of action into national, regional, continental and international public policies that not only ensure access to food but also other sectors closely linked to it: support for the economy based on agriculture and food production, property and/or access to land, access to water and its equitable distribution, as well as access to markets as a result of reducing or eliminating fees.

Regional continental policy platforms in line with those of the international order are presented as the framework of reference for national policies. However, national policies in almost all sectors are subject to a range of variables that tend to dilute their nature, transforming or hindering nodal aspects of these public policies, as in the case of agricultural development and food security policies.

With less than a year after the creation of AfCFTA and its gradual ratification by African countries, in this paper we are only able to highlight the importance that the treatment of the agricultural sector receives in this continental commercial framework and, therefore, the state of food (in)security in the continent from now on. In terms of economic redevelopment through African intra-continental trade, some aspects to be considered are imposed: rurality, the field-based economy and the dependence and importance that food security represents, the demographic transformation in the continent, as well as the impact of intra-continental migration.

Rurality of the continent

FAO estimates that, unlike the tendency of the world population to urbanize, sub-Saharan Africa is a fundamentally rural region. This organization asserts

that sub-Saharan Africa maintained 62% of its population in rural areas in 2015. Continental urbanization is a recent trend and this transitional process will continue taking place towards the late 2030s. (FAO-CIRAD, 2018, p. 20).

As such, rurality is a reality to be addressed in public policies concerning agricultural production and food security in the three areas of action (industry, commerce, agriculture), a reality that is closely linked to the population growth trend in the continent, intra-regional and offshore migration of young Africans, as well as the feminization of rural areas. FAO, in that sense, reveals that 70% of the agricultural workforce are women who produce 90% of all food.

Agriculture

The above data reveal the importance of agriculture in the dynamics of food sustenance and the economic life of short circuits or medium-range trade. Food provision in rural areas responds primarily to family food subsistence, community and, sometimes, intra-community trade. This is linked to another relevant and prevailing factor in rural Africa: access to land property and use. As mentioned before, 90% of food production is carried out by women. Such production occurs using very small-scale house-garden production models in a plot close to the family housing area, a community garden or school garden. There are also other medium-scale and export-trade models of agricultural production in the rural environment. Each of these three levels of production require a clear-cut approach according to their role. In the words of Paalberg (2013), "despite the growth of international food markets, roughly 90 percent of all food never enters international trade. It is still consumed within the same country where it was produced. In poor agricultural countries, a great deal of the food supply is still consumed within the same community that produced it, or even by the same individual who produced it" (Paalberg, 2013, p. 4). Hence, it is important to ask ourselves whether national (countrywide), sub-regional (RECs) and continental (AfCFTA) policies will maintain a rural dynamic where food subsistence prevails or if this new continental cooperation and integration arrangement can begin to move

political wills and economic forces to generate and organize human and material resources to change the current state of food (in)security within the continent.

Migration

Intra-African migration, from one rural area to another, mainly favored by seasonal work opportunities such as large-scale and export agriculture, mining and others, begins to raise new questions regarding future public development rural policies. One of the relevant aspects of this migration phenomenon is the estimated rural density growth of up to 100 inhabitants per square kilometer by 2050 (FAO, 2018, p. 20). Considering that not all rural areas have the same productive advantages, population density is very uneven. What consequences can this phenomenon have? With regard to the agricultural sector, tensions can be foreseen over modes of production, regulation of land ownership, access to water and basic welfare services.

According to the FAO study, the population growth trend in Africa will significantly influence the demand for work as, by 2030, 378 million people will be of working age, about 220 million of whom will reside in rural areas (FAO, "Afrique rurale en movement", 2018, p. 20). These data suggest the urgent need to articulate multi-sectoral and multi-player public policies on different government levels and regional and continental mechanisms.

The demand for work versus the supply of employment of the population growth-rural area binomial becomes a necessary aspect to address. Another element is the attention to the vast gap between extra-continental export agriculture, in the hands of a few versus house garden or community garden agriculture as a recurring livelihood. Both aspects necessarily influence the reconfiguration of rural spaces. As mentioned by Paarlberg (2013), "[…] food production in Africa today is far below the known potential for the region" (Paarlberg, 2013, p. 15). He asserts that African farmers today use almost no fertilizers, only 4% of their cropland has been irrigated, most of the cropped area

in Africa is not yet sown with seeds improved through scientific plant breeding, governments spend about 5% of their budget on agriculture but 60% of their population depends on the farming sector when it comes to income and employment. Consequently, "Africa is failing to keep up with population growth not because it has exhausted its potential but instead because too little has been invested in developing that potential" (Paarlberg, 2013, p. 15).

The question now is how, from the new AfCFTA initiative, will national and sub-regional policies, together with continental strategies set the guidelines for the imminent reconfiguration of these spaces? How to strengthen agricultural and livestock activity and, at the same time, diversify productive opportunities that ensure sufficient availability in quality and quantity of food? How to move from a passive, forgotten and polarized vision of the rural area to one in which it and its growing population are an advantage to the continent's own internal development for a more stable and sufficient purchasing power, not only to access food but all goods and services? For now, the way the continent is being reoriented in its demographic scope and urban and rural reconfiguration, coupled with the initiative to change the course of the commercial dynamics exporting raw materials, involves a series of inclusive decision making. The participation and visibility of Africans cannot be subordinated exclusively, in the best case, to polling. A horizontal dialogue has to be promoted to assume the changes and challenges (old and new) that include both the public and private sectors, civil society organizations and the participation of each person in the continent. In parallel to AfCFTA, it is urgent that the mechanisms already provided in the RECs and the AU provide institutional certainty of the decisions and conditions to participate in this reconfiguration of the continent, accelerating the path towards peace and political stability.

Conclusion

Following the initiative to create AfCFTA, some considerations prove relevant in the formulation of national and continental public policies to face

the current disadvantageous situation many sectors of the continent are undergoing along with its reconfiguration to take place in no more than a decade. The harmonization of public policies on the different government levels is a difficult discussion since they do not follow an ascending or descending order of formulation or action, but it is important to recognize that AFCFTA's second creation and consolidation stage involves further discussion regarding topics that are a priority when it comes to favor cross-continental trade.

In that sense, food security is a catalytic policy to improve the development of other priority sectors, hence the need to transcend the reading of statistics and trends and act more comprehensively. Appealing to the historic political will of African governments in regional cooperation and integration initiatives, a committed and much needed framework of action is urgent, one that articulates the various levels of government, economic parties and, in this particular case, stakeholders of the agricultural sector at national and sub-regional and continental levels.

The 2030 and the 2063 Agendas need to find in RECs and AFCFTA mechanisms that support the design, formulation and implementation of national public policies, where these become a part of the articulated cycle of regional and continental cooperation and integration work, being consolidated in the African continent. The strengths revealed in the Africa Regional Integration Index in each REC are now the starting point for harmonizing policies that, on the one hand, articulate from local to continental mechanisms and, on the other, boost trade as a trigger for development as projected in the 2063 Agenda.

This agenda has challenges to address in parallel with the multi-sectoral level and the different stakeholders involved, and that includes international parties that are taking a relevant presence in decisive sectors of regional development such as infrastructure—a nodal aspect in the dynamization of continental commerce—with China as an a active player, for example.

Part of the task of the continent's agendas also involves diversifying economic and income activities beyond agriculture, without neglecting them. On the contrary, given the demographic and reconfiguration trends and

demands of the rural environment, it becomes a priority to return to the nature of the countryside to invest in its human and productive potential and not leave this sector in the hands of local or international monopolies, particularly in food production. Paarlberg (2013) underlines: "most agricultural land in Africa is legally under the control of governments rather than individual farmers" (Paarlberg, 2013, p. 25). Therefore, since 2007 investors from China, India, South Korea and states in the Persian Gulf have seen "land in Africa as potentially useful for the production of both food and biofuels" (Paarlberg, 2013, p. 25). Hence the importance of an open and institutionally framed participation to secure property rights, economic compensation, land management and land use, as well as access to water, and making financing and technical training facilities available. The rural should not be synonymous of poverty as it has been for the countries of Africa or Latin America. It should not fade into oblivion, and the disadvantageous conditions under which most small and medium producers operate should not be normalized any longer. These are some guidelines to consider in the next policies arising from RECs and AFCFTA that can be linked to the public policies of African states.

If rurality is a reality in the African continent, it must become, through the articulation of multi-sectoral policies, an agent of change and an engine of the new continental commercial proposal that renews the agricultural sector and improves the state of security of the continent as a *sine qua non* towards development for the fulfilment of such a continental integration project.

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Sub-Saharan Africa in the Global Crossroads of Financialization

Alicia Girón

> Africa Rising, Africa continues to rise, but let's not deceive ourselves. Africa is a commodities play, and so when you are building that Africa Rising narrative, there was also the issue of commodities. But lots of countries have also begun to diversify.
>
> Kganyago, IMF, 2018

Abstract

Sub-Saharan Africa, from the post-crisis period, has been presented as a fundamental piece to the Silk Road, accompanied by American interests and former European colonies. The bases for economic integration have even been created to adapt to a new development model based on deepening the productive and financial circuits of large international corporations. Austerity policies, growing indebtedness, the informal economy, and the wave of migrations towards Europe passing through the Mediterranean question the nascent democracies where social reproduction conflicts arise. The axis of this essay is to ponder on the following question: to what extent can sub-Saharan Africa implement, in the future, a development model sustained through equity without jeopardizing social reproduction, but at the same time being a global player? The purpose of this paper will be to first analyze the relationship between financialization and globalization in a region of

strategic natural resources; second, to examine social reproduction in the face of an austerity project that limits development in all possible areas; third, the development of sub-Saharan Africa in the commodity futures market and the financial fragility that it represents in the face of price volatility within the international financial market; and finally, the complexity of the insertion of sub-Saharan Africa in an international context that calls the fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda into question.

Introduction

The post-crisis period has reoriented the financial flows of new actors by promoting new paths for financial circuits, mainly from emerging countries. Wamboye and Alehegn (2017) analyze the importance of foreign direct investment in Africa from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Even the investment from the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in this region collapsed, between 2008-2012, from $34 billion to $15.7 million. At the same time, the Official Development Assistance (ODA)[1], which meant almost 50 percent for low-income countries in Africa, displayed a steady decline in the total financial flows this continent receives. Meanwhile, the share of total foreign direct investment (FDI) from the BRICS in Africa increased from 8 to 12 percent between 2009 and 2012 (African Economic Outlook, 2014). China has invested the most during the post-crisis period, which makes it the main investor in emerging countries. Between 2004 and 2013, the annual FDI growth rate increased 50 percent and in 2016 alone 64 new investment projects were announced. Overall, there was a 1,400 percent increase in annual growth rates in comparison to the previous year (African Economic Outlook, 2017). The importance of Africa as a player on a global scale is noticeable when taking these figures into account. It was no accident that President Xi Jinping's welcome speech at the G20 Summit introduced the

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1   "This applies especially to bilateral aid from OECD countries. The share of ODA in total external flows declined from 37% in 2002-06 to 28% in 2012-16. Nevertheless, aid from China and other emerging partners is growing rapidly" (African Economic Outlook, 2017, p. 46).

need for the industrialization of Africa to achieve its development (Xi Jin-ping, 2016). Hence the importance of focusing on the following key points: the financialization process, the strong internationalization of the price of sub-Saharan African commodities in the financial markets, and the wealth of its natural resources sought not only by emerging countries but also by European colonies. The 2020 African Economic Outlook (AEO) showed that the continent's economies are growing well, above the global average. The report projected a steady growth trend in Africa from 3.4% in 2019 to 3.9% in 2020 and 4.1% in 2021 (African Economic Outlook 2020).

Financialization and Globalization

This essay addresses financialization, one of the most important and used terms in economic forums in the past decade. Before fully focus-ing on what is to be the insertion of sub-Saharan Africa in the context of financialization, it is necessary to draw on a theoretical framework to understand and define this concept in order to show why it is important for this region to encourage an autonomous development based on an industrialization project that adds value to the main export products and makes it less dependent on commodity prices that are determined in in-ternational financial markets.

   Several authors have devoted themselves to define financialization. Epstein, one of the most prominent, mentions that financialization re-sponds to the "...growing role of financial reasons, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operations of the local and international economy" (Epstein, 2005, p. 3). Even authors such as Guttman mention that the current Great Crisis has been "the first sys-temic crisis of a new financial regime driven by accumulation[2], and as

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2   Guttman (2008, p. 1) explains that, in recent years, the existence of a qualitatively different type of capitalism has been recognized and has received the names of "heritage capitalism" (Aglietta, 1998), growth regime driven by finance" (Boyer, 2000) or "accumulation regime dominated by finance" (Stockhammer, 2006). Regardless of its name, it is a fact that the new regime is managed by finance.

such, an important test of the tension for the total infrastructure of financial markets" (Guttman, 2008, p. 1). Financialization is a process that goes beyond financial deregulation, which is accompanied by the process of economic deregulation where commercial and development banks gradually blur in development financing operations, leaving an increasing number of institutions such as funds pensions, mutual funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, and institutional investors operate in financing from a profitability perspective. Under such an approach, debt securities become a priority in credit operations, which creates strong speculation in the sale of prices of future commodities that become derivatives and, in turn, strong financial speculation.

For the last 25 years, capitalism driven by finance has spread to such an extent that half of humanity has been integrated into the private market economy primarily through development financing (Girón and Chapoy, 2009). As seen in this paper, the financialization of export products from sub-Saharan Africa is looking at showing the causal relationship between the process of exporting natural resources, be these oil, gas, uranium, aluminum, cotton, and all those resources whose prices are not determined by the producer but by the large corporations involved in financial markets and that determine the sovereignty of nations. This relationship has developed to such an extent that many prices of export goods defined as commodities are traded in financial markets as part of a financialized accumulation regime, as described by Chesnais in his book 'Finance Capital Today: Corporations and Banks in the Lasting Global Slump' (Chesnais, 2016).

The prices of export commodities in sub-Saharan economies and their integration into the international financial system have had an impact on the countries' income and, therefore, on public spending, but mainly on social spending. If, alongside the degree of public indebtedness with institutional investors—with foreign investment adding to the latter —then exporting economies face serious difficulties; that is, not only payments to creditors and low commodity prices but also the impact of the social reproduction crisis.

Financialization, integration, and financial markets

From the processes of deregulation and economic and financial liberalization in the eighties and the continuous stabilization plans implemented in developed economies and today's emerging countries, a continuous process of double-movement integration deepened. The process is understood as the dependence of both exporting and importing countries, where product prices became dependent on the interests of institutional investors in financial markets. This integration process set the foundations for globalization and the global village where economic fragility gradually permeated countries to the extent that many of the decisions regarding exports and import prices were defined by large buyers worldwide, affecting a process where the countries producing the same product could compete.

As this essay intends to prove, the determination of prices is beyond the control of producers and consumers. It is, therefore, the great financial institutional investors who determine prices in the financial markets. The competition among countries that manufacture the same product causes prices to rise or fall depending on the world's supply or demand and to the detriment of another country whose competitive strength is lower. In turn, the increasingly strong integration of export products, mainly commodities, in the international financial market permeated an economic fragility that is difficult to contain through governments' public policies and, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, in countries with recent independence processes.

Ayküz mentions how "…the fortunes of Emergent Development Economies (EDEs) traditionally varied with conditions in international commodity markets because of their dependence on commodity exports. However, global financial conditions have increasingly become a stronger influence because of their deepened integration into the international financial system, financialization of commodities, and mutually reinforcing impulses between international financial and commodity markets, described as commodity-finance nexus. There has been a strong correlation between commodity prices and capital inflows to EDEs in the new

millennium, and growth in the South has gone up and down with them" (Akyüz, 2017, p. 2).

Therefore, sub-Saharan Africa is strategic to study financialization through the relationship between export products and financial markets. UNCTAD considers a country is 'export-commodity dependent' when "… more than 60 percent of its total merchandise exports are composed of commodities. Given that commodity dependence can have a negative impact on a country's economic development, it is extremely important to monitor the evolution of such dependence in countries throughout the world. In particular, detailed statistics on commodity dependence provide an invaluable tool for a comprehensive analysis of its causes and consequences, and contribute significantly to the policy debate about measures necessary to address it in the short and long terms" (UNCTAD, 2019, p. iv).

For example, from 1990 to 2018, 27 commodities went through a structural change in the sub-Saharan region, from exporting raw materials and food to energy, metals, and minerals. A gradual evolution whose transition can be explained by the role that China has given to Africa as a provider of strategic resources could be regarded in two ways: the first responds to the development of the Chinese economy itself during the last decades, where the increase in productivity led to absorbing a greater amount of natural resources, with Africa being one of its main energy suppliers; the second deals with the recent Chinese expansion all around the world, highlighting, on the one hand, the development of the technological industry which needs to provide itself with mineral and metal resources and, on the other, the need to keep the construction industry active as one of the engines of economic growth, increasing the importance of the Silk Road in China's long-term plans. The following table shows the commodities produced in the sub-Saharan region according to the World Bank classification.

The UNCTAD report also considers developing countries are dependent on commodities and as for Africa "…89 per cent of sub-Saharan African countries are commodity-dependent, compared to two thirds of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa, half of the countries

Table 1. Sub-Saharan Africa. Commodities Productions, 1990-2018

Commodity Groups		Commodity
1	Energy	Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas
2	Agriculture	Cocoa Coffee Tea
3	Food	Oils and meals	Coconut oil Fishmeal Palm oil Palm kernel oil Soybean oil Soybeans
		Grains	Maize Sorghum
		Other Food	Bananas Oranges Meat beef
4	Raw materials	Cotton Tobacco
5	Fertilizers	Potassium chloride
6	Metals & Minerals	Aluminum Copper Iron ore Nickel Zinc
7	Precious Metals	Gold Platinum

Source: World Bank, 2019.

in Latin America and the Caribbean, and half of the countries in East Asia and the Pacific. On the other hand, only a quarter of countries in South Asia and in Europe and the Central Asia region are considered commodity-dependent, while there are no commodity-dependent

countries in North America" (UNCTAD, 2019, p. 3). Therefore, the causal relationship between financialization and commodity-dependent developing countries (CDDCs) is decisive for economic policy management, being countries that are not integrated by "...the division of labor, but the geographical division of specific stages of the production process in global supply chains, supported by the dominance of foreign direct corporate investment financed by cross-border financial integration of geographically distinct national financial markets" (Kregel, 2019, p. 4).

Characterization of commodities during the last three decades (1990-2017)

The predominance of commodities in the sub-Saharan region has determined their economic evolution and development. The hypothesis presented in this section allows demonstrating how the insertion of this region in the process of internationalization has determined the economic development of the countries by internally determining the dependence on export prices and economic development from decision-dependent public policies outside territorial sovereignty.

Table 2 shows the five main commodities per decade. During 1990-1995, the region's commodities were mostly agricultural products, such as coffee, tobacco, black tea, and cotton. Also, the export of energy such as oil (oils), and minerals like coal began in this span. Although these exports represented 6.1 billion dollars, that accounted for only 0.1 percent of the region's GDP by 1995. However, in 2000 commodities were structurally changing their participation at an international level. This time, energy and minerals were placed as the main commodities of the region, leaving agricultural products in second place. During this year, the most important commodities were those derived from oil, especially oils, with a 7.6 percent share in GDP and with an export value of 30.8 billion dollars. In 2005, despite the fact that petroleum products remained as the main commodity, there is a noticeable decrease in their export value, dropping

Table 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Top Commodities Production
by Selected Year

Year	Commodity	Billion USD	% GNP	Million tons
1990	Tobacco, not stemmed	0.15	0.04	0.05
	Tobacco, stemmed	0.13	0.04	0.04
	Coffee	0.05	0.01	0.05
	Tea	0.05	0.01	0.04
	Cotton	0.00	0.00	0.02
	Total	0.38	0.11	0.20
1995	Coal	1.56	0.44	N/A
	Coffee	1.40	0.40	0.57
	Petroleum oils	1.39	0.39	13.52
	Cocoa	1.21	0.34	0.86
	Cotton	0.58	0.16	0.36
	Total	6.15	1.73	15.30
2000	Petroleum oils	30.08	7.67	19.12
	Petroleum derivatives	3.32	0.85	16.55
	Coal	1.26	0.32	68.02
	Cocoa	1.18	0.30	1.45
	Coffee	1.03	0.26	0.86
	Total	36.86	9.40	105.99
2005	Petroleum derivatives	8.05	1.06	24.98
	Petroleum oils	6.02	0.79	15.40
	Coal	3.18	0.42	72.50
	Cocoa	2.53	0.33	1.71
	Aluminum	2.07	0.27	1.22
	Total	21.85	2.87	115.81
2010	Petroleum oils	128.64	9.42	132.47
	Petroleum derivatives	12.48	0.91	20.03
	Gold, semi-manufactured	6.34	0.46	0.00
	Iron ores	5.59	0.41	53.79
	Coal	5.32	0.39	69.07
	Total	158.37	11.59	275.36
2015	Petroleum oils	36.66	2.20	107.87
	Gold, semi-manufactured	7.26	0.44	0.00
	Cocoa	4.54	0.27	1.61
	Petroleum derivatives	4.29	0.26	8.93
	Coal	3.90	0.23	N/A
	Total	56.65	3.40	118.41
2016	Petroleum oils	28.77	1.86	76.07
	Gold, semi-manufactured	10.95	0.71	0.00
	Cocoa	6.00	0.39	2.05
	Gold	5.34	0.35	0.00
	Natural gas	4.08	0.26	135.45
	Total	55.14	3.57	213.58
2017	Petroleum oils	46.95	2.81	120.76
	Gold, semi-manufactured	9.33	0.56	0.00
	Cocoa	6.27	0.38	2.77
	Gold	6.17	0.37	0.00
	Coal	5.55	0.33	80.69
	Total	74.26	4.45	204.22

Source: Own elaboration with data from WITS, World Bank , http://bit.ly/2LmNREH

to 8.05 billion dollars and representing 1.6 percent of GDP. New commodities were introduced, such as aluminum, with a value of 2.7 billion dollars.

It is necessary to point out 2010 was the peak of commodity exports for the sub-Saharan region. The total share of the first five commodities reached 11.6 percent of GDP and a value of 158.4 billion dollars. These comprise energy (petroleum oils and other derivatives), minerals (coal), and metals (gold and iron). During 2015, there was another decrease in commodity exports, 56.6 billion dollars with a GDP share of 3.4 percent, a change with respect to 2010 of 93 percent and 94 percent, respectively.

Finally, in 2016 and 2017 the region's commodities once again brought back agricultural products, specifically cocoa although energy and metals still contributed with the largest share. Overall, variations in their shares with relation to GDP are observed, however, they are lower than in previous years, thus going from 3.4 percent in 2016 to 4.4 percent in 2017.

The following table displays the main export and import partners for sub-Saharan Africa over the past thirty years. Like commodities, partners in the region have changed their commercial participation from one decade to another. Firstly, between 1990 and 1995, it may be observed that the United States positioned as the main export destination of the region with a market share of 14.3 percent of total exports. Likewise, this country positioned as the third import destination competing with European countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, with Japan as the only Asian partner during those years. The close commercial relations with European countries, the United States, and Japan represented 20 percent stakes respectively until 2000.

The entry of China to the World Trade Organization in 2001 was the necessary platform to make its formal leap into the internationalization of Chinese production in international trade. During 2005, the close commercial relations with the sub-Saharan region deepened both direct and indirect investments from China into the region, accompanied by a greater share of exports, which represented 4.3 percent of the total and a

Table 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Top 5 Exports and Imports Partners by Selected Year

Year	Partner	Billion USD	Participation (%)	Partner	Billion USD	Participation (%)
		Exports			**Imports**	
1990	US	0.10	14.25	South Africa	0.19	16.74
	France	0.10	13.99	France	0.19	16.59
	Germany	0.09	12.90	UK	0.16	13.85
	Japan	0.07	10.57	Japan	0.08	6.90
	UK	0.07	9.74	Germany	0.07	6.33
1995	UK	3.59	8.25	Germany	5.43	11.68
	US	3.37	7.72	UK	4.38	9.42
	France	2.37	5.43	US	4.20	9.04
	Japan	2.32	5.33	Japan	4.00	8.61
	Germany	2.22	5.09	France	3.70	7.96
2000	US	17.15	20.87	South Africa	6.54	9.88
	UK	6.87	8.36	Germany	5.18	7.83
	India	4.78	5.82	US	5.16	7.79
	France	4.59	5.59	France	4.77	7.21
	Spain	3.65	4.45	UK	4.67	7.05
2005	UK	11.28	11.32	South Africa	11.15	8.79
	US	10.90	10.94	Germany	9.89	7.80
	Japan	6.01	6.03	China	9.65	7.61
	China	5.74	5.76	France	8.41	6.63
	Netherlands	5.47	5.49	US	7.21	5.68
2010	US	50.44	16.24	China	35.21	12.75
	China	44.65	14.38	South Africa	21.40	7.74
	India	18.46	5.95	US	21.06	7.62
	South Africa	14.09	4.54	Germany	13.45	4.87
	Netherlands	11.81	3.80	France	13.21	4.78
2015	China	25.10	13.79	China	38.19	16.25
	India	10.39	5.71	South Africa	20.24	8.61
	US	9.98	5.48	India	12.73	5.42
	South Africa	7.85	4.31	Germany	12.14	5.17
	Switzerland	7.81	4.29	US	11.00	4.68
2016	India	13.93	8.44	China	38.22	17.64
	US	11.23	6.80	South Africa	14.71	6.79
	China	10.32	6.25	US	12.68	5.86
	South Africa	9.24	5.60	India	12.66	5.84
	Switzerland	7.36	4.46	Germany	12.55	5.79
2017	India	19.68	9.28	China	37.39	16.42
	China	18.52	8.73	South Africa	14.89	6.54
	US	14.92	7.03	Germany	13.44	5.90
	Netherlands	9.62	4.53	India	13.15	5.77
	Spain	8.46	3.99	US	11.74	5.16

Source: Own elaboration with data from WITS, World Bank, http://bit.ly/2LmNREH

Table 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Top Commodities by Region and Selected Year

	Year	Commodities	Billion USD	Top exporters
Central Africa	1990	N/A	N/A	N/A
	1995	Petroleum oils	1.34	Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo
	2000	Petroleum oils	2.99	Cameroon, Gabon
	2005	Petroleum oils	5.4	Cameroon, Gabon
	2010	Petroleum oils	52.2	Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo
	2015	Petroleum oils	33	Angola, Cameroon
	2016	Cocoa	0.68	Cameroon, Sao Tome
	2017	Petroleum oils	6.19	Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Southern Africa	1990	N/A	N/A	N/A
	1995	Coal	1.56	South Africa
	2000	Coal	1.26	South Africa, Eswatini
	2005	Coal	3.18	Botswana, South Africa
	2010	Copper	4.6	Botswana, Namibia
	2015	Petroleum derivatives	2.74	Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa
	2016	Petroleum derivatives	2.08	Botswana, Namibia, South Africa
	2017	Petroleum derivatives	2.41	Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa
West Africa	1990	N/A	N/A	N/A
	1995	Cotton	0.33	Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Niger, Togo
	2000	Cotton	0.57	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Togo
	2005	Cotton	0.84	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Togo
	2010	Petroleum derivatives	11.4	Coast of Ivory, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal
	2015	Petroleum derivatives	1.15	Benin, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Niger, Senegal, Togo
	2016	Petroleum derivatives	1.18	Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo
	2017	Petroleum derivatives	1.34	Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo
East Africa	1990	Coffee	0.05	Madagascar, Malawi
	1995	Coffee	0.88	Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Uganda, Malawi
	2000	Coffee	0.09	Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia
	2005	Coffee	0.69	Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia
	2010	Tobacco	1.10	Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
	2015	Tea	0.23	Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritius, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe
	2016	Tea	0.24	Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania
	2017	Tobacco	1.64	Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe

Source: Own elaboration with data from WITS: World Bank, 2019.
Note: The values in billion dollars are the sum of values of the commodity among the countries of the region for the each year.

value of 5.7 billion dollars. Meanwhile, imports placed China as the third country of origin with a 7.6 percent share in the region's total figures.

This situation, on the one hand, intensified as of 2010, when China followed the United States as an export partner of the sub-Saharan region, with a 14 percent share in total exports. In 2015, China was placed as the main export and import destination of the region, leaving the United States in third place in both cases. In 2016 and 2017, taking into account the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), relations between the sub-Saharan region and China remained close. This is explained firstly, by China's demand for raw materials, mainly rare earths and secondly, because of the development of infrastructure projects in the region, which shows the importance of maintaining a continuous commercial flow.

On the other hand, Table 4 shows the main commodities exported by each of the regions that shape the sub-Saharan Africa region: Central, Southern, Western, and Eastern Africa. In general, there is a specialization in exports by region. Central Africa specialized in energy, especially petroleum products from 1990 to 2017. Meanwhile, over the same years, the Southern region concentrated its exports mainly on minerals such as coal, metals such as copper, and energy, such as petroleum products. In contrast, the East and West participated in raw materials, mainly cotton, coffee, tea, and tobacco. Thus, the importance of commodities for the development of the region lies in the income that countries can obtain through their exports, mainly withholdings.

Final Considerations

Having analyzed the exports of sub-Saharan Africa's main export products and the relationship with the financialization process, this essay presents a hypothesis built on the survival of these countries thanks to greater direct investment, increased external indebtedness, deepening the relationship of their products' export prices, and the causal relationship between exporting and importing countries and European countries and China and India, which are the main importers of sub-Saharan products.

Drawing a relation between financialization and global neoliberalism in a region of strategic natural resources takes us to a second issue: social reproduction versus an austerity project that limits development by all means. Thirdly, we can analyze the development of sub-Saharan Africa in the commodity futures market and the financial fragility it represents in the face of price volatility in the global financial market, placing the region in a complex puzzle where sub-Saharan Africa faces the global world that calls the fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda into question.

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The Reconfiguration of the Banking Sector in Angola and Mozambique (2000-2016)

Monika Meireles

Introduction

The crisis of 2007-2008 has led *financial globalization* and the *financial deregulation* process from previous decades to new paths. For many heterodox analysts, this was the first major *financialization* crisis. It is worth remembering that, on September 15, 2018, ten years had elapsed since the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers bank, a milestone that marked a *credit crunch* in interbank fund markets due to the wide interconnection amongst them. Considering that the regulatory authority focused on the enormous leverage in bank operations (commercial, investment, and full-service banks), a series of new regulations has been implemented in the sector. As a result, capital requirements are continuously increasing, as provided in the *Dodd-Frank Act* and in other rules suggested in Basel III (Correa, 2013).

Since then, *major global banks,* whose headquarters are mainly based in Global North economies, reduced their rhythm of international expansion by consolidating branches and closing subsidiaries (especially in the Global South), and even reconsidering the dimension of their domestic operations. It is clear therefore that finance relations between central and peripheral economies are being reconfigured. In addition, the so-called "new financial actors" have appeared in the financial horizon, for example, new regional financial actors that are part of a bank capital internationalization modality that favors the regional expansion circuit over the global one.

It must be noted that the major global banks still are absolute leaders in terms of the asset volume controlled domestically and abroad in the continuous capital internationalization process. Nonetheless, in peripheral economies (especially, Africa and Latin America), new regional financial actors are widely present. As a result, the foreign bank profile and the relationship with domestic banks have changed. Inferring that the traditional dependency relationship between local and foreign financial oligarchies is merely readjusting in light of these events would not be an exaggeration (Meireles, 2015). Among new regional financial actors, it is worth noting the participation of pan-African banks (IMF, 2014) —banking entities whose headquarters are located in an African country, but have active branches in other countries in that region—.

The foregoing does not mean that traditional banks are no longer important. Major commercial banks and banking companies still are the more traditional agents within the financial ecosystem. In other words, even though it was somewhat "wounded" by the crisis, universal banking or full-service banking (that is, banks operating within the conventional commercial banking sector —characterized by the "entry" of deposits and the granting of loans to clients, but also those participating in long-term investments, brokeraging share/certificate placement in the stock market, and managing the opulent asset portfolio of select third parties) is still critical in understanding an economy's financial dynamics. Thus, understanding the changes that this bank has undergone in the ways (trends) it operates is especially crucial in assessing credit access conditions and development financing in peripheral countries.

In truth, the way those trends appear is neither even nor homogeneous in peripheral countries. If we consider the African continent, for instance, we will come to realize that the agendas vary from one sub-region to the next. An analytical instrument allowing a more adequate approach to the "regional trend" abstraction level entails creating typologies that cover groups of countries whose behavior is similar, by considering specific key variables; for example, the availability of bank credits for the domestic private sector and the behavior of the most important banks. The first step to start creating typologies anchored in a review of recent banking history and to start

building the foundation to speak more adequately about regional trends based on those typologies entails conducting a comparative analysis between countries. Therefore, in this paper we will compare the particularities of two countries in the region: Angola and Mozambique.

Contemporary financing conditions in the peripheral economies mentioned above are characterized by a unique combination of the new business model of traditional banks and the arrival on scene of new regional financial actors, which is not only contributing to a profound foreign banking reconfiguration within the banking sector in each relevant region (World Bank, 2018), but is also forcing us to make urgent questions that had neither been made before nor had they been analyzed by heterodox economists from previous generations. Yet, they demand an update in view of the novel processes mentioned.

In that regard, we may list some of our research questions: What are the "virtuous connections" between finance and economic development? Does daily private banking operation intend that a credit fulfill a "social duty" or is it more closely related to valuation circuits that hardly adhere to the "real sector" of an economy? Do credit dynamics and the composition of the banking sector in peripheral economies promote financing for productive investments stimulating an inclusive development pattern? How does credit granting by *megabanks* to the productive sector behave? How does the trend towards increasing bank capital concentration and centralization redefine the power held by major banks operating in African countries characterized by a low level of institutional strength?

Naturally, this chapter does not seek to find clear-cut responses to the questions posed here, which are rather broad and complex. Nonetheless, based on the questions asked above, we seek to assert that, in light of financialization, since the resources managed by major private banks have increased (interestingly enough, together with a change in their business models), a new oligopoly competition round in the sector has threatened development financing conditions in African economies.

In a little more detail, in this scenario, where the tension has renewed given the acutely increasing competition amongst major financial groups and given the tendency to reduce profitability on

account of the bank regulations implemented following the crisis, an extremely dangerous behavior is being stimulated, as it favors ongoing financial innovation and disproportionate speculation. Consequently, instead of prioritizing the creation and/or strengthening of a financial environment committed to financing productive activities, generating employment, and promoting socio-economic development, *financial fragility* is being exacerbated.

To organize the presentation of the main arguments put forward in this paper, this chapter is divided into three sections following the introduction. The first section makes reference to heterodox economic literature regarding the behavior of major banks at a time of financial deregulation, and the challenges posed for the socio-economic development of peripheral economies under these circumstances. The second section focuses on the analysis of recent changes and the current configuration of banking systems in the chosen countries. A series of final remarks are made in the third section.

Theoretical Framework: the bank in the financial deregulation era

In post-Keynesian readings, as regards the 2007-2008 crisis, emphasis has been made on the way the US bank operated, which has undergone a dramatic change since financial regulation was in place, given the rise of an institutional structure able to control and monitor banking activities more closely and effectively since the Roosevelt era. In that respect, the 1993 *Glass-Steagall Act* was the cornerstone of these measures. When this law was repealed (actually, it was abolished as a result of the enactment of the *Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act*, also called the 1999 financial system modernization act), a financial deregulation process that had been in the making for the past decades was approved, triggering a financial deregulation boom (Dymski, 2014).

In line with this reading, which appears to be a lot more heterodox, in lieu of a more efficient financial sector, legal amendments followed the rules of a rougher competitive game amongst newly created *megabanks* (Dymski, 2011). These "too-big-to-fail" entities are banking institutions

whose strength —in terms of solvency and liquidity— must be secured by the government, given that, in case either of them goes bankrupt, such a fall would drag the entire system on account of those institutions' size, importance, and broad connection with other economic agents. As a result, the stability of the national —or even international— financial system as a whole would be jeopardized.[1]

In this process, where bank capital concentration and centralization are increasing, the banks have become "too-big-to-fail" entities, and major bank operations and business models have evolved. The changes in how banks used to operate when banking activity was performed in ways that deemed to be in line with what is conventionally understood as banking business, and the way in which banks currently operate —where *megabanks* are "too-big-to-go-bankrupt" financial companies— translate into an environment characterized by new regulatory challenges. Undoubtedly, new regulations that limit *megabank* power are needed if a financial system —that is somewhat stable and less likely to be the fulcrum of a crisis that rapidly spreads throughout the entire economic system— is to be built. Nonetheless, prior to discussing the modalities of a regulatory structure, better understanding of how the banking system has actually changed is paramount.

Inspired by Cömert et al. (2016, pp. 11-12), we have summarized in four points the banking operational changes that occurred at a time of financial regulation until the *megabanking era*: a) the "too-big-to-fail" idea has encouraged banks to take greater risks; b) the easiness with which risks are transferred, through shadow banking, thickens the flanks through which the financial fragility of bank institutions may increase; c) managerial data about the quality of the transactions that a bank is performing is transmitted to a lesser extent between the local and central

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[1]   From a more institutional perspective and following a more specific methodology to determine which would be the global *megabanks*, the *Financial Stability Board* (FSB) —together with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and national authorities— identifies Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) on an annual basis (since 2011). Supervising and regulating these *megabanks* becomes increasingly complex and less effective, as it requires thinking, above everything else, on ways to hinder financial entities from growing and assembling colossal market segments [Mastromatteo and Esposito, 2016].

management of major banks; and d) the income of the banking sector is increasingly more dependent on the fees obtained from the purchase and sale of third-party resource positions rather than the difference between a passive and an active interest rate.

A wave of mergers was an expression of typical monopolist competition practices in the banking sector, where the purchase of a bank by another is essentially carried out with two purposes that are not mutually exclusive: a) expanding the client/consumer database and increasing market share by absorbing the client portfolio of the merged bank; and b) maintaining a local market position and preventing another competitor entering that market. In economic literature, mergers that take place mainly for this reason are called *defensive* mergers (Dymski, 1999).

As regards central economies, Cömert et al. (2016) have actually documented that, in the *megabanking era*, the main profitability source of a bank business is no longer the difference between active and passive interest rates; in other words, the earnings that were typically obtained from the difference between the remuneration given to savings account holders and the payments made by clients who acquired a loan lost ground in relation to the earnings made through the fees on novel financial transactions, such as fund management and/or other types of third-party cash management transactions (Wray, 2009).

When mapping bank mergers and megamergers in emerging countries (Girón, 2007), we may realize that the phenomenon worsened in the 1990s, when considerable institutional changes took place, mainly due to political pressure from the lobbying by prominent national and international bankers. Likewise, at a microeconomic level, daily bank operation was also adversely affected, especially in relation to banks operating in emerging countries (Dymski, 2002). In addition to these factors, major bank headquarters underwent changes that defined the strategy for branch operations.

To further reflect on this matter, let us reconsider the main points that heterodox literature the world over has highlighted as resulting from a change of era—from *financial regulation* to *financial deregulation*: a) the incorporation of *megabanks* as a result of the concentration and centralization of the sector's capital, and as a consequence of the fact that the same entity

may now freely operate as both a commercial and an investment bank; b) the nature of bank earnings, which are increasingly dependent on transactions that generate fees (such as transactions in derivatives markets and/or foreign exchange markets stemming from a difference in loan rates for productive activities); c) ongoing financial innovation, which catapults the securitization-leverage-risk trinomial to unprecedented levels; and d) outsourcing risks, a practice consisting of incorporating new companies with the purpose of eliminating, from a bank's balance, bank asset deals whose risk is not in line with reminiscent bank regulations. This practice greatly inflates *shadow banking*, as shown by the nearly indecipherable tangle of *shadow banking*-related transactions (Prates and Farhi, 2015).

Angola and Mozambique: financial deepening, bank profitability, and major bank concentration

Political instability in Angola's economy was rather high during the war for its political independence (1961-1975) and by the end of the civil war (2002) that erupted between three main separatist groups: The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, in Portuguese), the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA, in Portuguese), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, in Portuguese). It is no coincidence that the fight for gaining control over natural resource exploration (diamonds and oil) geographically and acutely determined conflict zones. The most dramatic GDP fall (6.9%) occurred precisely when the civil war ended; that is, when the result of almost fifty years of virtually uninterrupted war was communicated as final (*El País*, 2013).

Given that the armed conflict had ended, that there was an agenda for reconstructing the country's infrastructure, and that the door was open to foreign investors to participate in national oil activities, there was a rapid growth in the following years (*El País*, 2013). By 2007, Angola hit a historic record in terms of GDP: it registered a 22.7% rate, which had been driven by a considerable growth in oil production (*El País*, 2007). In light of those "stratospheric" growth rates, the fact that the GDP had reached 13.8% in 2008 was

already quite worrying (however, in that same year, developed economies had strongly resisted the effects of the international financial crisis). Nonetheless, in 2009, the red flag became obvious as growth had merely reached 2.4%. Hence, it became evident that Angola was not disconnected from the global deceleration trend. In the following years, the country's annual growth remained between 3 and 4% (this figure was slightly higher than the global average, yet extremely lower than the path it had followed for six years prior to the crisis), until, in 2016, due to the combination of a new outbreak of internal political tension and a decrease in the price of oil at an international level, the country's economy experienced a negative growth rate of 0.7%.[2]

In turn, the independence war in Mozambique encompassed several guerrilla movements, among which the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO, in Portuguese) must be noted, as it lasted from 1964 to 1974 (however, the country's official independence was acknowledged until 1975). In addition, anticommunist paramilitary forces were already gaining strength around those dates; in that regard, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO, in Portuguese) deserves special mention, as it would later become an important political force within the nation (in this respect, it must be noted that both political parties have been and still are the main actors in Mozambique's political arena). Once this stage had ended (in 1975), Mozambique went through several phases or historical periods: from a "real socialism" perspective —with Samora Moises Machel (1975-1986)— until it reached a "market economy" stage, whose foundations were rather fragile. According to Peter Gastrow and Marcelo Mosse (2002), an actual "market economy" phase started in 1987; however, it consolidated two years later, following the end of the civil war, and once democratic elections took place for the first time.

Owing to these considerations, we will now analyze recent changes and the current configuration of banking systems in the chosen countries. Certain basic economic and financial indicators from Angola and

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2   According to the IMF [2018], Angola was severely damaged by the international decline of oil prices. From 2015, the country's growth decreased due to a strong deceleration in the oil sector, coupled with the loss of dynamism in the industrial, construction, and service sectors, all of which were forced to adjust to private consumer cuts and the fall of public investment levels.

Mozambique are analyzed, especially during two key moments: a) the pre-crisis period (2000-2007) and b) the post-crisis stage (2008-2016).

It must be noted that the GDP growth rate of African countries rose exponentially in relation to other economies around the world, in spite of the crisis. It is also worthwhile highlighting that Angola and Mozambique are two of the African countries with the highest growth rates; hence, affirming that their spectacular economic dynamics is among the highest in the world would be far from an exaggeration. However, we should not forget that economic growth is different from socio-economic development, and that there is a mass of obstacles preventing the growth of an underdeveloped economy from translating into a sustained improvement of its population's social conditions (Nega and Schneider, 2016). Therefore, it is no surprise that, even though the GDP of both countries increased considerably, social indicators are not encouraging. To illustrate this, the Human Development Index (HDI) value in Angola is 0.533, while Mozambique's is 0.418; those values position each country at 150 and 181 out of 188 assessed countries.

Simply put, even though their growth has been substantial, these figures translating into the improvement of development indicators still poses a great challenge. Available financing sources and the conditions under which credits and loans are granted to investment projects are two among the main components necessary to achieve economic development. In this regard, the organization of the banking system becomes increasingly important when discussing the financial structure needed to design a successful development strategy.

With that in mind, we will now briefly and comparatively discuss the composition of the banking sector considering capital sources, credit dynamics, and bank profitability in Angola and Mozambique. In that regard, a critical balance about how these variables condition socio-economic development possibilities will be made.

Continuous political tension and civil unrest until the beginning of year 2000 in these two African countries partially explain the low financial deepening level prior to the crisis. According to Graph 1 —which shows the internal credit volume granted to the private sector as a GDP

percentage—, it may be observed that, towards the beginning of the decade, the indicator barely reached 2% of Angola's GDP; years later, the credit volume had reached 10.6% by 2007. Two years later, this indicator had nearly doubled (it reached 21.9% in 2009) and would remain at that level until 2016. With relation to Mozambique, as shown is Graph 1, it may be clearly noted that, similar to Angola, there was a significantly greater increase in internal credit granting to the private sector, yet a lot more intense in the post-crisis period. In fact, from 2000 to 2007, the credit volume in Mozambique went from 14.4% to 11.6% of the GDP; by 2015, it had reached a maximum of 35.1%. However, there would be a slight decrease in 2016 (34.5%) due to the difficulties related to sovereign public debt. Regardless, the values mentioned here are extremely low when compared to other economies (even those known as "emerging economies"); nonetheless, they constitute a significant increase for the path both countries had historically followed.

In the post-crisis scenario, there has been a generalized decrease in the profitability of the traditional banking sector as a result of the new regulations that increased capital requirements. In Graph 2, we used the profitability indicator obtained from the average profits made by banking activities over capital stock before taxes (Return on Equity, ROE). As a result, such a decrease may be noted in Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, bank ROE went from 21.6% in 2002 to nearly 48% six years later. Following the crisis, this indicator varied between 17 and 20%. In September 2016, five banks in Angola (among them, Banco de Poupança e Crédito, BPC) were decapitalized and had to meet prudential requirements (IMF, 2018). In the case of Mozambique, bank ROE was 34.9% in 2002, and it reached an outstanding figure of 61.35% in 2004. If, in the pre-crisis period (2007), it recorded 42.83%, following the crisis the numbers would be much lower (such as 18.78% in 2015). It must be mentioned that, regardless of the decreasing trend in banking profitability following the crisis, the figures obtained by banks in African countries are impressive, especially because it is known that bank ROE in central economies is usually below 10%.

When analyzing bank composition in Angola and Mozambique in greater detail, a more accurate insight into its dimension and importance

Graph 1. Angola and Mozambique's Domestic Credit to Private Sector, 2000-2016 (Percentage of GDP)

Source: Made by the author based on data from the World Bank (2018) *World Development Indicators*

Graph 2. Angola and Mozambique's Bank Return on Equity (ROE before tax) 2002-2015

Source: Made by the author based on data from the World Bank (2018) *Global Financial Development*

in the local economies may be obtained, together with a more accurate notion of what "too-big-to-fail" institutions would be in those economies. Both countries share a history of bank transformation: the bank used to be state-owned (it even was a part of the structure of the socialist regime implemented there) and, in the 1990s, it was mainly owned by Portuguese, Pan-African, and domestic private capital.

In Charts 1 and 2, we listed five major banks in 2016; their asset volume in the corresponding local currencies; how much their individual assets represent from total bank sector assets; and lastly, their percentage size in relation to GDP. In Angola, adding the assets of all five major banks results in an amount equivalent to 41.24% of GDP, while the figure in Mozambique is 60.49%, both of which are extremely relevant. In Angola, the three main banks are: Banco de Poupança e Crédito (BPC), Banco Angola de Investimentos (BAI), and Banco de Fomento Angola (BFA). BCP was founded in 1956. Since then, this bank has been the strongest in the country, as it holds assets representing 20.44% of share in the banking sector. Close to 75% of its shares remain in the hands of the Angolan government. In turn, BAI controls 15.69% of the assets of the sector. Its greatest shareholder is Sonangol, a state-owned company that supervises oil and natural gas production within the country. The third place is occupied by BFA, which was founded in 1990 as a representation office of the Foreign Promotional Bank (Banco de Fomento Exterior, BFE), and which came to be controlled by Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) in 1996. Currently, it holds 15.09% of total banking sector assets. In turn, the main banks in Mozambique are: Banco Comercial e de Investimentos (BCI), Millennium BIM-Banco Internacional de Moçambique (BIM), and Standard Bank. The BCI started operating in 1996; currently, the majority shareholder is Caixa Geral de Depósitos Group, which is Portuguese and held 31.08% of the sector assets in 2016. The second position is occupied by Millennium BIM-Banco Internacional de Moçambique on account of its asset size. This bank is also a private bank linked to a Portuguese group that controls 29% of all the assets in the country's banking system. Lastly, the Standard Bank is the first Pan-African bank that started operating in 1967 and that holds a market asset share of 17.27%.

Chart 1. Angola: Five Biggest Banks Bases on Assets (2016)

Nº	Bank	Assets (Millions of Kwanzas)	Share in the Banking Sector (%)	% of GDP**
1	Banco de Poupanca e Crédito (BPC)	1,778,202	20.44%	11.40%
2	Banco Angolano de Investimentos (BAI)	1,365,685	15.69%	8.76%
3	Banco de Fomento Angola (BFA)	1,312,879	15.09%	8.42%
4	Banco BIC	1,027,033	11.80%	6.59%
5	Banco Millenium Atlantico (BMA)*	948,454	10.90%	6.08%
	Total 5 Major Banks	6,432,253	73.92%	41.24%
	Total Banking Sector	8,701,457	100.00%	55.79%

Source: made by the author based on each bank's financial reports, *Análise ao setor bancário angolano* (KPMG, several years) and *Angola: Banca em enálise* (Deloitte, several years).
Notes: *Formerly, Banco Privado Atlantico (BPA).
**Estimate based on *World Economic Outlook Database* (IFM, 2017)

Chart 2. Mozambique: Five Biggest Banks Bases on Assets (2016)

Nº	Bank	Assets (Millions of Meticals)	Share in the Banking Sector (%)	% of GDP**
1	BCI	143,433	31.08%	20.87%
2	BIM	133,780	28.99%	19.47%
3	Estándar Bank	79,696	17.27%	11.60%
4	Moza Banco*	31,369	6.80%	4.57%
5	Barclays	27,374	5.93%	3.98%
	Total 5 Major Banks	415,624	90.06%	60.49%
	Total Banking Sector	461,506	100.00%	67.17%

Source: made by the author based on data from Associação Moçambicana de Bancos and KPMG: Pesquisa do sector bancário (several years).
Notes: *Amount of assets corresponds to year 2015.

As we have been able to discover, together with political stability and banking service deepening, a truly relevant issue for the African countries under study is the presence of foreign banks, especially the Pan-African bank and the reminiscence of the banks that belong to Portuguese bank groups.

Final remarks

This paper sought to delve into the construction of a perspective based on heterodox literature about the role played by credits, the dynamics of the contemporary banking sector, and the main characteristics of emerging financial markets. Emphasis was made on the African region, mainly through an analysis of Angola and Mozambique. It is worth noting that this paper did not simply apply the discussion conducted in other countries to passively adopt their key concepts without carrying out an analysis as regards peripheral economies. Precisely because of that, the intention was to identify the varied ways in which national banking systems have been created based on different development styles that come about also considering the influence of that variable. In addition, it proposed that a reflection be made on the recent bank restructuring process that has taken place in those countries, and that the way in which financial instability in the region increased as a result of bank concentration and centralization be discussed.

In a rather summarized way, this essay sought to question issues such as: a) deregulated finance behavior in the capital flow of emerging markets; b) the way in which international *megabanks* and national banks participating in the organization of financial systems in the Global South operate; c) the way in which bank operations have modernized, which are the services that are actually offered and provided; d) how the ongoing financial innovation observed in the world bank takes place in the day-to-day activities of banks in peripheral economies; and e) what role the credit and the banking sector play in the construction of development alternatives.

Lastly, if we consider that banks should essentially create purchasing power to finance investment projects leading to economic development

(Schumpeter, 1996 (1912)), we may clearly understand the social role played by credits. Only that way —generating more favorable credit conditions for actual development financing— will banking activity be justified to the eyes of society. In addition, we have considered the discussion revolving around the way in which new development challenges become more complex in an era characterized by a steep internationalization of financial and monopolist capital through transnational banks. Therefore, transnational banks operating in peripheral countries disrupt the conditions for designing a successful national development strategy, as it requires that "the decision center be internalized" and, hence, that there exists an ability to "propel oneself" on the path to development [Furtado, 1964 (1961); *our translation*]. This critical component has been irrevocably altered by the presence of private foreign capital banks—whether traditional or those from the Global South—, given that the autonomy in essential decision-making processes (including decisions in the political and economic arena) must always submit to a rationale that does not truly coincide with national development needs.

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III. Social Issues, Gender and the Construction of New Perspectives

African Women's Political Empowerment towards Gender Equality

Arlin Rivas

> There is no chance for the welfare of the world unless the condition of the women is improved. It is not possible for a bird to fly on one wing.
>
> Swami Vivekananda

Historically, women have been marginalized from government structures that determine political and legislative policies. Their participation in political life is fundamental since it is one of the conditions for democratic construction, and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is also a step towards achieving gender equality (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2008).

In the last 20 years, there has been an accelerated increase in women's political participation in national parliaments around the globe as the world average almost doubled from 11.3% in 1995 to 22.1% in 2015 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015). As a result, three countries that hold the top places in the world ranking of women's political representation in parliament have emerged: Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia. Rwanda, with 61.3%, is positioned as the first place in the world while South Africa and Namibia have 42.7% and 46.2%, ranking tenth and sixth in women's political representation in parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019).

Studies seeking to understand women's political participation have mostly focused on observing whether they have achieved greater

incorporation into the political arena and if they are equally represent-
ed, however, there are political phenomena of social relevance such as
the implementation of policies aimed to establish greater gender equality
known as affirmative actions, which have been left relegated in the back-
ground. In order to analyze the progress of women in the field of political
participation, it becomes necessary to examine the social and political
context where that battle is fought in terms of female empowerment.

In the first decade of this century, the governments of Africa have sought
to introduce affirmative action measures in order to achieve greater degrees
of participation in decision-making areas (Rodríguez, 2008). Despite the
progress made and the increase in women's political participation, the hope
to attain political empowerment and a more gender-sensitive agenda are far
from being realized. According to the World Economic Forum's Global Gen-
der Gap Index that measures political empowerment, the gap between men
and women remains wide. In 144 countries, only Iceland has closed more
than 70% of its gap; Nicaragua, Rwanda, Norway and Finland have crossed
the 50% threshold, South Africa and Namibia do not exceed 30%, and 34
countries, from all regions of the world, have closed their gap less than 10%
(Global Gender Gap, 2017), which means that political empowerment has
not increased despite a higher political participation.

Women continue to face structural difficulties to strengthen their
participation and political leadership, (un Women, 2015) limiting their in-
fluence on decision-making and affirmative actions capable of integrating
a strategy to strengthen their participation and empowerment in politics.

Considering that parity prioritizes gender equality and that, spe-
cifically sdg 5 aims to advance gender equality based on women's
empowerment (un Women, 2017), it is necessary to know how much
progress has been made and what are the main obstacles faced to achieve
full political empowerment. To get to these results, the first section
presents a brief overview of the context of women's empowerment and
political participation in Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia; the sec-
ond section analyzes the provisions emanating from their parliaments
to empower women. The third section visualizes the institutional culture
of parliaments as a process that affects women's empowerment, as these

parliaments are not sensitive to gender. Finally, some reflections and future lines of research are presented.

Women's political participation and empowerment

It was in 1970 when the concept of women's empowerment became relevant, demanding a change in the social models of the time that impeded their participation in social and political life. Women's movements promoted the term *empowerment*, which came with a very complex definition, having different connotations and meanings; however, it can be better explained as the process of generating and developing capacities to exercise control over life by expanding choice; it is also linked to self-confidence, knowledge, skills, attitudes and the inherent voice (Batliwala, 1997). The empowerment of women is defined as "a process through which women increase their ability to configure their own lives and their environment; an evolution in women's awareness of themselves, their status and their effectiveness in social interactions" (Schuler, 1998, p. 31), and it is that interaction and cooperation that achieve to configure their environment, allowing them to empower themselves.

The empowerment of women begins with an increase in political participation in decision-making positions, but it cannot stop there. Influential positions must be harnessed to make a difference in the decision-making process, thus exercising affirmative actions—that seek to compensate for the historical practices of discrimination against women—in order to achieve greater degrees of participation in decision-making areas (Rodríguez, 2008).

According to Kabeer (1999), the empowerment of women has three dimensions through which it can be measured: resources, agency, and achievements. Resources include having access to these and serve to improve the ability to exercise them. Agency is the ability to define the objective of influencing a negotiation to finally accomplish actions and results. It is also an individual's capacity that is supported by an institutional change (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2012), regarding interventions

that have to do with empowering and participating in a particular group. Additionally, it can reach multiple dimensions (social, political, cultural, economic, individual and collective), making it necessary to know the object of study: the empowerment of women in the political dimension.

Women's political empowerment is understood in this article as a process of expansion of skills and abilities in the development of strategic decisions to organize and mobilize social changes that will transform the context of the political arena, responding to their needs and concerns in a scenario that has created disadvantages in the control and access to resources, agencies and achievements through their political participation, which influences actions, processes and results (Rivas, 2019). In that sense, political participation of women is fundamental to legally endow laws that empower women in politics. For research purposes, political participation means the presence of political positions in parliament for the process of formulating and implementing affirmative actions to influence results that empower women in politics.

Women in National Parliament

There is a tendency to think that political participation of women in parliaments is higher in developed countries or full democracies[1]. In the United States, Russia and Korea, women's participation ranges between 15% and 19.5% only, in Germany and France, it is around 30%, while in sub-Saharan countries it amounts to 42% to 61.3% (see Annex 1).

The increase in women's political participation in African countries is largely explained by the introduction of different gender quotas, which were implemented in the elections of Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia in 2010, 2006 and 2013 respectively. Rwanda established a constitutional quota of 30%;

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1   The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Based on their scores on 60 indicators within these categories, each country is then classified as one of four types of regime: full democracy; flawed democracy; hybrid regime; and authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017).

South Africa and Namibia legislated voluntary quotas of no less than 50%, which matches the periods where their increase has been the highest, as an indication of the effectiveness of the laws placing more women in parliament (see Graph 1). There has been an increase in women's political participation between 10 and 22 % in the last 15 years. In this way, sustained progress has been rapid in increasing the numbers of women in parliamentary representative positions, which is also due to an increase in educational opportunities and promotional activities undertaken by women's movements that have had a positive impact on the participation of women in national parliaments.

Graph 1. Women's Political Participation in National Parliaments

Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union 2004-2019.
Note: Percentage of women in parliament positions in the elections from 2004 to 2019. The minimum gender quota for Rwanda is represented in black and the grey line shows the cases of South Africa and Namibia.

In the early 1990s, women actively participated in the liberalization and reform movements for the democratization of African countries, and also promoted the formation of women's leadership in the region. Such is the case of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Women's League, which conducted a campaign for the parties to adopt a gender quota of a minimum of 50% and thus ensure the participation of women in elections. In addition, they succeeded in getting political parties to get involved in gender issues by creating commissions (Ashiagbor, 2005).

South Africa gained 10.75% from the 2004-2009 elections; in con-
trast, Namibia had a setback of 2.56%. However, in the elections from
2009 to 2014, for the first time in its history, Namibia exceeded the 40%
in its chamber, earning 21.89% in the 2009 election, while South Africa
lost 0.96%. Nowadays, both countries keep percentages above 40% (see
Graph 1). In the case of Rwanda, the percentage of women in the 2003
elections was 48.8%, earning 7.5% in the 2008 and 2013 elections; in 2014,
it reached 63.8%, while in 2018-2019 it lost 2.5% and stood at 61.3% (see
Graph 1), As shown, this rate had been on the rise for 15 years, until 2018,
when there was a slight decrease.

While it is established that the structure of the parliament of South
Africa and Namibia may have at least 50 percent women, in the last three
parliamentary elections (2004, 2009, and 2014) they have not exceeded
44.5% (see Graph 1). In the case of Rwanda, it has doubled the established
constitutional quota percentage since the implementation of quotas began.

There is a tendency to assume that higher political participation
means greater political empowerment; in that sense, the Global Gen-
der Gap Report by the World Economic Forum measures gaps between
women and men in political empowerment[2] to ascertain the influence of
political participation and how it is visualized in the gaps.

From 2006 to 2009, there was an increase in the political empower-
ment index of 0.1234 for South Africa, and Namibia saw an increase of
0.0244 (see Graph 2). Nevertheless, in 2014 they recorded a decrease
of 0.0523 and 0.0209 each. It can be seen that political empowerment of
women in Namibia has gained strength since 2017 as it grew by 0.1425
compared to 2014.; despite this, it holds the 26th position worldwide. In
the case of Rwanda, information is available only since 2014, with a score
of 0.4762. It managed to surpass its 50% empowerment gap by 2017, be-
coming second in the ranking of the countries that have most closed the
political empowerment gap (see Annex 2).

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2   It measures the gap between men and women at the highest level of political decision-making
     through the ratio of women to men in ministerial positions and the ratio of women to men in
     parliamentary positions. The highest possible score is 1 (parity) and the lowest possible score
     is 0 (imparity) (Global Gender Gap, 2017).

On the other hand, South Africa has a declining trend since 2009. It has been asserted that although there are few public policies or laws that empower women, they are actually obsolete for the reality they face today. Despite the great advance behind the increase of women in parliament in some countries, there is still a long way to go, as this progress has not been accompanied by political empowerment. Parity is still very low, and even though Rwanda is second in overcoming 50% of its gap worldwide, the question is then if that percentage will remain as the highest for the country to close its gap.

Graph 2. Women's Political Empowerment in Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia

Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Global Gender Gap-World Economic Forum, 2006-2020.
Note: Regarding the empowerment index, the closer it is to 1, the more empowerment there is. Information is available since the beginning of the report in South Africa and Namibia; there is information about Rwanda since 2014 only. There is no information in 2019. The grey line represents overcoming 50% of the political empowerment gap.

Affirmative action's strategy to women's empowerment

According to Alda Facio (2000), affirmative action starts from the recognition of the historical inequality of power and enjoyment of rights between

women and men, forcing the State to take a series of special temporary measures to accelerate the achievement of gender equality without these being discriminatory expressions for men. In other words, women and men do not have the same opportunities for socially constructed causes and, therefore, the enforcement of neutral rules leads to unequal results, hence the need to implement concrete affirmative actions to counteract this.

In short, affirmative action seeks to implement a series of actions intended to substantively modify political culture understood as the set of values, beliefs, behaviours, symbols, and common and shared experiences which allow developing a unified way of political culture that has been "dominated by the values and characteristics considered masculine such as assertiveness, aggressiveness, competition, achievement orientation, independence, and the search for power, based on control and aspects that highlight dominance and strength" (Ramos, 2005, p. 41).

Hence the importance of underlining the need to implement effective affirmative actions aimed to develop and strengthen women's leadership. In addition to the existing actions—such as gender quotas—seeking to guarantee a minimum presence of women in the spaces of political representation will provide them with the capability of effectively exerting influence on the definition of the public agenda and therefore the adoption of political decisions.

Several affirmative actions have been carried out in cooperation in the international arena, one of which is the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, a non-binding commitment adopted in 2004 that covers six thematic areas: health, peace and security, governance, human rights, education, and women's empowerment. With relation to the last of these areas, the heads of state and government have pledged to report annually on their progress in incorporating the gender perspective. Despite making such commitments, no state has fully reported on implementation, and no studies have been conducted to date to evaluate the Protocol (Kombo, Sow and Jama Mohamed, 2013).

Another affirmative action is the adoption of the Gender Policy and the African Union (AU) Action Plan in 2010, whose objectives are to adopt a rights-based development approach through evidence based on decision-making and encourage reorientation of existing institutions using

data and performance indicators disaggregated by gender. The main purpose is to guide the process of gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment to influence procedures, policies, and practices which will accelerate the achievement of gender equality. Therefore, the policy offers a framework "to establish standards and criteria required to monitor, evaluate and ensure the follow up of progress realized in mainstreaming gender equality and empowerment of women in a regular manner" (African Union, 2009, p. 9), and Member States of the AU have to report annually on progress made in gender mainstreaming.

The plan also establishes measures to hold institutions accountable and responsible for the implementation of policies; and one of the plan's commitments is the creation of a favourable and stable environment to ensure that all political statements and decisions aim to eliminate persistent barriers to reach gender equality and women's empowerment. In the same way, the African Union developed a Strategic Plan for Gender Integration (GMSP), which mainly seeks to periodically review shared quotas and representations to increase the participation of women in decision-making by establishing gender-sensitive political and governance policies and adopting affirmative action programs.

In that same year, the African Women's Decade (2010-2020) was declared with "grassroots approaches to gender equality and women's empowerment," which emphasizes the bottom-up approach to development and builds on 10 priority issues that seek to empower women in Africa. Theme 9 focuses on women in decision-making positions in the legislature, the judiciary and the executive, and in reaching the principle of parity of the African Union (African Union, 2010). Likewise, the African Union's heads of state and government declared 2015 as the year of women's empowerment and development towards Agenda 2063 (African Union, 2016).

The Women Gender Directorate Development (WGDD), created in 2002 at the Office of the Presidency of the AUC, promotes gender equality in Africa and within the African Union, and oversees the development and harmonization of gender-related policies. In 2016, the gender meeting was held, making special emphasis on the following: a) evaluate the progress of women's participation in politics, public offices and the judiciary, identify

the challenges and barriers that impede their effective participation, and develop strategies to accelerate the role of women and their leadership agency, b) raise awareness and develop a common strategy for the implementation of 2016 as the year of Human Rights, c) involve practitioners, legislators and activists to review the implementation of the women's political participation agenda, learn from experiences and challenges, and reflect on what is needed to accelerate implementation and monitoring.

Meanwhile, it is essential to know what parliaments are doing as institutions to encourage and promote public gender equality policies that respond to an action pursuing women's political empowerment. A classification and analysis of three categories of measures towards political empowerment will be applied to the case study:

1. Precepts intended to promote equality in women's political participation.
2. Issued resolutions for the elimination of discrimination against women's political participation.
3. Provisions that dictate to monitor the effectiveness and enforcement of equality policies on women's political participation.

Rwanda

Rwanda's government has developed and implemented the "2020 Vision", which maintains a strong commitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), one of whose main objectives is to achieve gender equality and women's empowerment. Strong political will in Rwanda has led to significant positive advances in the provisions to promote equality in participation. Coupled with the aforementioned gender quotas, the Rwandan government established a national gender policy that seeks to incorporate the gender perspective into its projects, reinforcing the commitment of public institutions at the highest level—including the Office of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister and the National Gender Agency. to implement gender equality undertakings.

Regarding the elimination of discrimination against women in political participation, the Rwandan constitution maintains a precept in article 15 and 16 Protection against discrimination of any kind (Rwanda's Constitution, 2015) and an article that promotes freedom to join a political organization where no Rwandan will be subject to discrimination on the grounds of belonging to a particular political organization, or not belonging to a political organization (Chapter VI. Political organizations. Article 55). As well, gender-sensitive laws have been enacted, such as Law No. 59/2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-based Violence.

Finally, in what concerns the supervision and enforcement of equal political participation policies, Rwanda established the Rwanda Women Parliamentary Forum (1996), which a) advocates for the promotion of the gender principle of equality and the empowerment of women in politics, programs and budgets; b) ensures that the laws that are enacted are gender-sensitive; c) boosts momentum for a transformative gender agenda at national, regional and international levels; d) has created commissions led by women on health and education issues in a way to develop the capacity of the members. Likewise, the National Women's Council (2003) was created and has three axes: a) Mobilization of women to participate in different development programs in Rwanda, b) Development of women's capacities for effective empowerment, c) Advocacy for the resolution of women's problems and an Internal Gender Audit (2009), established by its constitution with the mission of empowering women and accelerating their participation in development.

South Africa

South Africa maintains 4 measures to promote equality in women's political participation: a) quotas legislated at the national level, b) voluntary quotas adopted by political parties, c) a South African Local Government Association, and d) a Discussion Committee on the situation of women in the diplomatic service.

The quotas legislated at the national level were established from the implementation of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (1998) providing the parties must try to ensure that 50% of the candidates of the party list are women in the elections for local assembly, however, its wording only encourages, but does not bind the parties to adopt a system for proportional representation seats.

In voluntary quotas adopted by political parties at the national level, the African National Congress (ANC) party remains the only party that practices voluntary quotas, first establishing a quota of 30 percent before the 1994 parliamentary elections. In 2006, the ANC adopted 50 percent; the party statute stipulates "the provision of a quota of no less than fifty percent of women in all elected structures" (ANC Constitution, Article 6). The quota was extended to the national elections in 2009.

Likewise, it is worthwhile highlighting the importance of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), which has pioneered the inclusion of acts to exert pressure to incorporate more women in local government leadership positions. A similar discussion committee is held regarding women in the diplomatic service and the search for measures that boost their political empowerment. With relation to measures to eliminate discrimination against women in political participation, the country has a law against harassment and political violence against women, one of the few constitutions that contemplate such laws.

Section three deals with measures to monitor the effectiveness and enforcement of equality policies on women's political participation under two dimensions: a) The Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) and b) Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill.

CGE came into existence after the Seventeenth Amendment Act in 2013 on the empowerment of women and gender equality, helping to establish a legislative framework for the empowerment of women, to align all aspects of laws and the implementation of women's empowerment-related laws and the appointment and representation of women in decision-making positions and structures, and to provide related information. It also states that there must be at least 50 percent representation and significant participation of women in decision-making positions and structures.

Chapter 4 of the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2013) addresses governance, powers of ministers and gender units. In order to promote the empowerment of women and the achievement of substantive gender equality for women, the bill stipulates that the Minister may: a) develop frameworks for the promotion of women's empowerment and gender equality, b) require the development and implementation of plans and measures by public bodies and private entities designated for the promotion of women's empowerment and gender equality in compliance with this bill and the submission of such plans and measures for consideration, review and guidance by the Minister, c) monitor and evaluate progress on women's empowerment and gender equality.

Namibia

Namibia has 3 provisions to promote equality in the political participation of women: a) quotas legislated at the subnational level, b) voluntary quotas adopted by political parties, and c) the Promotion of the Welfare of the People.

The first quota of women legislated at the subnational level in Namibia was established in the Local Authorities Act of 1992, stipulating that in the election of any municipal council or town council with 10 or fewer members, party lists must include at least 2 women. In the case of a municipal council consisting of 11 or more members, party lists must include the names of at least 3 women. In 1997, these figures increased to three and five, respectively, and in 2002 this rule was made applicable to future elections (Frank, 2004, p. 88, LeBeau and Dima, 2005, p. 84). With relation to the voluntary quotas adopted by the political parties, in August 2013, the ruling party in the National Assembly—South West Africa People's Organization (swapo)—adopted a 50% gender quota that will be applied to all political parties at national and regional structures.

The last provision promoting the welfare of people set forth in the Namibian Constitution establishes the enactment of legislation to guarantee

equal opportunities for women, so that they can fully participate in all spheres of the Namibian society, including politics. The measures to eliminate discrimination against women in political participation and monitoring the effectiveness and enforcement of equality policies on women's political participation only include one mechanism that addresses Apartheid and affirmative action, and sets out the enactment of legislation and the implementation of enacted policies and practices, taking into account that women in Namibia have traditionally suffered special discrimination and need to be encouraged and trained to play a full, equal and effective role in the country's political, social, economic and cultural life.

Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (Namibian Constitution, 2014) guarantees equality before the law and the right to non-discrimination on the grounds of sex. The constitution is considered one of the few instruments that thoroughly use gender neutral language. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa was ratified in 2004. The Namibian government recently signed and ratified the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, and it has also implemented several new policy measures.

Gender-sensitive parliaments to achieve political empowerment

Throughout Africa, women face a series of barriers to develop their full potential, from restrictive cultural practices to discriminatory laws. In this sense, it is necessary to underline that the restrictions on political participation that women are subject to are not determined by their individual qualities (aptitudes, personality and personal abilities), but are an expression of a political culture that legitimizes and enhances male values and establishes unequal opportunities in the exercise of citizenship, the result of which is the general tendency for women's political participation to concentrate in grassroots positions, while leadership, higher status and highly valued positions are occupied mostly by men.

It is also necessary to implement effective affirmative actions that develop and strengthen women's leadership, in addition to the existing ones,

especially in gender quotas, a mechanism implemented in different countries—including Mexico—to guarantee a minimum presence of women in spaces of political representation, aiming to effectively influence the definition of the public agenda and the adoption of political decisions. When entering the political arena in positions of popular representation, women are confronted with a world where their legitimacy is sometimes questioned due to unfavourable conditions that hinder them from fully exercising their position and consolidating their political empowerment.

Resistance to women in parliament can take different forms such as insults, sexist comments, intimidation, and harassment/political violence, all of which are unacceptable practices and have no place in political culture.

Political harassment against women has three main characteristics: a) it is directed against women because they are women, b) it can take a sexist form, c) it tries to discourage them from actively participating in policymaking. Violence against women parliamentarians is exercised in traditional political spaces, such as parliamentary premises, district offices and places for holding political rallies, as well as in new spaces for debate created by social media.

The perpetrators of violence do not circumscribe to the circle of political adversaries only. Women parliamentarians can be harassed or assaulted by male colleagues from their own parties (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016) because parliaments are not gender-sensitive, making it impossible for women to achieve full political empowerment.

Parliaments cannot be considered inclusive until they can take pride in including the full participation of women. Parliaments that are gender-sensitive do not tamper such broader participation of women and constitute a positive example for society as a whole. The inclusion of women in political decision-making is not only a matter of women's right to equality and participation in public affairs but also of leveraging women's resources and potential to determine political and development priorities that benefit societies and the community in general (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2008) since the active participation of women, on an equal footing with men, at all levels of decision-making is indispensable to attain equality, sustainable development, peace and democracy.

Improving the inclusiveness of parliaments is a multifaceted challenge that impacts everyone. There are factors that affect the adoption of gender-related legislation: a) support from the ruling party, b) support from parliamentarians, c) number of women in parliament, d) support from the opposition party.

In addition to the need to give democracy a greater and more decisive boost, there is a need for a greater number of women, stronger infrastructure from a gender perspective, as well as stronger policies and legislation on gender equality. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (2012) has stipulated an action plan that outlines 7 sections intended to make parliaments more gender-sensitive and thus achieve the political empowerment of women: a) increase the number and presence of women in parliament; b) develop and strengthen an appropriate legal framework on gender equality; c) mainstream gender equality throughout all parliamentary work d) incorporate the gender perspective in parliamentary tasks and ensure that all parliamentarians—men and women—share the responsibility to promote gender equality; e) improve gender-sensitive infrastructure and parliamentary culture infrastructure, f) encourage political parties to defend gender equality and g) enhance the gender sensitivity of, and gender equality among parliamentary staff. It is in this way that political participation of women is considered fundamental to influence the agenda and make parliaments more gender-sensitive to achieve their empowerment.

Conclusions

Historically, women have been excluded from political participation and governance. The need to guarantee women's political participation rights was acknowledged at the end of the 20th century. Thanks to the commitment of various international actors and agreements, women's political participation in Rwanda, South Africa and Namibia has increased in the last 20 years. Despite great progress has been made so far, it has not been accompanied by political empowerment. Only Rwanda exceeds 50% of its political empowerment gap, while South Africa and Namibia do not exceed 30%. These gaps

remain very wide and well reflect a very low level of political parity. While increasing the political participation of women in decision-making areas such as parliament is a form of political empowerment, it is necessary to exercise political power effectively through legislative and supervisory frameworks to transform the socio-political context of women, since the importance of empowering women is to promote political pluralism by encouraging equality through a balanced substantive representation in public and political life and to attain sustainable development, peace and democracy.

In spite of the publicly declared commitment of the international community to equality and reducing the gender gap in the political sphere, women's empowerment still is a very distant reality. The prevalence of cultural and traditional practices in many countries remains an obstacle. The political class continues to give low priority to solving the problems and obstacles that prevent women from participating in equal conditions to men, tending to keep on reproducing the same patterns of power that reflect a resistance to integrate women as political subjects, and thus excluding them in decision making. Actual equality in practice is still an aspiration. Political violence is an issue that has been relegated and significantly affects the participation and political empowerment of women. Although South Africa is one of the few countries worldwide whose constitution provides an endorsement against harassment and political violence against women and a framework for its enforcement, this is found in a sub-section of domestic law and not as a separate legal and binding instrument. It only classifies and defines political violence, but does not propose a framework to penalize it. In the case of Rwanda and Namibia, there is a lack of political will of the parties to open spaces, coupled with resistance to recognizing political violence in the law. There is still a long way to go, and whenever there are barriers that limit women's exercise of rights and acts of violence against them, no progress can be made to achieve full political empowerment.

In South Africa and Namibia, the presence of women in parliaments has increased exponentially thanks to the introduction of quotas legislated at the national and subnational levels and the voluntary quotas adopted by the parties. However, in terms of strengthening its legal framework, there is a gap in Namibia to provide for laws on gender equality and non-discriminatory

measures, which are essential to achieve progress in the political empower-
ment of women. It is also crucial to update and include frameworks related
to gender mainstreaming. On the other hand, South Africa, being one of the
few countries that has a law on political empowerment and gender equali-
ty, should update its legal framework. Since 2009, political empowerment of
women has decreased. Nevertheless, an updated framework does not mean
such a decrease will stop, but at least in the short term this can translate into
a mechanism to achieve greater degrees of empowerment. In Rwanda, al-
though it is true that there are commissions led by women, they address
downgraded issues of low importance to the national agenda such as health
and education—compared to economic and security issues—that only have
a mere consultative status.

It is very important to note that gender equality is not guaranteed
by simply having women in parliament. Instead, it depends on how
sensitized and aware of gender issues the parliament, its policies and in-
frastructure are. It is paramount for parliaments to analyze in detail the
masculinity of the institution, studying culture, customs and practices
regarding the day-to-day functioning of the institution, for example, the
sexist nature of procedures, language, rituals or ceremonies.

The gender system affects political relations, creating a glass ceiling[3]
not in having limited access to political positions of representation in
parliament—since it is not the case in Rwanda, South Africa and Namib-
ia—but in women encountering barriers to be active actors in making
public policies that empower them politically, establishing a sticky floor
by only being part of parliament but unable to influence decision-making
because of such obstacles.

Achieving a seat in parliament is the first handicap to overcome. Once
elected, women parliamentarians face a set of new problems such as finding
their own place in parliament and acquiring influence in policy-mak-
ing processes. Therefore, the election of more women parliamentarians is

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3   Term that refers to the barrier imposed by prejudice and discrimination when women have
     less opportunity to exercise leadership even if they have the same or even higher professional
     careers than men. (Eagle y Carli, 2004).

not equivalent to empowering women in politics. Parliaments and their members must become gender-sensitive, and only through a partnership between men and women can we implement a common platform to achieve women's political empowerment, which is necessary to close the current political empowerment gap that is in fact projected to be fully closed in 107 years from now if the situation remains the same.

Annexes

Annex 1. Women's Political Participation 2019

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2019) made on map-chart.net. Notes: Percentage of Women in National Parliaments

Annex 2. Women's Political Empowerment Gap 2020

Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Economic Forum and Global Gender Gap (2020) made on mapchart.net. Notes: Empowerment index, on a scale of 0-1 where the closest to 1 equals more empowerment.

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Ni Uhuru? Mau Mau and Nationalism in Kenya

Javier Sacristán

Abstract

This article analyzes how the independent state of Kenya has tried to build its own national identities based on its past and specifically on the rebellion of the Mau Mau. The objective is to look at how politicians employed memory in this episode of Kenyan history to build absolute unity in society. The main focus is trying to explain how the people how fought for land and freedom, the ones how fought for Uhuru, have been reminisced by the official history, and how they integrate nationalism in current Kenya. The search for identity as a nation starts with colonialism, and the question is if the Mau Mau rebellion can break the ethnic and gender barriers in building nationalism.

Introduction

The objective of this article is to explain the contribution of the Mau Mau rebellion in the construction of national identity in Kenya. In order to achieve it, the first step is to define the terms nationalism and ethnicity. Numerous authors in the twentieth century have written about nationalism and identity. In recent times, the Mau Mau topic has been a point of interest because in Kenya, after its independence in 1963, Mau Mau has been rescued in the historical memory of the Kenyan people. Those who fought for Uhuru are demanding the British government to obtain compensation for the time when they suffered violence. Other reasons for this resuscitation of Mau Mau include that the government is starting

a project named "Corner of the Heroes;" the dilemma is who will be in that corner.

What happened in the 1950s is still a topic of discussion. Mau Mau has become an excellent example of the use of memory as a form of political legitimation. It is therefore necessary to explain the political use of memory and the problems it can provoke in a social setting.

In 1956, the British government struggled with the difficult problem of taking care of its settlers in Kenya because Africans could return to violence at any moment, so having an army there was too expensive. The Mau Mau never asked for the independence of Kenya, but history recognizes that this rebellion was crucial to accomplish it.

The intention is to prove that Mau Mau has not been forgotten despite the politicians in Kenya who tried to do so for a long time. Hence, this rebellion had an essential role in the construction of the Kenyan identity and the values of the Kenyan society. The importance of this study is giving another perspective of the process of nationalism construction in Kenya.

Nationalism

One of the authors who tried to define nationalism was Krzysztof Jaskulowski (2010, pp. 289-303). He talks about eastern and western nationalism. In the words of this author, nationalism is "the idea of a chosen people, the emphasis on a common history and future, national messianism, and the supreme loyalty to political unity" (Jaskulowski, 2010, p. 292). Nationalism came from unity, but in the case of Africa, nationalism is a collective identity.

Another relevant author is K. R. Minogue (1968, 246 pp.) who explains that in the 17th century, the concept of nationalism referred to a specific group of people, making the concept exclusivist. This concept tries to include everyone in a determined geographic space. Those people had and still have a wish for belonging to a group, so they form a nation.

In Africa, the colonies started when the Europeans held the Berlin Conference in 1885. The limits that they defined at the time were the

same in independence, and it will be the work of their leaders to build identity searching common aspects in people of different ethnic groups (Kohn and Sokolzy, 1968, p. 104).

Nationalism is an ideology that promotes a collective identity; the people in one specific space understand their state and believe that the government is making the best decisions to benefit them. Nationalism forms an identity and people can even put their life at risk to defend it.

Memory

When historians started to professionalize, memory was a negative factor in such a discipline. No historian could trust in the things that some social groups may remember or not because those social groups had their own interests and political objectives. The first step in professionalizing history was the search for objectivity, and memory did not have a share in it.

More recently, history and memory have bonded, and many scholars started to work in this concept, and more precisely in the idea of collective memory. The concept of collective memory was academically reviewed in the early twentieth century (Lee Klein, 2011, p. 112). Historicism defines memory as a primitive form that is contrary to the historical consciousness because memory is the first step of history but does not analyze the process or the event. However, memory cannot be seen as the opposite of the historical discourse, because it contributes to constructing both itself and this discourse and can be a central part of the latter.

Scholarly memory can show how some cultures construct their history; an example is that in some eras, historians use oral traditions to deepen into history and a key element in this tradition is memory. Nevertheless, memory became a category of history that gathers a lot of other concepts as myth and folklore. Memory is an instrument, but it is necessary for official history.

The new use of memory is remaking historical imagination (Lee Klein, 2011, p. 114), including open memory boundaries to history, and

giving this discipline new participation in politics. In the case of the Mau Mau, the memory of those who were a part of the rebellion will be crucial in the construction of nationalism.

The construction of an identity

Before talking about nationalism in Kenya, it is necessary to consider this country was living in a post-conflict society that had recently gained its independence. This idea is essential as, in this context, people like Jomo Kenyatta had the necessity of making a national identity because independence has to come along with peace. Nevertheless, Kenya experienced the same ethnic situation as that of all the African countries and saw a division caused by the Mau Mau war, making it hard for the State to find common ground for nationalism.

Before the State of Emergency in 1952, Kenyan writers like Wunyabari O. Maloba conceived national identity had to arise from literature and would go through constant change (Maloba, 1998). After World War I, a feeling of unity came to life thanks to the oppression of the colonial institutions and the rebellion to fight it unfolded in written words.

The Gikuyu were searching for power, security, and integrity, but it would not be until World War II that they were to find a reason to demand those principles, and it was when they fought against the British Army in the war. The problem was that the educated elite were the ones who started the political fight. As Fanon (1973, p. 38) asserted, those elites have the European way of thinking, and they never believed in violence as a means.

Even though they believed in demonstrations, they did not believe in armed practices. An example of that was Harry Thuku, a man who was detained by the British army because of his political activities against the colonial government. When he got detained, many women went outside the jail to show that they were against his detention. The police fired into the crowd, and this riot went down in history as the Harry Thuku Riot. Before the Mau Mau, the colonial elite was the center not only of

nationalism but also of history. The riots of Harry Thuku in the year of 1922 are considered as the first steps towards constructing identity, but are also the first example of the problem of forgetting.

Several authors have discussed the Mau Mau myth. The idea of the rebellion as a myth shows the political problem that the Mau Mau fighters and this specific event represented to the newly independent nation of Kenya (Friedman, 1995). It is necessary to dismiss the idea of seeing the rebellion as a myth because that fight had an essential contribution to the historical process of independence and seeing it as a myth does not do justice to it. The institutions in power at the time wanted to forget the rebellion, so using the Mau Mau as a myth was the first step to forget because they were not heroes; they were a myth of violence and blood.

It seems that the first contribution of the Mau Mau is the idea of Africans against Europeans; even though the rebellion lost the war, the fighters demonstrated that Africans could raise their voice against the exploitation of the settlers. The Mau Mau gives pride to Kenyans, but then they were pitted against political interests, and people such as Jomo Kenyatta that was trying to improve the economy of his country, needed to erase them from history (Baer, 1956).

The first step in the problem of nationalism is memory. National identity emerged from history, and history has to demonstrate who is the ideal Kenyan; people who fought for their land were in the memory of people same as those who fought for freedom. The Mau Mau movement was a rebellion with an agricultural objective (Berman, 1991). The government of Jomo Kenyatta debases their participation in the process of independence because they were violent, but that violence made the security of the settlers untenable for the British Empire.

During the war, some Mau Mau regarded Kenyatta as a hero because he was in jail.[1] On the other hand, some former fighters think that he does not have any relation to the war because, in those years, he was in jail, and he did not believe in violence. Nevertheless, Kenyatta was the

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[1]   The British Empire thought that he was the leader of the rebellion and he was detained with some leaders of the KANU.

first president to try to forget the fight of those years; despite being in jail, he never denied the relation with the Mau Mau because being in a colonial jail would give him a better reputation. In 1963 the ones who did not believe in him saw a man that was searching power rather than freedom. The state was trying to sell the land, which was the reason for a fight. The songs of the war played an essential part in the first steps to forge nationalism. Thus, it is necessary to understand them to understand this process and its political implications.

Some songs of the Mau Mau can give the first steps of identity in the rebellion (Wa Kinyatti, 1990). The song *Tell the Elders to Keep Quiet* says that the young will take their lands with guns and will return the peace to the elders. So those who fought with the Mau Mau will have the authority to say that they want to help their fathers and grandfathers and the young that do not do anything or only study have to be in worse conditions than them. The settlers were in Kenya to eat the people. They wanted to take all they needed but young people were tired and they started to defend their property.

Another element that can be found in the songs is anti-colonialism. *When the British Came* (Wa Kinyatti, 1990) is a song saying that the British came to Kenya with oppression only; this feeling of no civilization started after World War II. The British arrived in Kenya talking about civilization, but when a lot of African soldiers were sent to the war, they saw that white people had the same problems that Africans had.

Nevertheless, not all the elements of nationalism come from Mau Mau, the song *May Imperialism Perish Forever* (Wa Kinyatti, 1990) talks about Chege wa Kibiru, a man who lived in the 18th century and talked about the arrival of Europeans. He said that men like a small pale-colored frog would arrive in their lands, and with their magical wands that throw fire they would defeat the Gikuyu warriors. He also talked about the necessity of defeating those men and throw them back from the place where they arrived. Chege was a model for the Mau Mau warriors because, to them, he was the first Gikuyu that wanted to fight white people, and it seemed that he had magic powers.

In this same song, we can see the worry of parents about the little kids and their need to grow in freedom, that is one of the reasons why they took

up arms. People who sing about the future generations will have a problem when they do not receive recognition in history. The Mau Mau did not take the *matunda ya uhuru,* the fruits of freedom, because they were violent, but without that violence, the Kenyans would not have achieved independence. Even though many people condemned such violence, they also know that "full independence can only be brought about by revolution" (Anonymous, 1982, p. 13). One of the things that contribute to the idea of violence was the oath necessary to be part of the Kenyan Land and Freedom Army. A lot of Gikuyu people were forced to take the oath. Some authors saw the oath as an element of the political identity of the Gikuyu (Anonymous, 1982, p. 13). It was a form of coercion and prevention of betrayal.

With independence in 1963, the black bourgeoisie took power. Jomo Kenyatta was the first president, but he even was in jail because the British government thought he was one of the leaders of the Mau Mau; his government gave many benefits to the loyalists and to the white settlers. Those who fought for *uhuru* forgot they needed to buy the land, and no bank would lend them money. They cannot sue the loyalists for torture because the loyalists were in the government, so they were condemned to oblivion. Kenyatta said that Uhuru was not enough, Kenyans needed to be economically equal in order to have a nation (Branch, 2009, p. 179).

The time of Kenyatta was the time of *uhuru na kazi*, freedom and work. However, who were working the land? The landowners were those who fought the Mau Mau rebellion with the British army, and those who were working were Mau Mau rebels who suffered torture in the camps and their situation did not change. They had another problem, and it was that those who tortured them were working in the Kenyatta government so they could not demand justice.

Kenyatta claimed that social divisions would end with love, peace, and union (Branch, 2009, p. 179). This element of Kenyatta's speeches shows that his government and the negotiation for independence left a lot of social differences, those who were in jail during the war did not have anything, and the government did not help them because they were selling land. Kenyatta knew that the loyalists were working with him, so he needed to build union and forgiveness in the country (Savage, 1970, p. 519).

The white settlers saw in Kenyatta some protection (Savage, 1970, p. 519). Their land remained in the hands of the same owners, the Mau Mau fighters did not obtain anything, and the government recognized their properties. Kenyatta saw the Mau Mau as a sickness that had to be forgotten. When he said all of them fought for *uhuru*, for freedom, he said that Mau Mau had no special participation in history, and he even said that it was necessary to forget that kind of violence.

In 1967, four years after independence, Kenyatta tried to Africanize Kenya but without affecting the white settlers. The only way was giving the Kenyans the option to buy land, but the soldiers of the Mau Mau did not want to buy the land that the white settlers had taken from them.

In the process of Africanization, the role of history and memory is fundamental. The government had the job of thinking who had to be a hero. The image of someone who gave the country independence would become a model of behavior and moral, but when a government thinks about making a monument, it is necessary to ponder who will be considered a hero.

If Kenyatta tried to forget those who fought for *uhuru*—because to him all the people fought for it—trying to build a nationalist identity becomes complicated. One question is who is qualified to decide who will lie in the Corner of Heroes. Who decides what a hero is? Some loyalists work for the government, and they think that people who were murdered by the Mau Mau are those who deserve this monument. On the other hand, the Mau Mau rebels hope that people like Dedan Kimathi will finally be recognized by the government not only with a statue, but by being buried as a hero, because a ceremony like this will give much recognition to their fight.

Ngugi Wa Thiong'o has many novels that analyze and make critiques of independent Kenya and the relation with the fighters for freedom. In *The Trial of Dedan Kimathi* (Githae Mugo and Wa Thiong'o, 1976) the reader can find the Kenyan identity beyond the ethnic identity. It seems that the Mau Mau were not fighting for the Gikuyu but for the freedom of Kenya. In the beginning, the author analyzes the problem of memory in Kenya; in any official capacity, the questions are who the heroes were and why nobody is writing about them. The analysis returns to the idea of the

model, like all nations of Kenya have to have a model, but when Kenyatta negotiated the independence and many loyalists stayed in power, memory became a political question.

The British government said that this rebellion was purely tribal and had no reason to be, but in the book of Wa Thiong'o, lieutenant Kimathi was a person who always had an answer (Githae Mugo y Wa Thiong'o, 1976, p. 13). So, for Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, the war had an objective, and he tried to show how this war contributed to the independence. In *The Trial of Dedan Kimathi*, the reader can see a moment when an old lady who used to transport weapons for the Mau Mau in the forest talks to two little boys. The old lady tries to explain the Kenyan model: a person who has to cooperate with others that have to work for a better life for all generations (Githae Mugo y Wa Thiong'o, 1976, p. 46).

It may seem that the Mau Mau weren't able to deal with civilization and they didn't search the benefit of Kenya. However, in history they fought against the exploitation of the British government and part of their contribution to nationalism was an identity against the British even though the government negotiated independence with the British settlers to maintain the status quo. For Ngugi Wa Thiong'o the fighters were forgotten, but there is no reason to consider the Mau Mau rebels an essential part of the Kenyan nation. It is necessary to insist as Berman does "that Mau Mau was a modern, rational, and nationalist political movement, not a tribalist reaction, and that the fighters of the Land and Freedom Army had fought a glorious struggle for national liberation" (Berman, 1991, p. 46).

Another element in the novels of Wa Thiong'o were the people who took the weapons to the forest or who sold the bullets (Wa Thiong'o, 1987). Those like in the poem of Berltot Brecht were a fundamental part of history, but without their names they were forgotten. In the novels where all kinds of people transport weapons to the forest, Wa Thiong'o presents this action as a collaboration to Kenya and its freedom. It is clear that Kenya needs to recognize this participation and also start to forget ethnic divisions. The Kenyans were colonized because imperialism introduced ethnic identities as an element of division and made all Africans fight among themselves. To this author, nationalism was not only

Kenyan; it seems that in order to fight against European imperialism all Africans had to collaborate.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to say that Ngugi Wa Thiong'o wrote with a political objective, which is why he was in jail during the government of Arap Moi. The emblematic novelist always made critiques about the politics of independent Kenya and Kenyatta's goal that sought to forget the Mau Mau.

History, in general, had forgotten the role of women, or maybe wanted to forget it, and Kenya is not the exception. In order to include all the society in nationalism, it is necessary to remember women. African history has to review and rethink women in the process of decolonization and in politics after independence (Santoru, 1996).

Colonialism brought the idea that women were needed at home and for having kids. Independent states tried to maintain this policy which is still present in Kenya and will only change when historians work out the role of women in rebellions like the Mau Mau. In the last days of rebellion, many men were killed or detained at camps, so their wives and daughters started to take control of the rebellion. On the other side, we have to think about their importance in the rebellion and in the Gikuyu society.

Women became more politically aware in colonialism because they saw what happened to their sons and husbands, and that is the reason why they joined the Mau Mau, which has made it hard to determine the role of women in the Gikuyu society.

Before the rebellion, women were working for the settlers, so when the State of Emergency started, they had a connection with the Europeans; (Santoru, 1996) even though many women did not have an active part in the rebellion, they gave the Mau Mau information about the British army and ammunition. It is clear that inside nationalism in Kenya the participation of women was forgotten and those who are interested in rescuing the history of the Mau Mau have to think about the actions of those that were not considered in history, women included.

The Gikuyu society was not divided only by loyalists and Mau Mau. The British army treated some civilians who celebrated the State of

Emergency as rebels, the only ones who weren't tortured were those who participated with the army or the traitors that ignored the oath.

When the war ended, one has to think where the fighters for uhuru were. Those who lost the war were afraid of the condition they would have after it because the loyalists of the British army were in better conditions and will be in power after independence. The fighters did not have money or land; instead, those who tortured and killed them were in power.

Conclusion

It is clear that part of the contribution of nationalism of the Mau Mau is anti-colonialism, but it is also true that another heritage of the rebellion that can be found in Kenyan identity is the existence of more than one nationalism in Kenya (Odhiambo, 2003).

Even though there is more than one nationalism, it was not constructed by those who ate the *matunda ya uhuru*.[2] The nationalism that could be found in Kenya, like all constructions of nationalism in the world, is about identity and not about who has access to state privileges.

In the work of Ngugi Wa Thiong'o we find another idea of nationalism. This author shows that the Mau Mau had a clear idea of Kenya, they fought for the nation even before it existed, and they fought for the freedom of a nation, but when the black bourgeoisie took power, when the nation was finally there, they started to be forgotten.

The government of Kenyatta forgot the fundamental part of the movement. Constitutionalists, those who fought a legitimate fight in colonial politics, were those who took power, and when the State of Emergency started, they condemned the fight of the Mau Mau because they went beyond the legitimate fight. The reader has to think about the past of Kenyatta. He lived in Great Britain with privileges that the Kenyan society did not have.

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2   Fruits of freedom.

Actually, nationalism in Kenya is divided between those who think that the Mau Mau made a great contribution to nationalism or those who think that they were only assassins that did not want the development of the British. Even Ngugi Wa Thiong'o thinks that the loyalists that worked in the government did not participate in the construction of a Kenyan identity, they were after the money that buys everything.

So, who must be in the Corner of Heroes? Who is a model of Kenyan nationalism? People such as Tom Mboya who helped detainees or those who have power and determination of forgetting the Mau Mau and their role in history? After the murder of Mboya in 1969, some people have recognized his role in the fight for freedom of speech. Tom Mboya is recognized as a Pan-Africanist and not as a collaborator of the Mau Mau (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2006, p. 8).

For Atieno Odhiambo (2003), there is more than one nationalism, and it is true, but it is essential to think which nationalism is ruling in Kenya in order to analyze the new project of the Corner of the Heroes. It is possible to find a lot of ideas of nationalism in one nation, but the people in power have the privilege to build a nationalism where they seem like heroes. The government always constructs the identity of a nation, so the elite decides who had a share in history and who did not. We can find in the opposition another vision of who can have or who deserves the privileges of freedom.

Anti-colonialism is a vital part of nationalism as long as the Mau Mau are considered in it because if they are not, the idea of anti-colonialism does not exist; people like Kenyatta was trying to make peace with colonialism rather than fight it.

One of the problems of nationalism in Kenya is the vision of history. In this specific case, it is the way of how people remember the Mau Mau. Some people see the Mau Mau as the government of Kenyatta saw them. Some people think that the Mau Mau were the good ones and the loyalists the bad ones:

> The chronicle of atrocity and bestiality perpetrated by British soldiers and their Kenyan lackeys lives on in the minds of our parents. Some

day soon their testimony must become part of our national heritage (Anonymous, 1982, p. 11).

There are many ways to see this. We can find Gikuyu in the Mau Mau, but we can find Gikuyu in the loyalists of the British Army. With the Mau Mau, one can find people without a job, and these people were not fighting for *uhuru*. They were fighting for something for them and their family, and even for revenge against a settler; they fought for personal problems.

The Gikuyu in power forgot the fight of other ethnic groups, and they think that those who can have the benefits of Uhuru are only them, ethnic groups like the Masai that fought with them, and now independent Kenya has no concerns. It is the work of historians to review the Mau Mau war and try to recognize the role of those who were not Gikuyu.

The construction of a national identity in a recently independent country is hard. The problems in Kenya came with a war where the settlers hardly participated. Those who fought were Kenyans, the ones who believed in the Mau Mau, and the ones that did not believe in them. The British provided soldiers but actually the ones who were killed were Kenyans at de hands of other fellow Kenyans.

This article intended to make a contribution to the discussion of nationalism in a country that has had a problem of identity since its independence. When someone walks in the street and sees the man that killed his father in war, the problem of making those men work together and see each other as equals is hard even though the Mau Mau are gaining a role in history as a rebellion against the settlers, thanks to whom Kenya is free.

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Tuareg Representations and Rebellions in Azawad: Geopolitical Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Mali

Adriana Franco

Abstract

Tuareg and Azawad representations have led the Malian government to justify the insecurity and systemic violence in which Tuareg have lived. However, this has fostered Tuareg rebellions against the Malian government in 1963, 1990, 2006-2007, and 2012. The last two insurrections have been re-operationalized by France and the us to expand their presence in the area, which shows that the Sahara-Sahelian region is becoming a geostrategic space for both countries. Therefore, this study aims to answer the following questions: How are France and the us territorializing their interest in the area? And what is the link of the re-operationalization of these conflicts within the production of space and Tuareg representations? Critical geopolitical perspectives will be used to respond to them and to show that Western production of Azawad and Tuareg representations have allowed France and the us to protect their interests in the Sahara-Sahelian region.

Keywords: Tuareg, Azawad crisis, conflict, horizontal inequalities and identities, systemic violence, production of space.

Introduction

In January 2012, members of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) started attacks against the Malian government in Tessalit, Aguelhok, and Ménaka (Perret, 2014, p. 37) and on April 6, they

declared the independence of Azawad, located in northern Mali (Raffray, 2013, p. 80). One month earlier, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo led a coup d'état in the south of the country against Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), the so-called soldier of democracy by Western nations (Whitehouse, 2012, p. 44). These events took international actors by surprise because the Western narrative held that Mali was a "model of democracy" since the 1992 elections (Penney, 2013). Nonetheless, the conflict in Mali should not be considered as unexpected because of the systematic violence that Malians were living.

Map 1. Tuareg areas

Own elaboration (Boilley, 1999)

Crisis in northern Mali in 2012 was not only a consequence of the state's inability to provide welfare to the population, but also an effect of the capitalist system of domination, which requires inequalities or uneven development to reproduce itself (Smith, 2008, p. 134). Besides, this crisis demonstrates that Azawad in particular and the Sahara-Sahelian zones in general are becoming geostrategic spaces for France, the United States, China, and other foreign actors. However, in this study, I will focus on the territorialization of the French and American interests as these countries have re-operationalized the last two Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali to strengthen their presence in this area.

In this paper, I will describe how Tuareg social and territorial representations have differed from Western characterizations and how the latter ones have been used to legitimize the violence against the former. I will identify some of the causes of the Tuareg rebellions and analyze some tendencies and actions to determine why Azawad is becoming a geostrategic space when there is no confirmation of the existence of "strategic resources" in this territory. Critical geopolitical perspectives will be used to achieve these objectives and to explain the dialectic relationship between the production of space and societies, which has been fundamental in the operationalization and re-operationalization of Tuareg rebellions.

I will divide the article into four parts. In the first one, I will not only analyze the Tuareg representations fostered mainly by the Malian, French and American governments, but also their own social and territorial images to identify the contradictions between both productions. In the second one, I will describe the exclusion, inequalities, and the systemic and direct violence in which Tuareg have lived since independence. Then, I will explain the linkage promoted by the West between Tuareg/ Azawad and terrorism. And finally, I will study the crisis in northern Mali, emphasizing the interests of the US and France.

The dialectical construction of Azawad and Tuareg

Tuareg are semi-nomadic groups living in parts of the Sahara-Sahelian area. They are one of the oldest groups inhabiting these regions (Hagan &

Myers, 2006, p. 16; Rodd, 1926, p. 29; Salama, 1981, p. 521); nevertheless, their culture, like all cultures, is not static and has changed over the years. Before the French colonization, Tuareg could freely move in the desert, an action that was fundamental to their survival because it allowed them to search for food, water, and shelter. It was also a system of defense and resistance facing foreign aggressions (Tamboura, 2016, p. 42). However, with the Berlin Conference (1884-85), Europeans imposed fixed borders in the entire African continent and Tuareg were divided by the territorial space of five countries. Therefore, they are nowadays dwelling "the central Sahara mountain ranges of the Ajjer in Libya, the Hoggar in Algeria, the Adagh in Mali, the Aïr in Niger, and the interior bend of the Niger river in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso" (Lecocq, 2004, p. 89).

In Mali, Tuareg are located in the northern part of the country, in a region they call "Azawad". During the colonial period, Tuareg were represented as rebel soldiers who opposed the imperial project, and after the independence of Western African countries this image persisted. Therefore, they were considered as an obstacle to the national project and the modernization and development of the new States (Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 115). As a result, the government has excluded them from political, economic, social and cultural power (Girons, 2008, pp. 20-23).

For this reason, Tuareg have faced the Malian regime in 1963, during the 1990s, in 2006-2007, and in 2012. However, during the last two struggles, the interests and roles of external actors, such as France and the United States, have been fundamental in the development and re-operationalization of the conflicts. Since the 21st century, Tuareg have also been represented as terrorist and extremist groups, which has legitimized the continuation of the systemic and direct violence used against them.

Tuareg identities and the images created by the West

Identity has been one of the elements of cohesion for Tuareg assertions. Thus, it is important to know how Tuareg represent themselves and how they have been projected in order to understand their demands. Identities

are constructed through a process of recognition at three levels: with the self, with the community, and with the otherness. Therefore, identities are not unidirectional constructions; they are not only formed by the own vision of the 'me' or the 'us', but also by the way in which alterity sees the 'other' (Bhabha, 1994). Identities are indeed internalized by a community or an individual and are often linked with power and political games. Identity is a "feasible project of historical construction and not just the confirmation of what has been, [it is] tension towards the future and something more than a frozen past" (Cerutti, 1998, p. 133).

Identities are built by different factors, one of which is the origin of the group or person. Studies have determined that Tuareg have a North African or a Middle Eastern origin (Hagan & Myers, 2006, p. 16; Rodd, 1926, p. 29; Salama, 1981, p. 521). Nonetheless, a more relevant element for the construction of their identities is the language. In fact, according to Lecocq, the origin is not the essential factor for the constitution of Tuareg identities. Actually, for Tuareg, the language is the most important element of their *temust* or identity (2004, p. 89), which can be reflected in the way they called themselves: "Kel Tamasheq", which means "the ones who speak Tamasheq" (Benjaminsen, 2008, p. 826).

Another important component to conceive and constitute identity is the way the 'other' sees the 'us' or the 'me'. As previously written, Tuareg are one of the oldest groups inhabiting the Sahara Desert, and even though they called themselves "Kel Tamasheq", Arabs and subsequently Europeans have called them 'Tuareg' (Rodd, 1926, p. 32). Despite the fact that the religion of Tuareg is Islam, 'Tuareg' is an Arabic word which means 'abandoned by God' (Moraleda, 2013, p. 2). This connotation can be explained not only because they adopted Sufism, but also because they mixed their own beliefs and practices with this religion, constituting a new system of beliefs, which is rejected by the orthodox Islamic perspective. In spite of the external origin of the word, I will use the word 'Tuareg' to refer to this sociocultural group, as they have reappropriated and reframed the term.

When analyzing societies that we consider opposed to 'ours', it is common to ignore, dismiss or idealize "the other". When Europeans interacted with different cosmogonies after the establishment of the

capitalist system, they did not try to understand "the other". Therefore, Europeans considered their cosmogony as the superior and ideal one, arguing that the one of the 'others' was in a state of barbarism (Toledo, 1996). Hence, they justify the colonization asserting that they were going to civilize those primitive people. However, although they claimed to help and assist the 'other', what they did was to establish a social classification that rejected any alternative lifestyle. Therefore, they represented the 'other', and in this case the "African", as an evil, cruel, and uncivilized being. Nevertheless, the "representations of the Orient tend to have more to do with 'the West' than with the 'real Orient'" (Lunacek, 2010, p. 191).

Following this line, Tuareg were misrepresented and misunderstood for the benefit of Europeans and their political projects. When people think of Tuareg, the image that comes to their mind is one of a man with a blue veil covering all his body except for his eyes, riding his camel or standing on a dune (Ag Assarid, 2009, p. 174). Indeed, they have been called the "blue people" because the indigo dyed clothing colors their skin. And even though this can be the image of a specific Targui[1] in a defined context, Tuareg are not just that, and they do not only dress in blue, they also use white and black veils, and they cover their bodies depending on their age class as a symbol of honor (Rasmussen, 1995). Nevertheless, this shows that they have been idealized and that their identities have been standardized and immobilized, fostering a misunderstanding of their lives and practices. Likewise, they have been conceived as people opposed to modernization and development because they do not fit in western reality.

How to understand the desert?

The representation of the otherness will be more problematic when their ways of life are conceived as opposed by those who describe it. Living in the desert and nomadism were two practices completely opposed to Western conception; yet, both are fundamental for Tuareg identities.

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1   Singular of Tuareg.

Geography and culture enrich each other with the interaction of human beings, who modify them to survive and improve their quality of life.

Geography is a science of synthesis that considers geographic space as a product and producer of human activity (Lefebvre, 2013, p. 56) so that it cannot detach itself from the culture and identity of the populations that reside in it. Culture is, "at any moment in the life of society (whether an open or a closed one), the more or less conscious result of economic and political activities, the more or less dynamic expression of the relationships prevailing in that society. On one hand between man (considered individually or collectively) and nature, and on the contrary, between individuals, groups of individuals, social strata or classes" (Cabral, 1974, p. 13).

To Europeans, the desert was a hostile place for life. To them, the desert is a dead space; nevertheless, Tuareg have a close relationship with the desert, it is even argued that they know the desert as sailors know the sea. In fact, there is a Tuareg story, which tells of the times when they settled in the Sahara. The narrative explains that other human groups had already tried to dwell in the desert, but the claims of the Saharan environment making it hard for human survival terrified them, and they left, but Tuareg stayed (Ag Assarid, 2009).

The representation of space is essential to understand the geopolitical dynamics within a territory (Lacoste, 1993). Therefore, social space should be understood as a dialectic process, where every mode of production requires a precise production of space (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 26-31). Tuareg are strongly tied to the desert, and they do not consider this environment as an obstacle to their lives because even though the desert is a dry habitat, "there is always water around 80 meters deep" (ag Assarid, 2009, p. 172).

Before colonization, the socioeconomic system of Tuareg was mobile (Davidson, 1977, pp. 556-561). In this way, unlike Western conceptions, space is not perceived as a static location. "The space is mobile – the desert is a sea of inner sand that connects more than it separates the different human anchor points. The oases, towns of the desert, are built not on water points, but at the intersection of Saharan trade routes" (Arfaoui, 2016, p. 4). Tuareg also have a different concept of "home" because it does

not correspond to a definitive location but to a "regular cycle of places in time" that coincide with the locations where the camp is set and where the beloved ones are (Lecocq, 2010, p. 56).

However, Tuareg have appropriated and produced space, and despite the idea that nomadism is rootless, Tuareg have claimed the desert as "theirs" (Raineri & Strazzari, 2015, p. 252). The Sahara Desert is "their" territory, where "moving means agency, actively negotiating within the global space. Mobility has always been a crucial factor in acting successfully in the Sahara" (Fischer and Fischer, 2010, p. 2). Consequently, nomadism not only stems from a survival necessity to get resources, but it is also a philosophy of life (Fischer, 2010, p. 15).

For Tuareg, private property, indispensable for capitalist reproduction, did not exist. However, there was a system, which was called "rights of way" where every human unity was "associated with a territory, included in another larger territory, over which it has priority rights although not exclusive" (Claudot-Hawad, 1999, p. 5). This meant that the group could use the available resources in that territorial space. The local chief managed these resources for the benefit of all the community, but neighboring groups could also use the wealth of the territory on demand (*Idem*). The reason is that territory is conceived as communal land, and no one had the right to keep another person out from what the territory has, especially because of the necessity of water in that environment. However, "the foreigners" have the duty to ask permission, and to pass giving a tribute for protection. These actions were seen as a matter of respect and recognition between different communities and not as a hierarchical system of domination (Raineri & Strazzari, 2015, pp. 252-253).

This conception coincides with the Tuareg cosmogonic representation where the universe is perceived in motion. Elements, humans, animals, plants, things, and even the smallest particles follow a cycle whose end marks the beginning of a new cycle, until their fusion in the cosmic fluxes. Anything that is capable of interrupting the nomadic path recreating the movement of the universe threatens the perpetuity of this world. Nomadism appears in this context as a "natural" necessity, therefore eternal and universal, inscribed in cosmic laws. (Claudot-Hawad, 1999, p. 98).

Tuareg in Mali live in Azawad, whose main biomes are the desert and the savannah. This region covers an area of 827,000 km^2 and represents two thirds of Malian territory. In 2010, it had approximately 1,300,000 inhabitants, equivalent to only 8.6% of the total population of the country, and a population density of three to five persons per square kilometer. This territory is divided into three regions: Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. Its soil is a rocky desert with volcanic mountains, the rains are not abundant, and the transport infrastructure is scarce, although there is one airport in Kidal and another in Gao (Barnet, 2015, pp. 15-18).

One of the main sociocultural groups of Azawad are Tuareg, who are located throughout the eastern part of the region. There are also ethnic Arabized groups in the West and Peul (Fula), Songhay, and Dogon in the South. According to figures obtained by Raffray, in 2012 Tuareg represented 30% of the population of Azawad. In the southern region of the State of Mali, there are groups such as the Bozo and the Dogon in the area bordering Azawad; Senoufu and Bomu to the east; Soninkes and ethnically Arabized peoples in the north; Toucouleur and Khassonké to the west; and Malinkes and Bambaras to the south (Raffray, 2013, p. 12).

Although Azawad is located primarily in the desert and has been opposed to the "useful south" (Perret, 2014, p. 93), there are salt mines in operation, recognized deposits of gold, uranium, magnesium, lead and zinc (especially in Kidal), and mines of phosphates in exploitation. In the Niger River, there are areas of fishing and rice cultivation, while in the center and south of Azawad animal husbandry and farming—mainly millet and sorghum—prevail (Gonin, 2013, p. 14). There may be oil fields in the Taoudeni area, northwest of Azawad; however, their exploitation would be challenging and costly by cause of the area in which they are located (Barnet, 2015, p. 16).

The independence of Mali: systemic violence and horizontal inequalities

The European project in Africa was institutionalized by the creation of the State, where heterogeneity has been seen as a non-favorable

condition for the development of the inhabitants of the territorial space, which it controls (Raffestin, 1980, p. 22). The establishment of state borders differentiates the people that are dwelling within and the person who lives out of the territorial space. This action seeks to give cohesion to the former, ranking the latter as a threat. Thus, "the positive image of 'us' requires the negative image of the 'other'" (Lunacek, 2010, p. 191), and in this way, the subjectivity of the 'other' is not recognized (Santos, 2012, p. 166).

Nevertheless, not all the people dwelling in the State are recognized as part of the 'us', and even though Tuareg inhabit Mali, they were seen as an obstacle and menace to the stability of the new country. Before analyzing the inequalities and systemic and direct violence in which they have lived since independence, it is necessary to answer the next question. If Tuareg were considered closer to Europeans (because they were thin, tall and had phenotypic traits more similar to European traits) unlike the Africans of the South (Rodd 1926, p.46), why did the French decide to grant independence to the people of the South?

The "racial factor"

The hierarchy established by the Europeans in Africa was based, principally, on skin color. This classification determined the productive activities that each sociocultural group could perform because of a "racial factor". In this way, if the color of your skin had "whiteness" then your social status could also be high. However, Echeverría (2007) argues that modernity, which is inherent to capitalism, requires the presence of *blanquitud*, i.e. an ethical and "civilizing" condition based on Western ideas and not on racial factors. People could obtain *blanquitud* through Western education. Therefore, people with different phenotypic traits were accepted if European ideas and practices were incorporated in their minds (2007, pp. 2-4).

Thus, some forms of otherness are considered appropriate and are tolerated because "they support and perpetuate the unequal relations

of power (...). But when other forms of otherness are articulated and they break the boundaries of the already defined dominant-dominating identities, they are perceived as subversive and are therefore rejected or repressed" (Jabardo, 2012, p. 310). Tuareg resisted the French colonization not only through armed conflict, but also by refusing to pay taxes and send their sons to French schools (Girons, 2008, p. 74). Therefore, even though Tuareg had more "whiteness" than their neighbors of the South, the "black" Bambara and Malinke had *blanquitud*, which was more important to keep the French interests after independence. In 1960, "when independence came, Tuareg were scattered over different states. In each state they felt marginalized, with less power and wealth than other citizens" (Abdalla, 2009, p. 3).

The European colonization project caused contradictions in Africa because of the interests of Europeans, who didn't promote an intercultural dialogue but exploited the resources and people who they "found" in those places. This project engendered new economic, political, cultural, and social problems owing to the destruction and modification of systems and institutions that were already there. Consequently, colonization generated a new elite, which controlled a territory delimited by rigid boundaries consistent with the idea of the State. Nevertheless, these boundaries were artificially created, and even though, as Touval (1966) argued, some Africans joined the colonial project and were willing to adhere to the oppressive rule, they did not represent the majority of the population.

The maintenance of the State, as established by Europeans, even after independence, encouraged the continuity of the transfiguration and transformation of the identities in the new countries, pre-eminently due to the hierarchical organization which denied the histories of the "unassimilated". The real problem was that "every ruling class tries to use the state machinery to organise itself and disorganise the oppressed (...) In fact, the colonial power turned nationality into an organising principle for both the state structure and economic life, thereby institutionalising it" (Mamdani, 1984, p. 1048).

Horizontal Inequalities and Violence: The first two rebellions

After independence, Modibo Keita became the first president of the Republic of Mali. Keita promoted an anti-colonialist discourse to give meaning to Malian nationalism (Ake, 1981, pp. 176-177). Tuareg were excluded from this plan as Keita's regime associated them with the colonial forces because of their "whiteness" (Lecocq, 2010, pp. 78-85). Keita reduced the representation and power of the *amenokal*, Tuareg leaders, and forbade nomad associations (Boilley, 1999, p. 304). Some Tuareg were integrated into the Malian government; however, "if they want to have a position in the political or economic environment they must speak in French, Bambara, Hausa or Arabic" (Kohl and Fischer, 2010, p. 5). Keita also forced Tuareg sedentism (settling of a nomadic population), set high taxes on them and fostered Mande culture to the detriment of Tuareg and other sociocultural groups' culture (Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 115).

For Tuareg, Keita's policies were perceived as illegitimate not only because they were excluded from political power, but also because Keita's group did not defeat them in battle, and because independence did not bring them what they hoped: liberation from a foreign rule. (Lecocq, 2010, p. 121). Therefore, Tuareg rebelled against the Malian government in 1963. The reasons for this uprising were not that the people of the South and Tuareg were different or incompatible, but that there were Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) among them.

Theories of HIs consider four dimensions of inequalities: economic (access and ownership of assets, employment opportunities, and income), social (access to services like health and education), political (participation in government institutions, including the army), and cultural (recognition and respect for cultural practices, language and religion) (Stewart, 2008, p. 13). Thus, they analyze the multidimensionality of inequalities emphasizing that sharp disparities between determined sociocultural groups or identities will increase the likelihood of violent conflict (Østby, 2008, pp. 144-148).

Tuareg rebellions can also be interpreted as a fight for their emancipation to guarantee their security. Hence, they have fought against the

systemic violence that is "not only direct physical violence, but also the more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation, including the threat of violence" (Žižek, 2008, p. 9). Tuareg resistances had not been explained. Thus, their violent actions have been condemned, and the rebellions have been linked to the non-institutionalized "savage" violence (Echeverría, 1998, p. 5), omitting the exclusion, insecurity and systemic violence in which they have lived. "The modern political sensibility is not horrified by all violence (…) what horrifies modern political sensibility is not violence per se, but violence that does not make sense. (….) Violence that cannot be illuminated by the story of progress that appears senseless to us" (Mamdani, 2002, p. 132).

Alfellaga or the Tuareg rebellion of 1963 was brutally repressed. The Malian army killed civilians, slaughtered the cattle and poisoned the wells (Baryin, 2013, p. 28). People were reestablished in zones of poor productivity, they were forced to work, and Azawad was put under military administration (Raffray, 2013, p. 91). Tuareg conditions got worse because of the drought of the seventies and eighties, and because of the regime's corruption (Baryin, 2013, p. 28; Raffray, 2013, p. 47; Barnet, 2015, p. 58; Lecocq, 2010, p. 200). However, during these years a new identity was configured: the *ashumar*. *Ashumar* is a word used to describe young people who have left their families to search for work, and it represents a social group, which is strange to its country and to the States where they migrate (Bourgeot, 1990, pp. 140-144).

One hypothesis suggests that *ishumar* (singular of *ashumar*) comes from the French word *chômage*, which means "unemployment" (Randall, 2005, p. 297), and some Tuareg highlight that *ishumar* means "the one who supports" and that, therefore, this term is associated with physical and psychological suffering. This word is also related to the Tamasheq word *ashammar*, which is connected with "patience" (Girons, 2008, p. 32). The relevance of these meanings is that all refer to the social exclusion, systematic violence, and HIs these young Tuareg suffer, highlighting the marginalization of "Ashamur [who] 'did not know where to go and had no place in the world'" (Kohl, 2010, p. 152).

This situation was aggravated by the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS), as the neoliberal policy "makes as if social

injustice was not its ally but its enemy" (Echeverría, 1998, pp. 5-6). At the beginning of the nineties, *ashumar* started a new rebellion (*tanekra)* against this situation (Lecocq, 2010; Boilley, 1999). The response of the Malian regime was, once again, indiscriminate violence against all the people in the north of the country (Boilley, 1999, p. 467). The violence and conflict in the north continued until 1996 and ended with the symbolic ceremony of "the Flame of Peace" (Lecocq, 2010, p. 249).

This rebellion and a coup d'état in the South led by Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) in March 1991 fostered the international society to pressure the leaders of the coup to conduct elections. After ballots were held, Alpha Oumar Konaré (AOK) won the presidency (see Perret, 2014). From that moment on, ATT was considered the "soldier of democracy" because he "permitted" elections to happen (Lecocq, 2010, p. 260), and Mali was described as the representative example of democracy for all Africa (Villalón & Idrissa, 2005, p. 49). Notwithstanding, democracy was reduced to multiparty elections (Carothers, 2002, p. 7), because that was the price that the political leaders in Africa had to pay to get international monetary funding (Chabal, 2002, p. 449).

AOK promoted a decentralization policy that in theory could respond to Tuareg demands guaranteeing their autonomy. However, this policy co-opted some local leaders and destroyed the organization of the people of the north even more (Maïga, 2012, p. 81). After a reelection of AOK in 1997, in 2002 presidential ballots were held and ATT was elected (Whitehouse, 2012, p. 39). His government did not end with the inequalities, violence or insecurity in Mali, on the contrary, he reinforced them. Indeed, with him, the representations of Tuareg started to be linked with terrorism.

Azawad as a political project during the 21st century

"The Sahara and the Sahel are more and more being transformed into a gateway for international politics and economic maneuvers" (Kohl and Fischer, 2010, p. 1). Since the 21st century, these territories started to

become fundamental for an old but renovated "spatial fix" that attempts
to solve the crisis of capitalism to continue the reproduction of the sys-
tem. Harvey asked how the central dilemmas and contradictions of
capitalism could be resolved during the crisis of overaccumulation. The
answer was the "spatial fix", which frees the overaccumulation of labor
power and capital through geographical shifts to control class struggles
and avoid devaluation and a profound crisis in a particular territory
(2001, pp. 312-344).

The Sahara and the Sahel are far away from the global centers (Kohl
and Fischer, 2010, p. 1). However, nowadays they are becoming core in
the context of the actual crisis of "scarcity". The fact that it is currently
said that the exhaustion of particular resources is becoming critical in-
dicates that "more and more of our essential supplies will have to come
from places that are risky for reasons of geography, geology, politics, or
some combination of all three" (Klare, 2012, p. 29). Technology allows
representing scarcity in abundance (Lander, 2000, p. 28), and nowadays
one of the most hostile environments considered by Western States is
represented as a geostrategic space for the interests of countries such as
France and the United States.

"The territory is the political space par excellence" (Raffestin, 1980, p.
52), the center of wealth and power (the dominant space) which always
tries to mold the dominated areas. Sometimes the hegemonic subject
uses direct violence to reach this objective and reduce the resistance or
obstacles it faces when producing the space (Lefebvre, 2013, p. 108). Nev-
ertheless, although the dominant political space tries to assert itself as a
reality, it is just an abstraction (*ibid*, 149) that does not correspond to the
reality of the people dwelling in it.

Mali and the Global War on Terrorism

Since the September 11 attacks, the US imposed its war on terrorism all
around the world. After this aggression, the George W. Bush administration
considered the Sahara as a space of terrorism, even though at that moment

there was no presence of terrorist groups in the region (Williams, 2012). However, this allowed the US to deploy a greater presence in the territory.

In the document published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2000, before the war on terror was declared, the Full Spectrum Dominance was described as a fundamental American strategy. This policy sought to dominate all the spaces of the world and dimensions of life to deter any real or potential threat to the tactic laws of power, i.e. dominate all the spectrum, every space in the world (Ceceña, 2008, p. 86). In the document "Joint Vision 2020" information was ranked as a necessary tool to control the entire spectrum, and the use of drones was essential to obtain and manage information (JCS, 2000, pp. 6-7) that could be useful for the reproduction of the space and the disciplining of populations. That is the reason why the presence of American drones in the area can be so harmful to the population of the region, because as Foucault (2013) argued, there is a dialectic relationship between knowledge and power.

Despite this speech and the military supremacy of the US, the country is incapable of controlling and dominating every single space in the world. Therefore, the regime needs allies that "provide the formal and informal bases that are the crucial stepping-stones for US power to transit the globe. The military power of these allies contributes modestly to maintenance and exploitation of command of the commons" (Possen, 2003, p. 44), i.e., spaces of air and sea which do not belong to any country, but which allows having a dominion of the world (*ibid.*, 8).

In West Africa, this strategy was implemented through the Pan Sahel Initiative, which in 2005 changed its name to The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and also with the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. Notwithstanding, these projects should be justified because at the beginning of the 21st century there was no presence of terrorist groups in the area, as written above (Williams, 2012).

In 2003, The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat kidnapped 32 Europeans in an Algerian small town near the Libyan border (Beaugé & Tuquoi, 2003). The kidnappings did not happen in one single moment but from February 21 to April 11, 2003 (Keenan, 2009, p. 15). However, this action strengthened the links between the US military forces and the

Algerian army with Bill Clinton and Bouteflika as heads of State (Barth, 2003, p. 681). Keenan argues that "there is evidence that the operation [the kidnapping] was orchestrated by the Algerian intelligence services, the Departement du Renseignement et de la Securité (DRS), with the complicity of US military intelligence services, and that both El Para and Abdelhamid abou Zaïd [leaders of the GSPC] were DRS agents" (Keenan, 2009, p. 14).

One fact that sustains this idea is that in 2003 the construction of an alleged base for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was completed near the Algerian airport of Tamanrraset. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of this area considered that this was a military base for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Barth, 2003, p. 679). Besides, "although formally denied, the US has established military bases in northern Mali and is behind the construction of Algeria's huge new military base at Tamanrasset. The US is also reported to have a GIS satellite located above the triangle formed by Mali's three northern towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal" (Keenan, 2006, pp. 763-764). Likewise, El Para was never imprisoned even though he was in custody of the Algerian authorities (Algerian-Watch, 2008).

The representation of the Azawad in particular and the Sahara in general as terrorist areas shows that "it is the strictly spatial dimension of geography that grows in importance with the inexorable progress of capitalist development" (Smith, 2008, p. 142). The production of Azawad as a terrorist space also created a new image of the people dwelling there because of the dialectic process between the space and its inhabitants, which reshape the image of the Tuareg.

Though, why to associate the Sahara and Tuareg with terrorism? Trumbull mentions that the interest in the desert focuses on three aspects: the fight against terrorism, the routes of organized groups, and the resources that can be found there. However, in some cases, the first two aspects have been modified or reproduced to boost the third one, and now "the Sahara and the Sahel turn into an economic and political playground [where] global players are looking for new resources to absorb the increasing consumption in the West" (Kohl and Fischer, 2010, p. 3), a spatial fix that does not emphasize on overaccumulation but on the supposed scarcity of resources.

During the so-called democratic government of ATT, Mali was a refuge for members of GSPC, which in 2007 changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This was not a situation unknown to the US, in fact "terrorism, religious extremism, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons were identified in 2004 by a USAID team as major challenges facing Mali" (William, 2012, p. 42). Besides, some Malian and Nigerian authorities blame ATT for having an agreement with AQIM to facilitate the liberation of foreign hostages (Bergamaschi, 2014, p. 355).

The terrorist image of the desert and Tuareg benefited both the local African governments and the external forces because the former obtained funding and the latter justified their military, economic and political presence in the area. During that century, Tuareg continued to be a threat to the hegemony, which "to subsist and consolidate, required and requires to rationalize all aspects of social life, adapting them to its dictates according to the very requirements of production, reproduction and accumulation of capital" (Herrera, 2017, p. 29). Therefore, now that the resources of the desert are becoming more necessary for the reproduction of capital, they need to reproduce the space to benefit the system from the outcomes of this action.

Tuareg and Gaddafi

The negative representation of Tuareg soon became to be associated with one of the most important enemies of the United States in Northern Africa: Muammar Gaddafi. After *tanekra*, Tuareg continued to live in a deplorable situation where violence and inequalities were the permanent conditions. "Oil- and gas-rich Libya, which direly needed a workforce to advance its economy, offered them a potentially available opportunity to earn a decent living, thus turning Libya into an attractive destination". (Ronen, 2013, p. 546). For the *ashumar*, Libya was a synonym of Europe, and even though they were not well received by the Libyans in general, they knew Gaddafi was their friend (Kohl, 2010, pp. 143-145).

Gaddafi identifies himself with Tuareg because of their nomadic origin. Therefore, he respected their way of life, and he characterized them

as 'the lords of the desert' (Ronen, 2013, p. 546). "Gaddafi, proclaimed that Tuareg were Libyan Arab tribes facing genocide in other countries. He asked Tuareg to return to Libya" (Abdalla, 2009, p. 8) and he called himself the 'protector of Tuareg' (Keenan, 2006, p. 762). Gaddafi's Tuareg-friendly policy and the country's relatively good social conditions encouraged immigrants mainly from Niger and Mali to travel to Libya (Kohl, 2010, p. 150).

"In February 1998, he thus established the Community of the Sahel and Saharan States (COMESSA), which at that stage included Libya, Chad, Sudan, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Tripoli, which assumed the financial burden involved, served as home to the organization's headquarters and Qaddafi himself was head of the organization" (Ronen, 2013, p. 548). In 2005, he gave identity cards to allow Tuareg to enter Libya and move freely there (Kohl, 2010, p. 147). Gaddafi also made them a core part of his security forces, and Tuareg were the most loyalist guardians of the regime (Ronen, 2013, p. 545). In 2006, he established a Libyan embassy in Kidal (Ronen, 2013, p. 552).

That same year, a Tuareg rebellion broke out against the government of ATT. Notwithstanding, authors such as Keenan doubt about its origin and the relationship between that movement and Tuareg demands. Actually, he considers that the rebellion was fostered by the Algerian regime to counter the regional power that Gaddafi was gaining. The strategy aimed to blame Gaddafi of the rebellion in order to obtain funding from the US, and in this way, Bouteflika could position himself as the regional leader. Some arguments to support this hypothesis are that the rebellion was started by Kel Ahaggar, who have worked closely with the Algerian secret services, and that ATT did not repress the movement (Keenan, 2006, pp. 764-765).

In 2007, two Tuareg rebellions developed separately in Niger and Mali. Keenan points out that these riots were caused by the damages against Tuareg population produced by the expansion of the uranium mines of Arlit and Akokan in Niger, which are controlled by a French consortium named Areva (Keenan, 2013, pp. 79-93). Because of these rebellions, on September 23 that year, some Tuareg from Mali and Niger

declared the independence of a territory known as Tumoujaghan, which corresponds to the spaces of northern Mali and northwestern Niger (Girons, 2008, p. 67). This project did not flourish; however, it is a precedent for the Tuareg independence movement.

In Libya, the situation of Tuareg worsened in 2011 with the murder of Gaddafi and the re-operationalization of the conflict in Libya by the military forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's military intervention was a strategy to obstruct the self-help and development projects that Gaddafi was fostering for his country and the continent (Campbell, 2013). Besides, Tuareg were also directly affected because they were associated with Gaddafi's regime and therefore they were targets of vengeance and violence by the opposite forces.

The Sahelian Tuareg ex-soldiers soon faced a socio-economic crisis, in addition to militant harassment by the vengeful ex-rebel armed militias. Facing a broken economy, fearing for their well-being, and aware that their shared Muslim identity with the Libyan population had proved insignificant in offering them protection and a further basis of collaboration, increasing throngs of Sahelian Tuareg crossed back into their native countries (Ronen, 2013, p. 545).

Crisis in northern Mali

What happened in Mali in 2012 should not be considered a direct consequence of the events in Libya, because in doing so we are once again omitting all the violence and inequalities in which Tuareg were living. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) data, 82.9% of Malians had vulnerable employment, and according to the World Bank (WB), 8.1% of Mali's population was unemployed since 2010, and 43.6% of the population lived in poverty. Unemployment has been most marked in the region of Azawad (Krings, 1995, p. 60); for example, in Gao and Kidal it was three times higher than the national rate (Barnet, 2015, pp. 59-66). According to the World Food Programme, this region was also under high risk of food insecurity, and by 2013, just over 75% of

the households in Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Mopti were food insecure.

Timbuktu had the lowest primary enrollment rate in 2011, and only 59% of Malians lived within 15 km of a health center, and 46% had access to potable water (Perret, 2014, p. 2013). In the region of Azawad, there are only two hospitals, one in Timbuktu and another in Gao, while in Kidal there are only four health centers (Barnet, 2015, pp. 59-66). Consequently, in January, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) attacked the Malian regime, and in April they declared the independence of the northern region of Mali (Raffray, 2013, p. 80).

The international press did not describe the violence and inequalities, and in general, Tuareg were portrayed as terrorists, justifying their suppression by the Malian government (Abdalla, 2009, p. 8). "The classic old colonial scenario of barbaric terror and demonization of Tuareg rebels in Mali lay on the front pages of media outlets while the creation of the Republic of Azawad was declared on April 6, 2012, by the NMLA (National Movement for Liberation of Azawad)" (Claudot-Hawad, 2012, p. 3).

During the conflict, Iyag ag Ghali, a controversial Tuareg leader because of his links with the Algerian secret services, wanted a management position in the NMLA. However, the members of the movement denied this demand. Thus, he decided to create his group: Ansar Dine (Pellerin, 2013, p. 842). In spite of the division, both organizations fought together at the beginning, but the alliance was broken when the NMLA declared the independence in April, because Iyad ag Ghali wanted autonomy and not independence and because he also wanted to impose *sharia* in the area, while the NMLA was a secular movement (Desert, 2013, p. 94-95).

Although the declaration of independence of a semi-nomadic group can be contradictory, it is important to say that the creation of a State is a geopolitical representation. Therefore, it can be confronted and constructed in different ways according to the place and time in which it is designed (Lacoste, 1985, p. 56). Tuareg cosmogonies and projects have changed over time and the formation of a State could give them the tools to guarantee their security and development in the context of international dynamics.

Therefore, images "are recomposed to form a spatial set whose denomination is both the symbol and slogan of a geopolitical project which in

principle can be cartographic" (Foucher, 2011, p. 191). Each society produces its space (Lefebvre, 2013, p. 451), and the independence of Azawad was part of the political project that Tuareg wanted to implement in order to change their lives. Besides, obtaining recognition could also provide them with more confidence that the Malian government would not violently repress them.

The re-operationalization of the conflict

During the crisis in northern Mali in 2012, the US tried to have a stronger presence in West Africa. However, this scenario was not the best for the interests of France even though they were allies, so the re-operationalization of the conflict has been a complicated process not only because of the low-intensity disputes of these two countries, but also because of the presence of the Chinese interests in the area, which reflects a more direct threat to the sake of the former actors.

Baryin (2003) argues that ATT, an associate of the French government, had expressed concerns about the relationships between the Algerian and American governments. Actually, in the middle of 2012, France led a conference to fight terrorism and the Algerian regime boycotted it (Keenan, 2013, pp. 217-218). The American military bases that are deployed in West Africa are small though numerous, and some of them are becoming permanent. Likewise, the deployment of drones to study the continent has also increased (Turse, 2015, pp. 12-38), and although this action seems militarily irrelevant, it is consistent with the policy of full spectrum and fundamental for the knowledge and possible control of the territory.

The US military presence is not so visible because of the use of Private Military Enterprises (PMCs), Special Operations Forces (SOFs), secret facilities and the Creeksand Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Program, which was established in 2007, and which is linked to the deployment of drones. Although in East Africa there are more American military infrastructure and operational capabilities, the area that has seen the largest military increase of US forces during the 21st century is the Sahel (Moore & Walker, 2016, pp. 686-970).

Before the declaration of independence of Azawad, in the south, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo carried out a coup d'état against ATT in March 2012, arguing that his group wanted to reestablish democracy and peace in the north (Whitehouse, 2012, p. 44). Whereas ATT had links with France, Sanogo was an ally of the US. Indeed, he had participated in several US military training programs (Moore & Walker, 2016, p. 705).

The French government did not want to lose its position in Mali and a president subjected to the Americans was not the ideal scenario to protect its interests in the area. Thus, France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) condemned the coup. In April 2012, Sanogo, the National Council for the Recovery of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (CNRDRE) and ECOWAS started negotiations and signed an agreement to return to a civil government. Hence, they named Dioncounda Traoré as provisional president and Cheikh Modibo Diarra as prime minister while elections were organized. Notwithstanding, neither had the support of the coup factions (Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 119), However, this was a better scheme for the French interests.

Meanwhile, in northern Mali, the NMLA was gaining force until June, when AQIM, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine took control of Azawad. In this way, Ansar Dine commanded the area of Kidal, MUJAO Gao, and AQIM Timbuktu (Pellerin, 2013, p. 842). The presence of these groups permitted, once again, the re-operationalization of the conflict in favor of France, because even though the existence of terrorist groups was identified as one of the greatest risks for the security in Mali since 2004 (Williams, 2012, p. 42), the international society did not try to intervene until the declaration of independence of Azawad.

France intervened in the conflict justifying itself with the theory of intervention by invitation and because of the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (Bannelier, 2013, p. 856). This country deployed Operation Serval in January 2013 (Raffray, 2013, p. 1). Paris incorporated military forces from Chad and other African countries so that the French were not identified as the intervening forces (Baryin, 2013, p. 79). The alleged objectives of the Operation were to stop the Jihadist advance in

the region, foster stability in Mali, protect French and Europeans in Mali, and restore the territorial integrity of the country (Boeke & Schuuman, 2015, pp. 811-812).

The French Ministry of Defense indicated that the operation would be transferred to Malian forces and the United Nations through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), but in August 2014 the French launched another Operation known as Barkhane, whose primary objective was, according to the Ministry of Defense, to fight terrorism in West Africa. Therefore, the French forces did not leave Malian territory (Bøås & Torheim, 2013, p. 418).

The relevance of the Sahara

The NMLA project was against the plans of the national, regional and international elite. France, Algeria, and Libya have sought to control Tuareg rebellions to benefit themselves, dividing this sociocultural group and re-operationalizing their demands (Claudot-Hawad, 2012, p. 4). For the Malian regime and other African governments, the independence of the Azawad was against their national projects, which are territorialized within the borders of the State. One of the main objectives of the African Union (AU) is to safeguard the national borders of the African member countries. Therefore, the independence of Azawad was seen as a threat to the entire continent, especially for those countries with Tuareg settlements, since they could also appeal for the independence of the territory where they are dwelling.

The worsening of the crisis could mean that neither the French nor the Americans could control the situation for their benefit, and that was, from my point of view, the reason why the US let the French government manage the military intervention. With the re-operationalization of the conflict, the US and France wanted to take control of the territory, but to do so they first needed to produce the space of the Azawad as a terrorist area. "Accumulation of capital is perpetually deconstructing that social power by re-shaping its geographical bases. Put the other way around, any struggle to reconstitute power relations is a struggle to reorganize

their spatial bases" (Harvey, 1989, p. 238). Besides, if they control the territory, they would also govern what is within this space (Herrera, 2017, p. 72), and in this way conduct the lives of Tuareg to reproduce the capitalist system in the Sahara and, therefore, incorporate or eliminate them.

Map 2. US and French presence in West Africa

U.S. and France in West Africa (2016)

- ● U.S. Military Presence
- ● French Military Presence
- ■ ExxonMobile U.S. (oil)
- ■ Total France (oil)
- ⬠ Areva France (uranium)
- ◆ Suez France (water)
- ◇ Veolia France (water)
- ★ U.S. ISR areas
- ▨ U.S. Surveillance zone
- ▨ Operation Serval
- ▨ Operation Barkhane
- ▨ Reach of U.S. Drones
- ▨ Mali

Own elaboration (Moore & Walker, 2016)

In addition, "the era for readily accessible oil and gas has come to an end: from now on, vital energy supplies will have to be drawn from remote and forbidding locations, at a cost far exceeding anything experienced in the past" (Klare, 2012, p. 22). In this context, the Sahara is becoming more and more important for the resources it possesses despite the arid environment. According to ExxonMobile, its presence in West Africa dates back to 1907 although during the 21st century they have strengthened it, especially in Chad. France also has oil projects in Mauritania,

Algeria, Ivory Coast, and the Central African Republic through French oil company Total (Lévêque, 2013). In 2003, China started to have influence in Tuareg areas when the Nigerian government signed an agreement to let them explore, exploit, and market oil in the north of the country (Grégoire, 2011).

Another reason why France did not want an independent Azawad was associated with the uranium mines, which are controlled by Areva in Arlit and Akoka, Niger, where there are Tuareg dwellers. These mines provide 20% of the uranium required by France for its nuclear reactors, which supply more than 70% of its national electricity (Boeke & Schuuman, 2015, pp. 811-812). The exploitation of Nigerian uranium by France started in the 1970s. Nevertheless, in 2006 Niger let a Chinese company led by a unit of China National Nuclear Corporation explore sites in the Agadez-Temasna region to search for uranium (Boeke & Schuuman, 2015, p. 215). "Niger has long been a primary source of uranium and is currently the world's third-ranking exporter after Australia and Canada" (Boeke & Schuuman, 2015, p. 214). Besides, the independence of Azawad could also mean a vindication in the Tuareg areas of Niger, where France exploits the uranium it needs.

The re-operationalization of the Azawad crisis is, in words of Klare, the beginning of the "invasion of the world's final frontiers", and water is going to play a fundamental role in the appropriation and control of this resource. Groundwater resources are a crucial source of water supply for many regions in Africa (Xuand & Braune, 2009, p. 21). One of Gaddafi's projects, "The Great Man-made River", was to take advantage of the water resources of the Nubia aquifer, which is estimated to be the largest source of fresh groundwater reserve in the world. However, after his murder, the British Geological Survey (BGS) made this fact known, stirring up the interests of water companies (Campbell, 2013, p. 91).

Africa concentrates 23% of all the fresh groundwater resources in the world. Groundwater is the primary drinking water resource on the continent (MacDonald *et al.* 2012, pp. 1-7), and is clean water that requires little treatment and is not depleted by droughts (MacDonald & Calow, 2009, p. 457). One of the problems with this type of water is that it does

not regenerate so easily. However, 30.1% of the water that can be used for human consumption is underground, and only 1.2% corresponds to surface water. The water of lakes and rivers represents 0.31% of all freshwater in the world. Therefore, groundwater is 97.72 times the water obtained from these sources. The remaining percentage is located in glaciers and permafrost (68.7%) (USGC Water Science School). After the NATO intervention in Libya, "Western transnational corporations such as Bechtel from the United States, Germany's RWE, and France's Veolia, Suez, and Lyonnaise des Eaux have been at the forefront of the call for privatization of water resources. French companies such as Suez, Ondeo, and Saur control more than 45 percent of the world's water market. For these companies, Libya and the region of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer should be within the French sphere of influence" (Campbell, 2013, pp. 91-92).

These companies also benefited from the Malian crisis. Indeed, Suez started the construction of a drinking water plant in Kalabancoro and strengthened its presence in Mali since 2013 (Suez, 2016). In the long term, this may be detrimental to the life of the population in the area as "market hegemony hinders the human right to water due to market inefficiencies which interfere with universal water provision" (Branco & Henriques, 2009, p. 21). No organism can live or survive without water. Nevertheless, the market does not care about social conditions, justice or equality, it only seeks profit (Branco & Henriques, 2009, p. 29). Besides, controlling their water resources can lead to biopolitical policies to regulate social reproduction. Notwithstanding, power also fosters resistances, and Tuareg and the people of the desert continue to fight in order to establish their own sociopolitical and spatial project.

Conclusions

The crisis in northern Mali in 2012 is not just a consequence of the corruption and bad government of the Malian regime, but also a result of the structural system of domination, which requires inequalities to reproduce itself. This system was spread in Africa through the European

colonization that made use of brutal violence to modify the social, political, economic and cultural processes and dynamics of the people dwelling in these spaces. Europeans classified the society and hierarchized it to their benefit, and in this system skin color was one of the most important elements to establish such hierarchy. However, *blanquitud* or the adoption of European education, ideas, and values was more relevant than "whiteness" to reproduce the relations of power after the independence of Mali.

Accordingly, even though Tuareg phenotypic traits were more similar to the ones of Europeans, they had no *blanquitud*, and their cosmogonies have been fully opposed to the French ones, especially because they were semi-nomadic groups with a sociopolitical organization that differed from the State, and also because they lived in an inhospitable area according to Western standards. Besides, Tuareg produced and knew their space, and that was another barrier to French colonial expansion. With the independence of Mali in 1960, Tuareg stereotypes with which Europeans had stigmatized them were preserved. Actually, they were strengthened by the government of Bamako to legitimize the direct and systemic violence committed against them.

Tuareg have faced multidimensional inequalities, i.e. political (they have been excluded from government institutions or they have been assimilated and divided), economic (they are unemployed, and they do not have good job opportunities), social (access to health and education services is low), and cultural grievances (the regime has forbidden their language and has associated their ways of life with irrational violence). Hence, they have rebelled in different moments to search for better life opportunities. In these struggles, identity has become a unifying factor in their fight, mainly because they have been represented as a threat to the country's stability and security. However, one of their greatest obstacles now is their internal division.

Azawad has been the territory of the people with no place within the social, political, economic, and cultural relations of Mali. The stigmatization of these people and their space has justified the environment of insecurity and violence in which this group has lived since its contact

with the French. Likewise, since the beginning of the 21st century, Tuareg rebellions have been re-operationalized for the benefit of the US and France, and this action has been possible because of the production of the Sahara and Azawad as terrorist zones, and the representation of Tuareg as members or collaborators of terrorist groups such as AQIM. Both France and the US want to have a pre-eminent presence and influence in the area, which accounts for the low-intensity conflicts they have had. Nevertheless, the Chinese presence has let them reach agreements where France has had a leading role, however, the deployment of American drones can change this situation in the future as knowledge gives power.

The independence of Azawad in 2012 endangered the national projects of Mali and the neighboring countries, as well as the interests of international actors such as the US and France. Thus, the situation was re-operationalized by these actors, who justify their intervention mainly because of the presence of terrorist groups (AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine). Even though they justified their interference with the objective to guarantee security in the area, the reality is that these countries want to dominate and control the territory in order to govern it and the people dwelling in it. Oil, uranium and water are abundant in Tuareg regions, and although the cost of exploration is high, it is now necessary to project how they can be exploited and in this way overcome the actual capitalist crisis. This will further threaten the lives of Tuareg population; nevertheless, they are still fighting and demanding justice and security to establish and follow their own political project, and consequently achieve freedom and a dignified life.

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The Ubuntu Philosophy and the Political Uses of the Past and History: the Gacaca Courts and Post-apartheid South Africa

Marco Reyes

Introduction

After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda experienced a high economic growth. During the first decades of the 21ˢᵗ century the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew at an annual rate of about 5%, finally reaching 50% above the level it had over the years before the genocide. At the end of the genocide, poverty was estimated at 70%. However, in 2000, poverty dropped to 59%, and then 57% in 2005 (Verpoorten, 2014, p. 1).

According to these figures, some authors like Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012, p. 9) considered that Rwanda's recent economic growth can be labelled pro-poor. Some writers such as Paul Collier regarded the rapid growth and sharp poverty reduction as a "hat trick" (Verpoorten, 2014, p. 1). For some other analysts, Rwanda is an exemplary case of a developmental authoritarian state which is promoting private sector-based development. For some analysts, on the other hand, twenty years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has become an example of a country where poverty has been reduced dramatically.[1]

Accordingly, women have taken some of the most important positions inside state bureaucracy. The Rwandan government led by Paul Kagame has

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[1] Most of the inquiries about Rwanda are anchored on the idea of development and progress as the only horizon possible. Economic success is therefore always evaluated according to the evolution the country has managed to fulfill in reaching or getting closer to that economic horizon. Some others emphasize the authoritarian nature of Paul Kagame's regime to reach "positive" economic and social indicators.

also eliminated all ethnic affiliations from national identity documents allowing everybody to become Rwandese before any other "ethnic" affiliation (Castel, 2014, pp. 122-123). Other articles highlight the importance of the Gacaca Courts to generate an atmosphere of justice and reconciliation. Indeed, at the end of the 20th century, many different governments such as South Africa or Rwanda, started raising the concepts of memory, truth, justice, and reconciliation to address social and political issues. Ubuntu was a rediscovered key concept in post-apartheid South Africa to solve a number of problems inherited by several regimes after a period of segregation or genocide.

The following pages will underline a series of elements: 1) Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were implemented in the early 1980s in Rwanda contributed severely to the unfolding of the genocide; 2) the political use of memory and reconciliation that Paul Kagame's government implemented after the genocide prevented any sort of criticism towards economic and political policies. In this sense, Kagame presented an idea of an idyllic Rwandan past that precluded any sort of rehabilitation of past conflicts. Reconciliation mechanisms made it impossible to review the effects that neoliberal reforms had on the unfolding of the genocide. It also precluded any criticism to neoliberal reforms after the genocide; 3) the Ubuntu philosophy that was used in South Africa as a tool that recovered the past in order to reconcile the post-apartheid society was finally subsumed by the logic of Rwandan state power, producing new forms of segregation.

Rwanda before the genocide

During the 1980s, International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund considered Rwanda as a developing country model where citizens were committed to development. Rwanda was indeed one of the African countries that implemented the Structural Adjustment Programs very late.

The economic crisis experienced in Rwanda in the 1980s had several effects: Rwanda's major export product, coffee, fell from $144 million in 1985 to $30 million in 1993. "This greatly reduced the earnings of the

Rwandan State–whose foreign exchange earnings are still far more than 80 percent dependent on coffee and tea…" (Uvin, 1997, p. 106). Michael Lipton (1988) raised the category of "ultra-poor" to refer to that segment of society who are deprived from policies of economic growth and whose income is spent mostly on food. Rwandan population in that socio-economic status of "ultra-poor" was higher than 50%.

The coffee crisis severely hit the poorest and very small-scale farmers. Rwandan foreign debt increased from very low standards in the 1980s to very steep figures. As a consequence, the Rwandan government of Juvénal Habyarimana was obligated to undergo structural adjustment programs. Juvénal Habyarimana had traveled to Washington to assure his government and personal commitment to SAPs. Finally, in September 1990, an agreement was signed with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions recommended the "retrenchment" of the Rwandan state from omnipresence to very few social and economic functions: "The Bank itself proffered a structural adjustment credit of 90 million, the first tranche of which (55 million) was disbursed up to September 1993, with the balance of 35 million ultimately canceled as the reform programme broke down…" (Storey, 2001, p. 371).

The strategy of boosting coffee exports and reducing exports was based on a Rwandese franc devaluation of 40% in 1989 and 40% more in 1993 (Uvin, 1997, p. 107). Given the economic crisis and the deployment of SAPs during the 1990s, Rwanda experienced three different processes: 1) the rise of internal discontent especially among the Hutu, who were excluded from the spoils of power; 2) the invasion of the Rwandese Patriotic Front mainly composed by the Tutsi who fled to Uganda at the end of the 1950 decade; 3) the end of the cold war and the strong pressure on democratization (Uvin, 1997, p. 108).

In this sense, for Chossudovsky (1996), the "demise of state institutions" in Rwanda was caused by the policies implemented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the imposition of a structural adjustment programme in the early 1990s. The economic reforms ended up destroying the economic activity and people's livelihoods, fueled unemployment and created a situation of generalized famine and

social despair (Chossudovsky, 1996, pp. 366-367). Some people directly connected with the state agencies such as parastatal enterprises, those who ran economic development projects, and those inside the military were getting richer while the mass of the population became poorer.

> "The land available to ordinary cultivators actually diminished in some regions as local officials appropriated fields for development projects and as members of the urban elite bought out the poor, establishing themselves as absentee landlords" (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 45).

While the *Akazu* (little house in Kinyarwanda) and its small inner circle of associates were thriving economically, a profound concentration of land ownership was the most obvious manifestation of the asymmetrical process of enrichment and impoverishment. For the majority of Rwandan populations, the benefits of being ruled by a Hutu government were diluting, and a fracture between rulers and ruled was produced (Storey, 2001, p. 369).

After the shooting down of the aircraft carrying President Habyarimana in April 1994, the low-intensity warfare that had begun in 1990 resumed notwithstanding the Arusha Accords signed in August 1993. Genocide and mass killings claimed more than a million Rwandan people between April and July 1994. The Hutu extremist of Habyarimana's regime killed both Hutu moderates and Tutsi alike, including civil society members considered allies of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

> "After its military victory in early July 1994, the RPF inherited a devastated country. In human terms, the toll was horrendous: about 1.1 million dead, 2 million refugees abroad, over 1 million internally displaced, tens of thousands of deeply traumatized genocide survivors and over half a million 'old caseload' (i.e Tutsi) refugees returned in a chaotic fashion" (Reytiens, 2004, p. 178).

All Rwandan political parties were included in the government with the exception of Habyarimana's single party (the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development, NRMD) and the radical extremist Hutu

Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), both of which were banned because of their participation in the genocide. Therefore, after the genocide, a strong presidential system was also introduced through some constitutional reforms. "The amended Fundamental Law was, in effect, a subtle piece of constitutional engineering which attempted to mask the consolidation of the RPF's hold on political power" (Reytiens, 2004, p. 178). During the first days of the RPF government, a great number of Habyarimana's politicians, civil servants and military were kept inside the RPF-led bureaucracy:

> "It reiterated its commitment to a broad-based transitional government, the rule of law, the formation of a national army open to all Rwandans and dedicated to serve their interests. In that spirit, the RPF announced that it was ready to share power with the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), the Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC), the Parti Démocratique Islamique (PDI), the Parti Libéral (PL), the Parti Socialiste Démocratique (PSD), the Parti Socialiste Rwandais (PSR) and the Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais (UDPR)" (Ndahiro *et al.*, 2015, p. 74).

Nonetheless, according to Reytiens (2004, p. 180), this appearance of inclusiveness disappeared shortly. Hutu and Tutsi survivors left Rwanda claiming violations of human rights and discrimination. The wave of departures increased in the first years after 2000. Tutsi genocide survivors declared they were being treated as second class citizens by the RPF, which seemed to be more interested in a clear military victory than in protecting Tutsi survivors.

The Arusha Accords, signed in 1993, had established a ten-year transition. As part of this process, provincial elections were held on March 6th, 2001. In fact, Paul Kagame had declared since 1995 that conducting elections that allowed more political parties to participate would create bigger problems. To Kagame, multi-partyism would never lead to a united country (Misser, 1995). "The voting system itself was very indirect and of Byzantine complexity, allowing RPF placement to exercise full control over the process" (Reytiens, 2004, pp. 182-183). The main goal of the provincial elections was to develop the RPF presence in the countryside

and building the party's political base for the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003 (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 7).

Gacaca and the politics of "define and rule"

The Gacaca Courts were implemented in Rwanda in 2002. They were presented as the response to several issues concerning justice in Rwanda. Gacaca were put in place to solve the incapacity of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Local Rwandan Courts to address genocide accusations. After the genocide, one hundred and twenty thousand people, mainly Hutu, were incarcerated while Rwandan prisons could hardly accommodate forty thousand inmates[2].

The Gacaca courts were at the heart of the government efforts to fulfill national unity and reconciliation. This RPF strategy looked forward to forging a unified Rwandan identity and fostering reconciliation between survivors of the genocide and its perpetrators. "The official narrative of unity and reconciliation argues that the combination of a docile and obedient population, a legacy of authoritarian government, and colonial policies of ethnic divisionism caused the 1994 genocide" (Thompson, 2011, p. 376). For the Rwandan government, reconciliation would only occur until the national unity was restored. Therefore, reconciliation allowed the government to present an idea of a peaceful past that needed to be retaken[3].For those Rwandans who did not step into the reconciliation and national unity building processes,

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[2]   In 1994, both Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed by Hutu extremists in Rwanda. The genocide took place 4 years after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded the country from Uganda. Led by the then Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, the RPF ended up defeating the radical Hutu militias. Although the RPF obtained the power in Rwanda, the prosecution of the genocide perpetrators generated a deeply harsh situation. Prisons were spilling over with about 120,000 people accused of participating in the genocide. The pace of processing all the genocide offenders was very slow, only 7,000 people accused of taking place in the genocide had been prosecuted by the first year of the 21st century (Buckley, Zistel, 2005, pp. 114-115).

[3]   In an interview made by Susan Thompson in Rwanda in 2006, the interviewee considered reconciliation as the only way to achieve the "national unity" that had existed before the colonizers arrived (Thompson, 2011, pp. 377).

the reactions coming from the government were very clear: "imprisonment without charge, disappearance, intimidation, even death" (Thompson, 2011, p. 377). On the other hand, reconciliation was built upon the binary base of victims and killers or *génocidaires* on the basis of where they were during the genocide or based on what they were doing during the genocide.

> "For example, the policy of national unity officially substitutes génocidaire for Hutu, and is thus able to exclude from public life those Hutu who were victims or bystanders, or who will not confess to their real or imagined crimes. While the policy appears to be inclusive and conciliatory, Hutu can in fact participate only as génocidaires, not as victims of the genocide, of civil war, or of revenge attacks" (Thompson, 2011, p. 377).

Rony Brauman considers "the logic of ethnicity" is alive in the official messages relentlessly repeated by the Rwandan government. Every Hutu becomes suspect since their ethnic community is held responsible for the genocide; by the very same logic, only Tutsis qualify as victims.

Besides the above, we have to remember that the crimes committed by the RPF were not limited to Rwanda; tens of thousands of Hutu civilians were killed in Eastern Congolese land between October and November 1996. However, trying to raise these points in Rwanda had become a dangerous activity since anyone could be punished for challenging the Rwandan constitution on issues related to the trivialization and banalization of the genocide. To René Lemarchand, behind this repressive legislation looms the Paul Kagame determination to ban all references to ethnic identities. According to this rationale, there are no Hutu, Tutsi or Batwa in Rwanda but victims and victimizers. It seemed that the Kagame regime considered the genocide to be the result of ethnic divisions and, accordingly, avoiding such divisions was the best guarantee for peace even though these ethnic divisions were constantly present in legal texts or the constitution.

One thing is clear: under the present circumstances, any attempt to re-evaluate the roots of the genocide becomes extremely problematic. "Not only does it run counter to the taboo of «revisionism», denial and

trivialization"; doing so offers an opportunity for being subject to an indictment on the grounds of divisionism, discrimination or sectarianism, or all the above (Lemarchand, 2006, p. 27).

The politics of national unity and the political use of the past that Paul Kagame's regime had deployed to raise an idyllic past between Hutu, Tutsi, and Batwa had not only helped to define Hutu as a genocidal identity but to obscure any criticism towards the deepening of the 1980s crisis caused by the Structural Adjustment Programs as well. "Rwanda under Kagame is in some respects a star pupil of the Washington Consensus. The RPF-led government has been strongly committed to the private sector as the engine of development" (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011, p. 386).

Tzvetan Todorov (2000) points out that concerning too much on the past will take US to the disengagement of the present time. In this sense, throughout the preservation of the memory of the genocide victims, the RPF-Kagame government has been able to grasp at political power but has also defeated some other pasts and memories. The cult of memory in Rwanda had assured its practitioners and genocide victims some privileges inside the society. It would seem that there is hardly something pleasant in the fact of being a victim given that nobody wants to be a victim but everybody would like to have the status of a historical victim. Eventually, the victim position is more desirable than the one of a killer or culprit. It is even more advantageous to preserve the recognition as a victim *ad infinitum* given that it allows to have an "inexhaustible credit line" (Todorov, 2000, p. 54).

The defeated memories: the hutu-ricide and the risks of over-emphasizing the past

For Tzvetan Todorov (2000, p. 17) re-establishing or knowing the past exactly the way it happened is something beyond any real possibility. On the contrary, memory is always a given selection of past events, some things are to be remembered and some others forgotten. Some elements of the

historical event will be kept while some others will be marginalized and finally forgotten. If the past is impossible to know in the way it exactly happened, memory can be utilized with political objectives in the present. Therefore, if there is an exigency to recover the past, of historicizing the past, that obligation does not give us any clue about how memory will be used and/or what kind of political purposes it will end up serving.

Despite its outstanding economic indicators, Rwanda's post-genocide history can be used as an evidence that the memory cult not always delivers more justice and it is not necessarily favorable to memory itself. Maurice Halbwachs (2004) assures that there is always a number of collective memories existing simultaneously. There is nothing more historically inaccurate than viewing ethnic memories through a binary prism.

> "Among Hutu there are those who killed out of hatred and those who killed in order not to be killed, and there are those who risked their lives to save their Tutsi neighbors, and those who, though innocent, were driven into exile and managed to escape the avenging arm of the FPR" (Lemarchand, 2006, p. 29).

Consequently, somebody should alert the custodians of this or that memory for taking history and memory as a political hostage. Contrary to the arguments that considered there were three million genocide perpetrators (one half of the Rwandan population), recent studies have shown that actually no more than 8 per cent of the Hutu population certainly participated in the killings (Strauss, 2004, p. 94). Notwithstanding these figures, the official history has assigned the status of perpetrators and killers to the Hutu majority. At the same time, the Tutsi become the undisputed victim of the genocide. For Lemarchand (2006, p. 27), Paul Kagame has involved itself into a work of memory characterized by erasing ethnic identities, while defining and leaving no doubt on the identity and roles of perpetrators and victims, assigned respectively to Hutu and Tutsi. Hutus become the killer and Tutsi the ultimate victim.

This manipulative handling of memory in Rwanda denies the status of victims to those Hutus who, even though they did not kill, were massacred so as to create a climate of terror (Vidal, 2004, p. 10). The power structures in Rwanda have organized a whole process of forced memorization (*mémorisation forcée*), within which there exists an extreme symbolic violence.

> "Indeed, in every commemoration, power has instrumentalized the representation of genocide according to the conflicts of the moment and has also produced an official history that ideologically contributed to the balance of power in which the authorities were involved at the time." (Vidal, 2004, p. 10).

Pierre Nora underlines the fact that, given the actions of several groups, today we can testify that there are several groups defending memory more and more aggressively. "They impose a tyrannical memory, sometimes terrorist…" (Nora, 2005). However, this aggressive tendency or wave of defenders of memory fighting against those considered as memory or past killers, sometimes ends up in what Pierre Nora defines as a "tyrannical memory", a tyrannical use of the past in order to legitimate the governments that take or hold power after a traumatic historical episode. The work of memory (Rosoux, 2011, p. 3) that the RPF-Kagame government has developed in Rwanda has a literal profile, that is a sort of political use of memory that inhibits any action in the present time, it is the memory used to legitimate the *status quo*, it is the best example of tyrannical use of the past.

The practitioners of this sort of literal memory are also to a certain extent the defenders of assigning privileges inside the society. A dichotomic construction of the victims and killers in the genocide allowed the regime to avoid any further criticism on the neoliberal transformation that Rwanda had undergone since the late 1980s. Therefore, the use and abuse of the genocide victims' memory enabled the regime to continue reproducing the same economic model that was followed years before the genocide. The memory of the deep mourning of genocide impedes to pay attention to someone else

suffering or is even used to justify some rather unfair actions exercised against others, in other words, the memory of suffering is used to acquire power and privileges.

Counter-memories of the genocide: economic development to forget

For Tzvetan Todorov (2000), there will have to be a question about the acts that pretend to be founded on the memory of the past and there will have to be a steady criticism alerting about the uses and abuses of memory. For this author, there are two possible readings of past events: literal and paradigmatic/exemplary (Todorov, 2000, p. 30). The exemplary use of memory permitted to draw conclusions of a traumatic event and use them as an example. Therefore, the past becomes a principle of action for the present. Exemplary memory has a potential of emancipation. On the contrary, within the literal use or reading of the past, that memory of those people who are still living in the past inhibits the present action, the past is consequently used to repress the present moment as memory legitimizes the *status quo,* and the post genocide present.

In this case, there is a constant danger in using historical observation and surveillance for watching the past rather than the present (Todorov, 2000). Gacaca was presented as a mechanism that belonged to and was inspired by an idyllic African past and therefore as a useful tool for not questioning some present injustices. Gacaca became a receptacle or deposit of fantasies (Mbembe, 2016) dodging any further criticism of the Rwandan present and future.

While the post-genocide regime outlawed any reference to ethnic identification within the Rwandan society, the "work of memory" that Paul Kagame's government unfolded was based on a binary terminology of victims and génocidaires. By preserving this dichotomy, it also extended to the future the permanent privilege of the victims and the culpability of the killers.

> "To have been a victim concedes the right to protest and ask for retributions. Unless the status of a victim is shattered, everybody would be

obliged to satisfy all the petitions. It is more favorable to keep on the role of being a victim than receiving a specific restoration for the suffering. It is better to keep a permanent privilege…" (Todorov, 2000, p. 57).

On the other hand, by using Gacaca, the government raised the idea of a harmonic past between Hutu and Tutsi that eroded any further possibility of criticizing other historical factors that also contributed to the outbreak of the genocide. Meanwhile, the "work of memory" produced a status of permanent privileges of the victims and a permanent culpability of the génocidaires. If the present of the past is the memory and the present of the future is the expectation (Bedarida, 1998, p. 21), the Rwandan past was presented as fully harmonic and the present was displayed to reproduce the privilege of the victims of the genocide.

The "work of memory" and the political use of the Rwandan past contributed to regenerate, to reset an order, *habitus*, *ethos* and *telos ad hoc* to the development of the capitalist modernity. The old modernizing discourse used before the genocide was re-launched by the RPF-Kagame government. Past, present, memory and future mixed together not only to discipline individuals but also to set up the conditions leading to a social atmosphere which is normalized and productive in capitalist terms. In other words, below the "work of memory" and the political use of the "harmonic" Rwandan past, the objective of recreating capitalist modernity could be found (Escobar, 2014, p. 225).

The idea of a harmonic past has also helped to produce normalized subjects, a "docile body" (Foucault, 1997) produced by a whole regime of discipline and normalization. A *Homo Economicus* who is able to produce under determined physical and cultural conditions. Capital accumulation and the expansion of education, health and wealth that Rwanda has reached in the first two decades of the 21st century required the establishment of a disciplinary society.

If, according to Valerie Leach (2003, p. 325), modernity is an individualization process which is deeply related to the State, releasing capitalist modernity after the genocide required to reaffirm once again the mercantile individualism within the Rwandan society. Notwithstanding the argument

of the idyllic past, this individualistic logic of capitalist behavior unfolded because the "work of memory" carried out after the genocide maintained the same binary colonial boundaries between Hutu and Tutsi, those limits that recognize somebody as an entity belonging to the "not being zone" (Fanon, 1987) that seems to subsist to the reconciliation policies in Rwanda.

Post-apartheid South Africa

Rwandan genocide is not an exception of major dynamics recorded at the end of the second half of the 1990s when the African continent experienced several events with deep historical meanings: the apartheid regime in South Africa. The epilogue of South Africa's Interim Constitution of 1993 stated that in order to address the divisions and strife of the past: "there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for Ubuntu but not for victimization" (Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993, p. 139).

Desmond Tutu shared the conviction that there could be "no future without forgiveness" (Murithi, 2009, p. 224). He also suggested that Ubuntu looked forward to restoring the dignity of all the people involved and focused on forgiveness in order to restore the balance between victim and perpetrator. For Desmond Tutu (1999):

> "Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks to the very essence of being human. When you want to give high praise to someone we say, 'Yu, u nobuntu'; he or she has Ubuntu. This means that they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring, and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means that my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life…. A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes with knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are". (Tutu, 1999, pp. 34, 35)

Mechanisms such as Ubuntu pre-dated colonialism and continue to function until today. Societies that practice Ubuntu place a high value on communal life. They also try to maintain positive relations within the society.

> "According to the notion of ubuntu, each member of the community is linked to each of the disputants, be they victims or perpetrators. If everybody is willing to acknowledge this (that is, to accept the principles of *ubuntu*), then people will either feel some sense of having been wrong, or a sense of responsibility for the wrong that has been committed" (Mutithi, 2009, p. 228).

Despite the use of the Ubuntu philosophy by the post-apartheid government, several waves of violence against the Makwerekwere[4] have taken place since 1994. "The largest and best known broke out in May 2008 in a Johannesburg shantytown of Alexander. The militants were black citizens who exclusively targeted African foreign nationals…". (Matsinhe, 2011, p. 295). Two decades after the end of the apartheid, in the words of Achille Mbembe, many people in South Africa finally have brought the white supremacy down to its knees, but that does not seem to apply when it comes to condemning the extra judicial executions of fellow black Africans on the streets just because they do not have the South African nationality.

> "In South Africa's public mind, "foreign nationals" are mostly black people from the rest of Africa and, eventually, from the various African diasporas in the world. From a South African perspective, what characterizes African "foreign nationals" is their blackness and the fact that, Nigeria notwithstanding, they enjoy no protection from a powerful state….Today, many black "foreign nationals" are at the receiving end of this violence originally designed to discipline and to domesticate black South Africans…" (Mbembe, 2019).

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4   This term refers to "foreigners", or black immigrants coming from the African continent, mainly Nigerians.

For Mbembe (2019), South Africa has reached very high levels of deportation. The former policies that were used for black Africans under apartheid are now being applied to black African foreigners. Furthermore, we can realize that there are probably more variants of racism in the twenty-first century than we ever imagined. New configurations of segregation are emerging worldwide. Racism, classism and xenophobia have also proven resistant to Ubuntu and reconciliation tribunals. Memory has demonstrated to be capable of both erasing ethnic labels and at the same time perpetuating the dichotomic terms of victim and killer delaying any further possibility of deeper justice inside societies.

Some final considerations

Walter Benjamin used to say that there is always a danger that tradition becomes an instrument of the ruling classes. Whenever that happens not even the dead will be saved if the enemy wins and this enemy has not ceased to win the battles so far. Are we moving forward in the fight against racism and discrimination and therefore in the consolidation of social justice or are we simply opening spaces for social and political mobility, and the formation of small black political elites that end up reproducing the status quo in the name of memory, reconciliation and racial equality?

Ubuntu and Gacaca were not originally designed to operate under the nation-state structure. Even more, using Gacaca and Ubuntu under these apparatus inherited from colonization might end up in the subsumption of the Gacaca and Ubuntu spirits to the polarizing and exclusive logic of capitalism (Amin, 2004). By being inserted into the logic of the state, Ubuntu, memory, and Gacaca were instrumentalized in the logic of power of state politics. In both cases —Rwanda and South Africa— Gacaca and Ubuntu were instruments to grasp political power. Therefore, those elements that are not important to reach power are suppressed or considered as marginal. "This instrumentalization/hierarchy is simultaneously an impoverishment of the struggle. When the world is conceived through the prism of the power conquest, many ways of expression of our

rejection of capitalism, many ways of fighting for a different society are simply filtered or remained hidden" (Holloway, 2005, pp. 20-21).

In this sense, changing society through the conquest of power using ideas such as Ubuntu or Gacaca ends up reaching everything but what it originally intended. What begins as a struggle against dehumanization of people becomes an imposition of the logics and discourses of power. It may be time to consider those defeated pasts, those genes of anti-power that have been obscured by the fights concerned with taking power, those exercises of anti-power which are not interested in who will hold the power but in the existence/removal of power the way we have known it.

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